In this bold, sweeping study of the development of Western economies, Douglass C. North sets forth a new view of societal change.

Pryor follows the theme of structural complexity through many different subdisciplines of economics to show how the US economy has evolved.

CD-ROM contains: World Bank data.

The trade policies addressed in this book have far-reaching effects on the world's increasingly interdependent economies, but until now little research has been devoted to them. This volume represents the first systematic effort to analyze specific U.S. trade policies, particularly nontariff measures. It provides a better understanding of how trade policies operate, how effective they are, and what their costs and benefits are to trading nations. The contributors chart the history of U.S. trade policy since World War II, analyze industry-specific trade barriers, and discuss the effects of tariff preferences and export-promoting policies such as export credits and domestic international sales corporations (DISCs). The final section of essays examines the worldwide impact of import policies, pointing out subtleties in industry-specific policies and providing insight into the levels of protection in developing countries. The contributors blend state-of-the-art economics with language that is accessible to the business community, economists, and policymakers. Commentaries accompany each paper.

This book is the first systematic treatment of the philosophy of science underlying evolutionary economics. It does not advocate an evolutionary approach towards economics, but rather assesses the epistemic value of appealing to evolutionary biology in economics more generally. The author divides work in evolutionary economics into three distinct, albeit related, forms: a structural form, an evidential form, and a heuristic form. He then analyzes five examples of work in evolutionary economics falling under these three forms. For the structural form, he examines the parallelism between natural selection and economic decision making, and the parallelism between natural selection and market competition. For the evidential form, he looks at the relationship between animal and human economic decision making, and the evolutionary explanation of diversity in human economic decision making. Finally, for the heuristic form, he focuses on the plausibility of equilibrium modeling in evolutionary ecology and economics. In this way, he shows that linking evolutionary biology and economics can make for a powerful methodological tool that can enable progress in our understanding of various economics questions. Structure, Evidence, and Heuristic will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, evolutionary biology, and economics.

This book explores new approaches to the measurement and interpretation of the linkages between economic activity flows and income flows in urban and regional economies and new ways to explore the importance of regional economic structure in development. The book combines theoretical contributions, chapters that focus on the construction and interpretation of new social accounting systems and a variety of empirical applications. These applications encompass community-level income distribution impacts, assessments of income distribution problems in Brazil, interregional impacts of unexpected events in Japan, welfare reform in the US and structural change in Chinese metropolitan economies. One of the special features of the book is the use and application of a wide variety of models - demo-economic, social accounting, interregional computable general equilibrium - employed at a variety of spatial scales.

Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.