The collapse of central planning was hailed as evidence of the economic and moral superiority of capitalism over any possible alternative. The essays in this book challenge that claim. The case for more democratic forms of enterprise management is considered from a variety of viewpoints. One chapter deals with the philosophical justification for enterprise democracy. The remaining chapters are devoted to the question of efficiency, which has been central to economic debates about ownership and control. The orthodox belief amongst economists is that any shift to more democratic forms of enterprise control would be unworkable. The essays in this book provide a thorough theoretical and empirical critique of this orthodoxy.

This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable, and, if so, what strategic changes might be required to regulate the market- based interaction of economic agents. The contributors bring contemporary microeconomic theory to bear in an attempt to find a progressive replacement to traditional state socialism. Various approaches to the study of economic interaction are considered in an attempt to understand the relationship between power and efficiency in market economies.

In Economic Justice and Democracy, Robin Hahnel puts aside most economic theories from the left and the right (from central planning to unbridled corporate enterprise) as undemocratic, and instead outlines a plan for restructuring the relationship between markets and governments according to effects, rather than contributions. This idea is simple, provocative, and turns most arguments on their heads: those most affected by a decision get to make it. It's uncomplicated, unquestionably American in its freedom-reinforcement, and essentially what anti-globalization protestors are asking for. Companies would be more accountable to their consumers, polluters to nearby homeowners, would-be factory closers to factory town inhabitants. Sometimes what's good for General Motors is bad for America, which is why we have regulations in the first place. Though participatory economics, as Robert Heilbronner termed has been discussed more outside America than in it, Hahnel has followed discussions elsewhere and also presents many of the arguments for and against this system and ways to put it in place.

Uses both political and democratic studies perspectives as well as economic, philosophical and managerial to provide a practical insight into the issues like the extensive economic power of large enterprises and changing balance of power between public and private sector, regulation and the governance of large private entities.

Conventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. But logically extending this wisdom implies that associated principals – voters, consumers, shareholders – will favor themselves over the greater good when ‘rules of the game’ instead create too much accountability. Democratic Governance and Economic Performance rigorously develops this hypothesis, and finds statistical evidence and case study illustrations that democratic institutions at various governance levels (e.g., federal, state, corporation) have facilitated opportunistic gains for electoral, consumer, and shareholder principals. To be sure, this conclusion does not dismiss the potential for democratic governance to productively reduce agency costs. Rather, it suggests that policy makers, lawyers, and managers can improve governance by weighing the agency benefits of increased accountability against the distributional costs of favoring principal stakeholders over more general economic opportunities. Carefully considering the fundamentals that give rise to this tradeoff should interest students and scholars working at the intersection of social science and the law, and can help professionals improve their own performance in policy, legal, and business settings.