For nearly two centuries, On War, by Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831), has been the bible for statesmen and military professionals, strategists, theorists, and historians concerned about armed conflict. The source of the famous aphorism that "war is an extension of politics by other means," it has been widely read and debated. But, as Jon Sumida shows in this daring new look at Clausewitz's magnum opus, its full meaning has eluded most readers-until now. Approaching Clausewitz's classic as if it were an encoded text, Sumida deciphers this cryptic masterwork and offers a more productive way of looking at the sources and evolution of its author's thought. Sumida argues that On War should be viewed as far more complete and coherent than has been supposed. Moreover, he challenges the notion that On War is an attempt to explain the nature of armed conflict through the formulation of abstract theories. Clausewitz's primary concern, Sumida contends, was practical instruction of the military and political leadership of his country. To achieve this end, Clausewitz invented a method of reenacting the psychological difficulties of high command in order to promote the powers of intuition that he believed were essential to effective strategic decision-making. In addition, Sumida argues that Clausewitz's primary strategic proposition is that the defense is a stronger form of war than the offense. This concept, Sumida maintains, must be understood in order to make sense of Clausewitz's positions on absolute and real war, guerrilla warfare, and the relationship of war and policy/politics. Sumida's pathbreaking critique is supported by examination of the Prussian officer's experience during the Napoleonic Wars, previous major theoretical and historical scholarship on Clausewitz and his writing, and modern philosophical and scientific works that have much in common with Clausewitz's creative guide to the consideration of strategic practice. A major study of intellectual and military history, Sumida's book provides a provocative and above all readily comprehensible treatment of a previously inaccessible classic. It will surely become essential reading for all military professionals and serious students of military thought.

A pathbreaking critique of the thought of military studies icon Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz and his magnum opus On War that illuminates why and how that work should be viewed as much more mature, coherent, innovative, and complete than suggested by previous accounts.

Two classic works of military strategy that shaped the way we think about warfare: The Art of War by Sun Tzu and On War by Karl von Clausewitz, together in one volume “Civilization might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world wars . . . if the influence of Clausewitz’s On War had been blended with and balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.”—B. H. Liddel Hart For two thousand years, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War has been the indispensable volume of warcraft. Although his work is the first known analysis of war and warfare, Sun Tzu struck upon a thoroughly modern concept: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Karl von Clausewitz, the canny military theorist who famously declared that war is a continuation of politics by other means, also claims paternity of the notion “total war.” On War is the magnum opus of the era of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Now these two great minds come together in a single volume that also features an introduction by esteemed military writer Ralph Peters and the Modern Library War Series introduction by Caleb Carr, New York Times bestselling author of The Alienist. (The cover and text refer to The Art of War as The Art of Warfare, an alternate translation of the title.)

In his groundbreaking work, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, Sumida presents a provocative and authoritative revisionist history of the origins, nature and consequences of the "Dreadnought Revolution" of 1906. Based on intensive and extensive archival research, the book strives to explain vital financial and technical matters which enable readers to observe the complex interplay of fiscal, technical, strategic, and personal factors that shaped the course of British naval decision-making during the critical quarter century that preceded the outbreak of the First World War.

As the People's Republic's seemingly inexorable rise to economic and military power continues, never has the need for a better grasp of Chinese strategic thought by the West been more acute. In Deciphering Sun Tzu, Derek Yuen seeks to reclaim for the reader the hidden contours and lost Chinese and Taoist contexts of Sun Tzu's renowned treatise The Art of War, a literary classic and arguably one of the most influential books ever written. He also explains its historical, philosophical, strategic, and cross-cultural significance. His comprehensive analysis of Sun Tzu, based on a close reading of the Chinese sources, also reconstructs the philosophy, Taoist methodology and worldview that effectively form the cornerstones of Chinese strategic thinking, which are arguably as relevant today as at any moment in history. Yuen's innovative reading and analysis of Sun Tzu within and from a Chinese context is a new way of approaching the strategic master's main concepts, which he compares with those of Clausewitz, Liddell-Hart and other Western strategists. Deciphering Sun Tzu offers illuminating analysis and contextualization of The Art of War in a manner that has long been sought by Western readers and opens new means of getting to grips with Chinese strategic thought.

Between 1890 and 1913, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan published a series of books on naval warfare in the age of sail, which established his reputation as the founder of modern strategic history. The author of this work argues that Mahan has been misunderstood and reconsiders his works.

The first book to draw a blueprint for defeating al-Qaeda on ideological rather than military grounds.