This book provides a discussion of the general impact of WTO membership on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and addresses the political and economic impact on cross-Strait relations of common membership.The book begins with an introduction which analyzes the state of cross-Strait economic and political relations on the eve of dual accession to the WTO and briefly introduces the chapters which follow. The first chapter discusses the concessions made by both sides in their accession agreements and is followed by two chapters which describe the manner in which the Taiwan economy was reformed to achieve compliance as well as the specific, restrictive trade regime that was put into place to manage mainland trade. The next two chapters deal with the implications of that restrictive trade regime for the Taiwan economy in Asia and with the nature of the interactions between the two sides within the WTO. The final four chapters of the volume examine the impact of membership on four sectors of the economy: finance; agriculture; electronics and automobiles. There is a post-script which briefly covers developments since the chapters were completed.

Focusing on the impact of WTO disciplines, this book explores the WTO’s contribution to domestic reform, economic integration and dispute settlement of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau: the four WTO Members in Greater China.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

With the KMT regaining power from the DPP on May 20, 2008, both Beijing and Taipei have been adjusting their policies toward each other. However, these recent changes can be seen as part of the overall ongoing process of policy adjustment in both Beijing and Taipei, in response to changing domestic and external conditions since the 1980s. This book explores the process of attitude change and policy adjustment on both sides of the Straits since the 1980s and offers policy recommendations.

This study assesses the current state of economic integration in Asia - in particular in East and South East Asia- and analyzes the prerequisites for a sustainable path of economic integration, using the background of the EU experience as a benchmark.

Adopting a critical political economy perspective this book sheds new light on the social and political struggles that shaped the political dynamics of Taiwan-China relations and cross-Strait rapprochement between 2008 and 2014. Presenting a careful analysis of primary sources and interviews, the book reconstructs the historical, political and socio-economic factors that shaped Taiwan’s path to the Sunflower Movement of 2014, reinterpreting this process as a struggle over Taiwan’s role in the global economy. It challenges received wisdoms regarding the rise and fall of the rapprochement: First, the study argues that the rapprochement was not primarily driven by political elites but by capitalist conglomerates within Taiwan, which sought a normalisation of economic relations across the Taiwan Strait. Second, it finds that Taiwan’s social movements during that period were not homogeneous but rather struggled to find a common vision that could unite the critics of the rapprochement. The insights provided not only offer a deeper understanding of Taiwan’s protest cycle between 2008 and 2014, but also serve to recontextualise the political dynamics in post-Sunflower Taiwan. As such it will appeal to students and scholars of Taiwan Studies, East Asian Politics and Social Movement Studies.

Grounded on a series of first-hand interviews with Chinese government officials, this book examines China's accession to the World Trade Organization, providing an 'inside' look at Chinese WTO accession negotiations. Presenting a systematic political economy model in analyzing Beijing's decision-making mechanisms, the book argues that China's WTO policy making is a state-led, leadership driven, and top-down process. Feng explores how China's determined political elite partly bypassed and partly restructured a largely reluctant and resistant bureaucracy, under constant pressure from an increasingly globalized international system. By addressing China's accession to the WTO from a political analysis perspective, the book provides a theoretically informed and intriguing examination of China's foreign economic policy making regime. The book highlights contemporary debates relating to state and institutionalist theory and provides new and useful insights into a significant development of this century.