Rodman (a contributor to such journals as The Journal of Strategic Studies, Israel Affairs, and Defence Studies) provides an explanatory outline of the Israeli national security doctrine, "pragmatic and effective, though essentially unarticulated." He begins with a description of the historical arcs of the key military and diplomatic variables of d.

The most comprehensive study to date of Israel's national security. It combines an exhaustive analysis of the military, diplomatic, demographic and societal challenges Israel faces, with the responses it has developed, to present a detailed proposal for an overall new national security strategy, the first such Israeli strategy ever published.

This book provides a ground-breaking assessment of the Israeli national security experience from the establishment of the country through to the present day. Seventy-five years after its establishment, the State of Israel continues to face an acute national security predicament as a result of the still unresolved Arab–Israeli conflict. This monograph offers a new framework for analyzing this experience, first exploring the crucial events of the past and present that define it, including interstate wars, asymmetrical wars, low-intensity conflicts, and developments in weapons of mass destruction. The book then probes how Israel’s evolving national security doctrine has addressed these various challenges over the years, highlighting the roles of a number of variables: deterrence, warning, and decision; strategic depth and defensible borders; the quality and quantity of fighting men and machines; intelligence; self-reliance in military matters; foreign policy; and the influence of ethnic demography, societal resilience, economic prosperity, and water security. Written in accessible, non-technical language, the book will appeal to general readers seeking an introduction to Israeli security as well as to specialists and researchers in various fields, including Israeli history, Middle Eastern politics, and security studies.

"The U.S.-Israel relationship is in trouble," warn Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellows Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon in a new Council Special Report, Repairing the U.S.-Israel Relationship. Significant policy differences over issues in the Middle East, as well as changing demographics and politics within both the United States and Israel, have pushed the two countries apart. Blackwill, a former senior official in the Bush administration, and Gordon, a former senior official in the Obama administration, call for "a deliberate and sustained effort by policymakers and opinion leaders in both countries" to repair the relationship and to avoid divisions "that no one who cares about Israel's security or America's values and interests in the Middle East should want."

During the early to mid-twentieth century, the Zionist Organization secured a series of political victories on the international stage, leading to the foundation of a Jewish state and to its ability to expand its territorial control within Palestine. The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders provides a revisionist account of the founding of Israel by exposing the misrepresentations and false assurances of Zionist diplomats during this formative period of Israeli history. By comparing diplomatic statements at the United Nations and elsewhere against the historical record, it sheds new light on the legacies of such leaders as Chaim Weizmann, David Ben Gurion, Abba Eban, and Shabtai Rosenne. Including coverage of little-discussed moments in early Israeli history, this book offers an important new perspective for anyone interested in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In Zion's Dilemmas, a former deputy national security adviser to the State of Israel details the history and, in many cases, the chronic inadequacies in the making of Israeli national security policy. Chuck Freilich identifies profound, ongoing problems that he ascribes to a series of factors: a hostile and highly volatile regional environment, Israel's proportional representation electoral system, and structural peculiarities of the Israeli government and bureaucracy.Freilich uses his insider understanding and substantial archival and interview research to describe how Israel has made strategic decisions and to present a first of its kind model of national security decision-making in Israel. He analyzes the major events of the last thirty years, from Camp David I to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, through Camp David II, the Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2005, and the second Lebanon war of 2006.In these and other cases he identifies opportunities forgone, failures that resulted from a flawed decision-making process, and the entanglement of Israeli leaders in an inconsistent, highly politicized, and sometimes improvisational planning process. The cabinet is dysfunctional and Israel does not have an effective statutory forum for its decision-making—most of which is thus conducted in informal settings. In many cases policy objectives and options are poorly formulated. For all these problems, however, the Israeli decision-making process does have some strengths, among them the ability to make rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision-making, effective planning within the defense establishment, and the skills and motivation of those involved. Freilich concludes with cogent and timely recommendations for reform.

Argues that states' attachment to the strategy of deterrence can increase the chances of violence rather than avoid it.