The chapters collected in this volume represent the "state-of-the-art" of research on the development of intentional action and intentional understanding--topics that are at the intersection of current research on imitation, early understanding of mental states, goal-directed behavior in nonhuman animals, executive function, language acquisition, and narrative understanding, to name just a few of the relevant foci. Collectively, the contributors demonstrate that intentionality is a key issue in the cognitive and social sciences. Moreover, in a way that was anticipated more than a century ago by the seminal work of J. Mark Baldwin, they are beginning to reveal how the control of action is related in development to children's emerging self-conscious and their increasingly sophisticated appreciation of other people's perspectives. This volume brings together the world's leading researchers on early social and cognitive development in an in-depth exploration of children's understanding of themselves and others.

A collection of empirical reports and conceptual analyses written by leading researchers in an exciting new area of the cognitive sciences. The book examines a fundamental change that occurs in children's cognition between the ages of two and six.

Intention is one of the masterworks of twentieth-century philosophy in English. First published in 1957, it has acquired the status of a modern philosophical classic. The book attempts to show in detail that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned. This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.

"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.

In the late 1980s, a vigorous debate began about how we may best justify, in constitutional terms, the English courts’ jurisdiction to judicially review the exercise of public power derived from an Act of Parliament. Two rival theories emerged in this debate, the ultra vires theory and the common law theory. The debate between the supporters of these two theories has never satisfactorily been resolved and has been criticised as being futile. Yet, the debate raises some fundamental questions about the constitution of the United Kingdom, particularly: the relationship between Parliament and the courts; the nature of parliamentary supremacy in the contemporary constitution; and the possibility and validity of relying on legislative intent. This book critically analyses the ultra vires and common law theories and argues that neither offers a convincing explanation for the courts’ judicial review jurisdiction. Instead, the author puts forward the theory that parliamentary supremacy – and, in turn, the relationship between Parliament and the courts – is not absolute and does not operate in a hard and fast way but, rather, functions in a more flexible way and that the courts will balance particular Acts of Parliament against competing statutes or principles. McGarry argues that this new conception of parliamentary supremacy leads to an alternative theory of judicial review which significantly differs from both the ultra vires and common law theories. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of UK public law.

This book is a result of a study group that met to discuss the child's theory of mind. A topic whose effects span cognitive, language, and social development, it may bring a unifying influence to developmental psychology. New studies in this area acknowledge children's conceptions of intention and belief, as well as intention and belief themselves, and consider the explanations they provide for children's developing abilities. The contributors to this important volume examine several aspects of the child's theory of mind, and present significant research findings on the theory itself and how it changes and develops for each child. Discussions of the utility of a theory of mind to the child, and to developmental psychologists trying to understand children, are provided. Finally, new explanations are offered for how children acquire a theory of mind in the first place.

This landmark text integrates diverse perspectives on how humans understand others’ minds (or ‘theory of mind’) beyond early childhood into middle childhood and adolescence. It explores how the neural, cognitive, and social changes of middle childhood and adolescence shape the ongoing development of theory of mind, and how theory of mind helps children navigate their lives. Drawing on cutting-edge research from leading international experts, this book provides a survey and analysis of the current state and future direction of the field. It is organized around three themes relating to the key issues in contemporary research. The first part focuses on the biological and cognitive bases of theory of mind in middle childhood and adolescence. The second part goes on to explore the social predictors and consequences, considering how theory of mind is shaped by social experiences and, in turn, impacts children’s social lives in middle childhood and adolescence. Finally, the third part focuses on theory of mind in the context of neurodiversity, disability, and youth mental health in middle childhood and adolescence. Offering in-depth understanding for all students and scholars of developmental and cognitive psychology, neuroscience, clinical psychology and psychiatry, and education, this valuable text also identifies an agenda for future scholarship on this exciting topic.