The Democratic Coup d'État advances a simple, yet controversial, argument: democracy sometimes comes through a military coup. Covering coups that toppled dictators and installed democratic rule in countries as diverse as Guinea-Bissau, Portugal, and Colombia, the book weaves a balanced narrative that challenges everything we knew about military coups.

In this lively and provocative book, Erica De Bruin looks at the threats that rulers face from their own armed forces. Can they make their regimes impervious to coups? How to Prevent Coups d'État shows that how leaders organize their coercive institutions has a profound effect on the survival of their regimes. When rulers use presidential guards, militarized police, and militia to counterbalance the regular military, efforts to oust them from power via coups d'état are less likely to succeed. Even as counterbalancing helps to prevent successful interventions, however, the resentment that it generates within the regular military can provoke new coup attempts. And because counterbalancing changes how soldiers and police perceive the costs and benefits of a successful overthrow, it can create incentives for protracted fighting that result in the escalation of a coup into full-blown civil war. Drawing on an original dataset of state security forces in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, De Bruin sheds light on how counterbalancing affects regime survival. Understanding the dynamics of counterbalancing, she shows, can help analysts predict when coups will occur, whether they will succeed, and how violent they are likely to be. The arguments and evidence in this book suggest that while counterbalancing may prevent successful coups, it is a risky strategy to pursue—and one that may weaken regimes in the long term.

Despite the decline in the number of military coups since the 1960s and 1970s, Militaries continue to be crucial political actors in many world regions. Their impact on the democratic development of nations, however, has been mixed. On the one hand, coups against democratically elected leaders in Mali (2012), Egypt (2013), and Thailand (2014) have spelled doom for these countries’ nascent democratic regimes and have ushered in new periods of military dominance in politics. The cases of Portugal (1974), the Philippines (1986), and Tunisia (2011), on the other hand, show that the military’s decision not to defend authoritarian leaders against mass protests contributed crucially to the fall of dictatorships and facilitated transitions to democracy. This volume addresses the military’s ambivalent role as "midwife" or "gravedigger" of democracy and highlights the often multi-layered and complex relationship between militaries’ political behaviour and democratization. The chapters were originally published in a special issue of Democratization.

Bank Risk Management in Developing Economies: Addressing the Unique Challenges of Domestic Banks provides an up-to-date resource on how domestically-based banks in emerging economies can provide financial services for all economic sectors while also contributing to national economic development policies. Because these types of bank are often exposed to risky sectors, they are usually set apart from foreign subsidiaries, and thus need risk models that foreign-based banks do not address. This book is the first to identify these needs, proposing solutions through the use of case studies and analyses that illustrate how developing economic banking crises are often rooted in managing composite risks. The book represents a departure from classical literature that focuses on assets, liabilities, and balance sheet management, by which developing economy banks, like their counterparts elsewhere, have not fared well. - Contains fifty cases that reinforce risk management best practices - Provides a consistent chapter format that includes abstract, keywords, learning focus, and outcomes - Summaries, questions, and glossaries conclude each chapter

This book provides the first comprehensive overview of the history of democracy in Africa and explains why the continent's democratic experiments have so often failed, as well as how they could succeed. Nic Cheeseman grapples with some of the most important questions facing Africa and democracy today, including whether international actors should try and promote democracy abroad, how to design political systems that manage ethnic diversity, and why democratic governments often make bad policy decisions. Beginning in the colonial period with the introduction of multi-party elections and ending in 2013 with the collapse of democracy in Mali and South Sudan, the book describes the rise of authoritarian states in the 1970s; the attempts of trade unions and some religious groups to check the abuse of power in the 1980s; the remarkable return of multiparty politics in the 1990s; and finally, the tragic tendency for elections to exacerbate corruption and violence.

Africa's former colonial masters, including Great Britain; France, Portugal and Spain, trained members and leaders of the various colonial Armed Forces to be politically non-partisan. Yet, the modern-day Armed Forces on the continent, made up of the Army, Police, Air Force and Navy, have become so politicized that many countries in Africa are today ruled or have already been ruled by military dictators through coups d'etat, occasionally for good reasons as the book points out. This book traces the historical-cum-political evolution of these events, and what bodes for Africa, where the unending military incursions into partisan politics are concerned.