This book assesses major schools of thought in macroeconomic theory between the Great Depression and the Long Recession, focusing on their analysis of cycles, crises and macro-policy. It explores the road from the dominance of Keynesian ideas to those of New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) toward the end of the millennium. The book covers the early influential work of Knut Wicksell; the economic debates of the 1930s, with core contributions from John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich von Hayek; the rise of Keynesianism in the 1950s and its decline since the 1970s; the rise of Monetarism in the 1960s; and NCM’s subsequent rise to prominence. Finally, the book outlines how macroeconomics has evolved from its birth in the 1930s as a theory separate from microeconomics, resulting in a split between macro- and micro-theories, and ended up with a new hegemonic paradigm based on microfoundations. The ensuing policy thinking witnessed a transformation from "active" macro-policy after the Great Depression to a far more "passive" macro-policy during the last quarter of the twentieth century, which may have contributed to missing the signs of the impending Long Recession of 2008. “When the 2008 crisis struck, macroeconomists were caught with models that were theoretically elegant yet inappropriate to the needs of the moment. A broader historical perspective may have prevented the jettisoning of Keynesian models that had proved useful in the past and might have done so again. This highly readable book by Arie Arnon is a wonderful antidote to economists’ short time horizon and contributes mightily to restore the profession’s “collective memory” of the diversity of ideas within macroeconomics.” Professor Dani Rodrik, Harvard Kennedy School

This book assesses major schools of thought in macroeconomic theory between the Great Depression and the Long Recession, focusing on their analysis of cycles, crises and macro-policy. It explores the road from the dominance of Keynesian ideas to those of New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) toward the end of the millennium. The book covers the early influential work of Knut Wicksell; the economic debates of the 1930s, with core contributions from John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich von Hayek; the rise of Keynesianism in the 1950s and its decline since the 1970s; the rise of Monetarism in the 1960s; and NCM's subsequent rise to prominence. Finally, the book outlines how macroeconomics has evolved from its birth in the 1930s as a theory separate from microeconomics, resulting in a split between macro- and micro-theories, and ended up with a new hegemonic paradigm based on microfoundations. The ensuing policy thinking witnessed a transformation from "active" macro-policy after the Great Depression to a far more "passive" macro-policy during the last quarter of the twentieth century, which may have contributed to missing the signs of the impending Long Recession of 2008. "When the 2008 crisis struck, macroeconomists were caught with models that were theoretically elegant yet inappropriate to the needs of the moment. A broader historical perspective may have prevented the jettisoning of Keynesian models that had proved useful in the past and might have done so again. This highly readable book by Arie Arnon is a wonderful antidote to economists' short time horizon and contributes mightily to restore the profession's "collective memory" of the diversity of ideas within macroeconomics." Professor Dani Rodrik, Harvard Kennedy School.

"A brilliantly conceived dual-track account of the two greatest economic crises of the last century and their consequences"--

Controlling inflation is among the most important objectives of economic policy. By maintaining price stability, policy makers are able to reduce uncertainty, improve price-monitoring mechanisms, and facilitate more efficient planning and allocation of resources, thereby raising productivity. This volume focuses on understanding the causes of the Great Inflation of the 1970s and ’80s, which saw rising inflation in many nations, and which propelled interest rates across the developing world into the double digits. In the decades since, the immediate cause of the period’s rise in inflation has been the subject of considerable debate. Among the areas of contention are the role of monetary policy in driving inflation and the implications this had both for policy design and for evaluating the performance of those who set the policy. Here, contributors map monetary policy from the 1960s to the present, shedding light on the ways in which the lessons of the Great Inflation were absorbed and applied to today’s global and increasingly complex economic environment.

This chapter discusses various past and future aspects of the global economy. There has been a huge transformation of the global economy in the last several years. Articles on the future of energy in the global economy by Jeffrey Ball and on measuring inequality by Jonathan Ostry and Andrew Berg are also illustrated. Since the 2008 global crisis, global economists must change the way they look at the world.

The author of "The Age of Diminished Expectations" returns with a sobering tour of the global economic crises of the last two years.

Back to the future: a heterodox economist rewrites Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money to serve as the basis for a macroeconomics for the twenty-first century. John Maynard Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money was the most influential economic idea of the twentieth century. But, argues Stephen Marglin, its radical implications were obscured by Keynes's lack of the mathematical tools necessary to argue convincingly that the problem was the market itself, as distinct from myriad sources of friction around its margins. Marglin fills in the theoretical gaps, revealing the deeper meaning of the General Theory. Drawing on eight decades of discussion and debate since the General Theory was published, as well as on his own research, Marglin substantiates Keynes's intuition that there is no mechanism within a capitalist economy that ensures full employment. Even if deregulating the economy could make it more like the textbook ideal of perfect competition, this would not address the problem that Keynes identified: the potential inadequacy of aggregate demand. Ordinary citizens have paid a steep price for the distortion of Keynes's message. Fiscal policy has been relegated to emergencies like the Great Recession. Monetary policy has focused unduly on inflation. In both cases the underlying rationale is the false premise that in the long run at least the economy is self-regulating so that fiscal policy is unnecessary and inflation beyond a modest 2 percent serves no useful purpose. Fleshing out Keynes's intuition that the problem is not the warts on the body of capitalism but capitalism itself, Raising Keynes provides the foundation for a twenty-first-century macroeconomics that can both respond to crises and guide long-run policy.