What is Price Discrimination Price discrimination is a microeconomic pricing strategy where identical or largely similar goods or services are sold at different prices by the same provider in different market segments. Price discrimination is distinguished from product differentiation by the more substantial difference in production cost for the differently priced products involved in the latter strategy. Price differentiation essentially relies on the variation in the customers' willingness to pay and in the elasticity of their demand. For price discrimination to succeed, a firm must have market power, such as a dominant market share, product uniqueness, sole pricing power, etc. All prices under price discrimination are higher than the equilibrium price in a perfectly competitive market. However, some prices under price discrimination may be lower than the price charged by a single-price monopolist. Price discrimination is utilized by the monopolist to recapture some deadweight loss. This Pricing strategy enables firms to capture additional consumer surplus and maximize their profits while benefiting some consumers at lower prices. Price discrimination can take many forms and is prevalent in many industries, from education and telecommunications to healthcare. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Price discrimination Chapter 2: Monopoly Chapter 3: Monopolistic competition Chapter 4: Oligopoly Chapter 5: Perfect competition Chapter 6: Imperfect competition Chapter 7: Deadweight loss Chapter 8: Two-part tariff Chapter 9: Pricing Chapter 10: Barriers to entry Chapter 11: Yield management Chapter 12: Market power Chapter 13: Non-price competition Chapter 14: Market structure Chapter 15: Pricing strategies Chapter 16: Dynamic pricing Chapter 17: Revenue management Chapter 18: Value-based pricing Chapter 19: Rental value Chapter 20: Profit (economics) Chapter 21: Monopoly price (II) Answering the public top questions about price discrimination. (III) Real world examples for the usage of price discrimination in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Price Discrimination.

There are few industries in modern market economies that do not manufacture differentiated products. This book provides a systematic explanation and analysis of the widespread prevalence of this important category of products. The authors concentrate on models in which product selection is endogenous. In the first four chapters they consider models that try to predict the level of product differentiation that would emerge in situations of market equilibrium. These market equilibria with differentiated products are characterised and then compared with social welfare optima. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between horizontal and vertical differentiation as well as to the related issues of product quality and durability. This book brings together the most important theoretical contributions to these topics in a succinct and coherent manner. One of its major strengths is the way in which it carefully sets out the basic intuition behind the formal results. It will be useful to advanced undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in industrial economics and microeconomic theory.

A theoretical and unified explanation of how prices are determined in practice, written in a non-technical way.

This volume brings together significant articles which have appeared between 1971 and 1997, analyzing the application and effects of price discrimination.

​This book provides an updated overview of the recent progress in the theoretical study of third-degree price discrimination. It is a marketing tactic and is said to be present if the unit price is different across different groups of buyers. Its welfare evaluation is often difficult because it entails two countervailing effects: on one hand, it exploits surplus from consumers who have high willingness-to-pay, but on the other hand, it generates gains from trade from consumers who otherwise would not purchase the good. Recognizing this difficulty, we provide new insights on evaluation of third-degree price discrimination in consideration of network effects and vertical product differentiation. Our analysis is particularly useful for the industries related to information and communication technologies (ICT) because these two elements characterize them. Furthermore, we also study the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under imperfect competition other than monopoly. At first, it seems that it may complicate the analysis under monopoly. However, we argue that the main thrusts of analysis under monopoly carry over to the case of oligopoly. We also take into account behavioral aspects and their implications for studying third-degree price discrimination. Overall, this book is designed to provide implications for contemporary management and policy issues by advancing theoretical issues in industrial organization.

Large sunk costs of development, negligible costs of reproduction and distribution and substantial economies of scale make information goods distinct from physical goods. Consequently,how to take advantage of the specific characteristics of information goods is an important managerial problem. Price discrimination and product differentiation are common ways this issue has been addressed. In previous literature, vertical differentiation and related pricing strategies have been researched in contexts such as nonlinear utility functions,network externalities, competition and anti-piracy. Little attention has been paid to the relationship between market segmentation and product differentiation. In this paper, we emphasize the interaction of market segmentation and product differentiation as we believe that any product differentiation must be based on existing market segmentation. In our model, we treat vertical differentiation as a special case of horizontal differentiation, and we model the interaction between different market segments showing the differences in product differentiation strategies when moving from horizontal to vertical differentiation. We find that it is always sub-optimal to differentiate information goods if the market is not fully differentiated or if characteristics of the information goods are not specifically designed for certain market segments. We divide characteristics of information goods into four categories according to the ease of differentiation and design guidelines for firms to differentiate their goods based on these characteristics. We further provide guidance on whether to merge one or several versions when costs for versioning information goods are significant.