Today, war is considered a last resort for resolving disagreements. But a day of staged slaughter on the battlefield was once seen as a legitimate means of settling political disputes. James Whitman argues that pitched battle was essentially a trial with a lawful verdict. And when this contained form of battle ceased to exist, the law of victory gave way to the rule of unbridled force. The Verdict of Battle explains why the ritualized violence of the past was more effective than modern warfare in bringing carnage to an end, and why humanitarian laws that cling to a notion of war as evil have led to longer, more barbaric conflicts. Belief that sovereigns could, by rights, wage war for profit made the eighteenth century battle’s golden age. A pitched battle was understood as a kind of legal proceeding in which both sides agreed to be bound by the result. To the victor went the spoils, including the fate of kingdoms. But with the nineteenth-century decline of monarchical legitimacy and the rise of republican sentiment, the public no longer accepted the verdict of pitched battles. Ideology rather than politics became war’s just cause. And because modern humanitarian law provided no means for declaring a victor or dispensing spoils at the end of battle, the violence of war dragged on. The most dangerous wars, Whitman asserts in this iconoclastic tour de force, are the lawless wars we wage today to remake the world in the name of higher moral imperatives.

An account of the naval campaign of Santiago de Cuba during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the subsequent public controversy and Court of Inquiry.

The end of the Cold War was a "big bang" reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the world wars in 1919 and 1945. But what do states that win wars do with their newfound power, and how do they use it to build order? In After Victory, John Ikenberry examines postwar settlements in modern history, arguing that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power. He explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions—both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power—has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit "constitutional" characteristics. Blending comparative politics with international relations, and history with theory, After Victory will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today.

While the United States and its allies put their military focus on the post-9/11 challenges of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Russia and China put their military focus onto the United States and the risks of regional wars that they came to believe they might have to fight against the United States. Their first priority was to put their intellectual houses in order-that is, to adapt military thought and strategic planning to the new problem. The result is a set of ideas about how to bring the United States and its allies to a "culminating point" where they choose to no longer run the costs and risks of continued war. This is the "red theory of victory." Beginning in the second presidential term of Obama administration, the U.S. military focus began to shift, driven by rising Russian and Chinese military assertiveness and outspoken opposition to the regional security orders on their peripheries. But U.S. military thought has been slow to catch up. As a recent bipartisan congressional commission concluded, the U.S. intellectual house is dangerously out of order for this new strategic problem. There is no Blue theory of victory. Such a theory should explain how the United States and its allies can strip away the confidence of leaders in Moscow and Beijing (and Pyongyang) in their "escalation calculus"-that is, that they will judge the costs too high, the benefits to low, and the risks incalculable. To develop, improve, and implement the needed new concepts requires a broad campaign of activities by the United States and full partnership with its allies.

Ernest R. May's Strange Victory presents a dramatic narrative-and reinterpretation-of Germany's six-week campaign that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in spring 1940. Before the Nazis killed him for his work in the French Resistance, the great historian Marc Bloch wrote a famous short book, Strange Defeat, about the treatment of his nation at the hands of an enemy the French had believed they could easily dispose of. In Strange Victory, the distinguished American historian Ernest R. May asks the opposite question: How was it that Hitler and his generals managed this swift conquest, considering that France and its allies were superior in every measurable dimension and considering the Germans' own skepticism about their chances? Strange Victory is a riveting narrative of those six crucial weeks in the spring of 1940, weaving together the decisions made by the high commands with the welter of confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field. Why did Hitler want to turn against France at just this moment, and why were his poor judgment and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? It is May's contention that in the future, nations might suffer strange defeats of their own if they do not learn from their predecessors' mistakes in judgment.

Im Kontext der kulturwissenschaftlichen Gedächtnisforschung widmet sich diese interdisziplinär ausgerichtete Reihe dem Verhältnis von Medien und kultureller Erinnerung. Die hier vorgestellten Studien behandeln die ganze Bandbreite der durch Medien konstruierten, tradierten und verbreiteten Erinnerung. Schrift und Bild, das Kino und die ‘neuen’ digitalen Medien, Intermedialität, Transmedialität und Remediation sowie die sozialen, zunehmend transnationalen und transkulturellen, Kontexte der mediatisierten Erinnerung gehören zu den Forschungsinteressen der Reihe. Ziel ist es, eine internationale Plattform für die interdisziplinäre Medien- und Gedächtnisforschung zu schaffen. Eingereichte Manuskripte werden im peer review Verfahren durch externe Experten begutachtet. Den Herausgebern, Astrid Erll (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main) und Ansgar Nünning (Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen) ist ein internationaler Beirat aus renommierten Wissenschaftlern assoziiert: Aleida Assmann (Universität Konstanz) Mieke Bal (University of Amsterdam) Vita Fortunati (University of Bologna) Richard Grusin (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) Udo Hebel (Universität Regensburg) Andrew Hoskins (University of Glasgow) Wulf Kansteiner (Binghamton University) Alison Landsberg (George Mason University) Claus Leggewie (Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen) Jeffrey Olick (University of Virginia) Susannah Radstone (University of South Australia) Ann Rigney (Utrecht University) Michael Rothberg (University of Illinois) Werner Sollors (Harvard University) Frederic Tygstrup (University of Copenhagen) Harald Welzer (Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen)

On 11 April 2016, Timor-Leste initiated a compulsory non-binding conciliation proceeding against Australia under Annex V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on its maritime boundary dispute with Australia in the Timor Sea. On 6 March 2018, the parties signed a settlement treaty on the basis of the proposal of the Conciliation Commission. Two months later, the Conciliation Commission issued its report, marking the conclusion of the first ever conciliation proceeding under Annex V of UNCLOS.This book provides detailed analyses of the proceedings and a step-by-step account of the conciliation process, as well as its wider implications for dispute settlement under UNCLOS and beyond. The various chapters explore a wide range of issues, including an overview of conciliation as a means of dispute settlement and the conciliation procedure in UNCLOS, as well as the origins and historical background of the maritime boundary dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia. The book also provides a comprehensive examination of each step of the conciliation proceedings, including the role of the Conciliation Commission, the Conciliation Commission's Decision on Competence, the issue of joint development, and the Maritime Boundaries Treaty, which Timor-Leste and Australia concluded as the legal outcome of the conciliation proceedings. Critically, the book offers insightful perspectives from Australia and Timor-Leste on the conciliation process. The book is an important contribution to the research and analysis of the Timor Sea conciliation. As one of the first books on the case, it will raise awareness and bring more familiarity with conciliation as a viable and effective dispute settlement process, thereby encouraging states to consider conciliation as a means to settle their disputes.