The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds.

This paper estimates the causal effect of fiscal rules on fiscal balances in a panel of 142 countries over the period 1985-2015. Our instrumental variable strategy exploits the geographical diffusion of fiscal rules across countries. The intuition is that reforms in neighboring countries may affect the adoption of domestic reforms through peer pressure and imitational effects. We find that fiscal rules correlate with lower deficits, but the positive link disappears when endogeneity is correctly addressed. However, when considering an index of fiscal rules’ design, we show that well-designed rules have a statistically significant impact on fiscal balances. We conduct several robustness tests and show that our results are not affected by weak instrument problems.

Do deficits matter? Yes and no, says Daniel Shaviro in this political and economic study. Yes, because fiscal policy affects generational distribution, national saving, and the level of government spending. And no, because the deficit is an inaccurate measure with little economic content. This book provides an invaluable guide for anyone wanting to know exactly what is at stake for Americans in this ongoing debate. "[An] excellent, comprehensive, and illuminating book. Its analysis, deftly integrating considerations of economics, law, politics, and philosophy, brings the issues of 'balanced budgets,' national saving, and intergenerational equity out of the area of religious crusades and into an arena of reason. . . . A magnificent, judicious, and balanced treatment. It should be read and studied not just by specialists in fiscal policy but by all those in the economic and political community."—Robert Eisner, Journal of Economic Literature "Shaviro's history, economics, and political analysis are right on the mark. For all readers."—Library Journal

This paper estimates the causal effect of fiscal rules on political budget cycles in a sample of 67 developing countries over the period 1985–2007. We exploit the geographical pattern in the adoption of fiscal rules to isolate an exogenous source of variation in the adoption of national fiscal rules. Based on a diffusion argument, we use the number of other countries in a given subregion that have fiscal rules in place to predict the probability of having them at the country level. We find that in election years with fiscal rules in place, public consumption is reduced by 1.6 percentage point of GDP as compared to election years without these rules. This impact is equivalent to a reduction by a third of the volatility of public consumption in our sample. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these rules depends on their type, their institutional design, whether they have been in place for a long time and finally on the degree of competitiveness of elections.

Two main themes of the book are that (1) politics can distort optimal fiscal policy through elections and through political fragmentation, and (2) rules and institutions can attenuate the negative effects of this dynamic. The book has three parts: part 1 (9 chapters) outlines the problems; part 2 (6 chapters) outlines how institutions and fiscal rules can offer solutions; and part 3 (4 chapters) discusses how multilevel governance frameworks can help.

This book examines legal limitations on government deficit and debt and its impact on the ability of nations to provide services to their residents. It studies constitutional and statutory limitations, as well as those imposed by international treaties and other instruments, including those of both the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The book contains a general report examining the fiscal rules that govern the budgets and expenditures of nation states. The general report is followed by a special report which covers the limits imposed by the European Union and by the smaller group of countries constituting the Eurozone. Ten national reports, describing the limits in their respective countries, form the basis of the general report. These countries include eight members of the European Union (five of which use the Euro and three of which do not), one other European state and one non-European state. The reports include two countries in which constitutional “debt brakes” limit national deficit and debt.

This volume contributes to empirical research on the role of national fiscal rules and institutions in shaping fiscal policies. It provides original, policy-oriented analysis on a number of questions and gives illuminating conclusions about the devices which promote sound and sustainable policy. Contributors are leading experts.