We contribute to the literature on Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in three ways. First, we provide evidence on whether FD has achieved its intended effect of leveling the information playing field by examining whether differences across investors' information quality prior to earnings announcements have declined after the pronouncement of the regulation. We find strong evidence of a decline in earnings announcement period trading volume attributable to differential prior precision after FD consistent with a more level playing field. Second, we re-examine whether FD has resulted in firms reducing or chilling their information flows (disclosures) to investors. Contrary to prior work, we find that there is evidence of an overall reduction or chill in information flows after FD relative to a quot;cleanerquot; pre-FD period than the pre-FD period used in other studies. Third, we document that while the leveling effect of FD is relatively wide-spread, the chill effect is driven by (i) relatively smaller, high technology firms and (ii) relatively larger firms with high book-to-market ratios. We interpret the latter result as evidence that firms with relatively high costs of public disclosure chose to eliminate the disclosure altogether rather than broadening access to the disclosure.

We document that Regulation Fair Disclosure has reduced differences in information quality between investors prior to quarterly earnings announcements consistent with the intent of the regulation. This reduction is driven by small firms and high technology firms, rather than the large firms targeted by the SEC, which suggests that selective disclosure among large firms may have been much more limited than what was presumed by proponents of FD. In addition, we document that FD has decreased the average information quality of investors in small and high technology firms in the period prior to an earnings announcement while having no lasting effect on other firms. Taken together these two results suggest that, for small and high technology firms, FD succeeded in eliminating selective disclosure but also lowered the average quality of information available about these firms.

With the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), market behavior around earnings releases displays no significant change in return volatility (after controlling for decimalization of stock trading) but significant increases in trading volume due to difference in opinion. Analyst forecast dispersion increases, and increases in other measures of disagreement and difference of opinion suggest greater difficulty in forming forecasts beyond the current quarter. Corporations increase the quantity of voluntary disclosures, but only for current quarter earnings. Thus, Reg FD seems to increase the quantity of information available to the public while demanding more effort and struggle from investment professionals.

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