This book is a condensation of a large body of work concerning human learning carried out over a period of more than five years by Dr. Sun and his collaborators. In a nutshell, this work is concerned with a broad framework for studying human cognition based on a new approach that is characterized by its focus on the dichotomy of, and the interaction between, explicit and implicit cognition and a computational model that implements this framework. In this work, a broad, generic computational model was developed that instantiates Dr. Sun's framework and enables the testing of his theoretical approach in a variety of ways. With this model, simulation results were matched with data of human cognition in a variety of different domains. Formal (mathematical and computational) analyses were also carried out to further explore the model and its numerous implementational details. Furthermore, this book addresses some of the most significant theoretical issues, such as symbol grounding, intentionality, social cognition, consciousness, and other theoretical issues in relation to the framework. The general framework and the model developed generate interesting insights into these theoretical issues.

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Could a single human being ever have multiple conscious minds? Some human beings do. The corpus callosum is a large pathway connecting the two hemispheres of the brain. In the second half of the twentieth century a number of people had this pathway cut through as a treatment for epilepsy. They became colloquially known as split-brain subjects. After the two hemispheres of the brain are cortically separated in this way, they begin to operate unusually independently of each other in the realm of thought, action, and conscious experience, almost as if each hemisphere now had a mind of its own. Philosophical discussion of the split-brain cases has overwhelmingly focused on questions of psychological identity in split-brain subjects, questions like: how many subjects of experience is a split-brain subject? How many intentional agents? How many persons? On the one hand, under experimental conditions, split-brain subjects often act in ways difficult to understand except in terms of each of them having two distinct streams or centers of consciousness. Split-brain subjects thus evoke the duality intuition: that a single split-brain human being is somehow composed of two thinking, experiencing, and acting things. On the other hand, a split-brain subject nonetheless seems like one of us, at the end of the day, rather than like two people sharing one body. In other words, split-brain subjects also evoke the unity intuition: that a split-brain subject is one person. Elizabeth Schechter argues that there are in fact two minds, subjects of experience, and intentional agents inside each split-brain human being: right and left. On the other hand, each split-brain subject is nonetheless one of us. The key to reconciling these two claims is to understand the ways in which each of us is transformed by self-consciousness.

Thaler contributes to the literature on national identity in border areas, and fills a gap in English-language history of the particular region. For many centuries, he explains, the duchy of Sleswig between the North and Baltic Seas formed a link and buffer between southern Denmark and northern Germany. It is now partitioned between the two states, and about the only people who even use the name are local people of one nationality who ended up in the other country. It is there that he analyzes the composition and changeable nature of identity, and explores what has motivated local inhabitants to define themselves as Germans or Danes. Self-identification is important, he points out, because there is little else to distinguish the two groups. Among the dimensions he explores are politics, history and culture, changing times, and biographies during the age of nationalism.

From Dualism to Oneness in Psychoanalysis: A Zen Perspective on the Mind-Body Question focuses on the shift in psychoanalytic thought, from a view of mind-body dualism to a contemporary non-dualistic perspective. Exploring this paradigm shift, Yorai Sella examines the impact of the work of psychoanalysts and researchers, such as Winnicott, Bion, Daniel Stern and Kohut, and delineates the contributions of three major schools of psychoanalytic thought in which the non-dualistic view is exemplified: (1) intersubjective; (2) neuro-psychoanalytic; and (3) mystically inclined psychoanalysis. Reaching beyond the constraints of dualism, Sella delineates the interdisciplinary approaches leading to psychoanalysis's paradigm shift. Focusing on the unique contribution of Zen-Buddhism, the book draws on Ehei Dōgen's philosophy to substantiate the non-duality of subject and object, body and mind - ultimately leading from alienation and duality to what Bion has termed "at one-ment". The way in which psychoanalytic theory and practice may develop further along these lines is demonstrated throughout the book in a variety of clinical vignettes. This book will inform the practice of all psychoanalysts, mental health professionals, psychotherapists and clinicians interested in mind-body issues in psychotherapy, in the philosophy of psychoanalysis, and in East-West dialogue.

This book explores the idea that we have two minds - one that is automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to dual processs theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics which evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms. Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual-processes to summarize the state of the art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work. It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches.