May 2000 - An alternative to traditional subsidies for water and sanitation services is direct subsidies - funds governments provide to cover part of the water bill for households that meet certain criteria. Issues associated with such a subsidy are analyzed through a case study of Panama. As an alternative to traditional subsidy schemes in utility sectors, direct subsidy programs have several advantages: they are transparent, they are explicit, and they minimize distortions of the behavior of both the utility and the customers. At the same time, defining practical eligibility criteria for direct subsidy schemes is difficult and identifying eligible households may entail substantial administrative costs. Foster, Gomez-Lobo, and Halpern, using a case study from Panama, discuss some of the issues associated with the design of direct subsidy systems for water services. They conclude that: · There is a need to assess - rather than assume - the need for a subsidy. A key test of affordability, and thus of the need for a subsidy, is to compare the cost of the service with some measure of household willingness to pay. · The initial assessment must consider the affordability of connection costs as well as the affordability of the service itself. Connection costs may be prohibitive for poor households with no credit, suggesting a need to focus subsidies on providing access rather than ongoing water consumption. · A key issue in designing a direct subsidy scheme is its targeting properties. Poverty is a complex phenomenon and difficult to measure. Eligibility must therefore be based on easily measurable proxy variables, and good proxies are hard to find. In choosing eligibility criteria for a subsidy, it is essential to verify what proportion of the target group fails to meet the criteria (errors of exclusion) and what proportion of nontarget groups is inadvertently eligible for the benefits (errors of inclusion). · Administrative costs are roughly the same no matter what the level of individual subsidies, so a scheme that pays beneficiaries very little will tend not to be cost-effective. It is important to determine what proportion of total program costs will be absorbed by administrative expenses. · Subsidies should not cover the full cost of the service and should be contingent on beneficiaries paying their share of the bill. Subsidies for consumption above a minimum subsistence level should be avoided. Subsidies should be provided long enough before eligibility is reassessed to avoid poverty trap problems. · The utility or concessionaire can be helpful in identifying eligible candidates because of its superior information on the payment histories of customers. It will also have an incentive to do so, since it has an interest in improving poor payment records. Thought should therefore be given at the design stage to the role of the service provider in the implementation of the subsidy scheme. · The administrative agency's responsibilities, the sources of funding, and the general principles guiding the subsidy system should have a clear legal basis, backed by regulations governing administrative procedures. · To reduce administrative costs and avoid duplication of effort, it would be desirable for a single set of institutional arrangements to be used to determine eligibility for all welfare and subsidy programs in a given jurisdiction, whether subnational or national. This paper - a product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services and to enhance access of the poor to these basic services. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

An alternative to traditional subsidies for water and sanitation services is direct subsidies - funds governments provide to cover part of the water bill for households that meet certain criteria. Issues associated with such a subsidy are analyzed through a case study of Panama.

A higher share of income for the middle class and lower ethnic polarization are empirically associated with higher income, higher growth, more education, better health, better infrastructure, better economic policies, less political instability, less civil war (putting ethnic minorities at risk), more social "modernization," and more democracy.

"Briceno, Estache, and Shafik review the evidence on the state of infrastructure in the developing world, emphasizing the investment needs and the emerging policy issues. While their assessment is seriously constrained by data gaps, they provide useful insights on the main challenges ahead, emphasizing that, in addition to the widely discussed access problems, the poorest also face major affordability and service quality issues which were not well addressed by the reforms of the 1990s. The authors make a case for a stronger commitment of the international community to generate the information needed to assess and monitor infrastructure needs and policies. This paper--a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network--is part of a larger effort in the network to upgrade economic and policy work in infrastructure"--World Bank web site.

This publication is a practitioner's guide for analyzing the distributional impact of reforms to trade, monetary and exchange rate policy, utility provision, agricultural markets, land policy and education. These six areas of policy reform are the ones most likely to have an impact on distribution and poverty. Such analysis helps in policy formulation and development and for implementing poverty reduction strategies in developing countries. Each chapter in this volume provides an overview and guidance on the specific issues arising in the analysis of the distributional impacts of policy and institutional reforms in selected sectors.

During the last two decades many governments have allowed private companies to offer infrastructure services which were previously provided only by state-owned businesses. In some cases they have privatized state-owned business and in others, they have permitted private firms to invest in and operate those businesses under lease contracts or long-term concessions. In still other instances, private firms have been allowed to compete alongside former government monopolists. 'Infrastructure for Poor People' examines the data on infrastructure and the poor in developing countries, and discusses how policies, centered on private provision, can address their needs. It focuses on the design of government policy for the provision of infrastructure services by private firms, highlighting the rules determining which firms can sell infrastructure services, the prices they can charge, the quality of service they must offer, and any subsidies provided by the government.