The separation of powers doctrine is undoubtedly one of the key principles of contemporary constitutionalism. Despite this, it has not been framed into a single, homogeneous, and thus universal form. The abundance of approaches and nuances found in legal and political doctrine makes it an extremely labile and meandering concept, which can take on a variety of shapes. Its legislative articulation is by no means uniform, and thus reproducible, either. The separation of powers in constitutional law is therefore expressed in a broad array of formulas, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly. In addition, it can take on a classic, almost model form, or it can be shaped in a significantly altered manner compared to what we used to call its model […] …the dispersion of ideas about what the separation of powers is, where it originates or how to best frame and apply it in legislation and practice does not deprive the separation of powers of the nature of a timeless general notion that underlies the very concept of the division of power. After all, the impulse to formulate the assumptions for the separation of powers was in each case triggered by the desire to eliminate the vesting of unlimited or excessive power in an individual or a narrow, oligarchised group. Therefore, its essence and also the main advantage is, first of all, protection against the despotism of power, which translates into the specific benefit of consolidation of institutional guarantees of civil rights and liberties through the attribution of individual power functions to different branches of government, and then their clear separation”. MARCIN ROMANOWSKI, Separation of Powers: Meanders of Doctrine and Legislation

The establishment of electoral systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan presents both a complex set of empirical puzzles and a theoretical challenge. Why did three states with similar cultural, historical, and structural legacies establish such different electoral systems? How did these distinct outcomes result from strikingly similar institutional design processes? Explaining these puzzles requires understanding not only the outcome of institutional design but also the intricacies of the process that led to this outcome. Moreover, the transitional context in which these three states designed new electoral rules necessitates an approach that explicitly links process and outcome in a dynamic setting. This book provides such an approach. Finally, it both builds on the key insights of the dominant approaches to explaining institutional origin and change and transcends these approaches by moving beyond the structure versus agency debate.

In the second edition of his essential book—which incorporates vital new information and new material on immigration, race, gender, and the social crisis following 2008—Michael Zweig warns that by allowing the working class to disappear into categories of "middle class" or "consumers," we also allow those with the dominant power, capitalists, to vanish among the rich. Economic relations then appear as comparisons of income or lifestyle rather than as what they truly are—contests of power, at work and in the larger society.

The author is convinced that there is a ruling class in America today. He examines the American power structure as it has developed in the 1980s. He presents systematic, empirical evidence that a fixed group of privileged people dominates the American economy and government. The book demonstrates that an upper class comprising only one-half of one percent of the population occupies key positions within the corporate community. It shows how leaders within this "power elite" reach government and dominate it through processes of special-interest lobbying, policy planning and candidate selection. It is written not to promote any political ideology, but to analyze our society with accuracy.

To understand how politics, the economy, and public policy function in the world’s largest democracy, an appreciation of federalism is essential. Bringing to surface the complex dimensions that affect relations between India’s central government and states, this short introduction is the one-stop account to federalism in India. Paying attention to the constitutional, political, and economic factors that shape Centre–state relations, this book stimulates understanding of some of the big dilemmas facing India today. The ability of India’s central government to set the economic agenda or secure implementation of national policies throughout the country depends on the institutions and practices of federalism. Similarly, the ability of India’s states to contribute to national policy making or to define their own policy agendas that speak to local priorities all hinge on questions of federalism. Organised in four chapters, this book introduces readers to one of the key living features of Indian democracy.

This book develops the idea that since decolonisation, regional patterns of security have become more prominent in international politics. The authors combine an operational theory of regional security with an empirical application across the whole of the international system. Individual chapters cover Africa, the Balkans, CIS Europe, East Asia, EU Europe, the Middle East, North America, South America, and South Asia. The main focus is on the post-Cold War period, but the history of each regional security complex is traced back to its beginnings. By relating the regional dynamics of security to current debates about the global power structure, the authors unfold a distinctive interpretation of post-Cold War international security, avoiding both the extreme oversimplifications of the unipolar view, and the extreme deterritorialisations of many globalist visions of a new world disorder. Their framework brings out the radical diversity of security dynamics in different parts of the world.