This collection of essays by a series of academic specialists examines the crisis stemming from the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 from a range of standpoints. The chapters probe the geopolitical and strategic dimensions of the crisis as well as the longer term military and diplomatic implications for Europe and the central Asian region. The collection will be of major importance to students of Russia and Eastern Europe, military analysts as well as journalists and politicians concerned with what some observers have termed a "new cold war" between Russia and the West. This book was published as a special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies.

Russia's invasion, occupation, and partition of Georgia in August 2008 initially sent shock waves throughout Europe and NATO and appeared to signal a new confrontational phase in Moscow s relations with the West. This volume places the conflict in the context of Russia's broader objectives, its internal weaknesses, the limitations of EU and NATO policies, and America s security priorities. First, the Georgian conflict underscored Moscow's determination to reclaim an extensive zone of dominance corresponding with the former Soviet territories. Second, it displayed a shrewd calculation by the Kremlin about the fractured and ineffective Western response, and Moscow continues to test the Obama administration's rapprochement in pursuing its expansionist ambitions. Third, the 2008 conflict had a lasting impact on the Central-East European and post-Soviet states most exposed to pressures from Moscow. While the former demanded more tangible security guarantees from NATO, the latter either sought accommodation with Russia or intensified their protective strategies. Additionally, beneath the veneer of success, the conduct of the war, the economic recession, escalating separatist sentiments, and faltering attempts by Moscow to make the country more globally competitive revealed Russia's long-term weaknesses in the midst of its attempted neo-imperial restoration. The study concludes with succinct recommendations on how the transatlantic alliance can more effectively handle Russian ambitions and prepare itself to deter or manage future crises

This collection of essays by a series of academic specialists examines the crisis stemming from the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 from a range of standpoints. The chapters probe the geopolitical and strategic dimensions of the crisis as well as the longer term military and diplomatic implications for Europe and the central Asian region. The collection will be of major importance to students of Russia and Eastern Europe, military analysts as well as journalists and politicians concerned with what some observers have termed a "new cold war" between Russia and the West. This book was published as a special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies.

In the summer of 2008, a conflict that appeared to have begun in the breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia rapidly escalated to become the most significant crisis in European security in a decade. The implications of the Russian-Georgian war will be understood differently depending on one's narrative of what transpired and perspective on the broader context. This book is designed to present the facts about the events of August 2008 along with comprehensive coverage of the background to those events. It brings together a wealth of expertise on the South Caucasus and Russian foreign policy, with contributions by Russian, Georgian, European, and American experts on the region.

In August 2008, Russia launched an invasion of Georgia that sent shock waves reverberating--first across the post-Soviet space, but then also into the rest of Europe and the world, as the magnitude of the invasion and its implications became clear. This invasion took the world by surprise. But what should have been surprising about it was perhaps the extent of Russia's willingness to employ crude military force against a neighboring state, not that it happened. Indeed, Russia had for several years pursued increasingly aggressive and interventionist policies in Georgia, and had employed an array of instruments that included military means, albeit at a smaller scale. In the several months that preceded the invasion, Moscow's increasingly blatant provocations against Georgia led to a growing fear in the analytic community that it was seeking a military confrontation. Yet western reactions to this aggressive behavior remained declaratory and cautious in nature, and failed to attach cost to Russia for its behavior. After invading Georgia on August 8, Russia did score some initial successes in portraying the invasion as a response to a Georgian decision to militarily enter Tskhinvali, the capital of Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia. Yet a growing body of evidence rapidly emerged, implying that Russia's invasion was premeditated, not reactive--or in the words of a leading Russian military analyst, planned, not spontaneous. Indeed, as the chronology included in this paper shows, Russia had been meticulously preparing an invasion of Georgia through the substantial massing and preparation of forces in the country's immediate vicinity. Scholars will debate whether Russian tanks were already advancing inside Georgian territory when Georgian forces launched their attack on Tskhinvali; yet there seems little doubt that they were at least on the move toward the border. And the scope of the Russian attack leave little doubt: it immediately broadened from the conflict zone of South Ossetia, to include the opening of a second front in Abkhazia and systematic attacks on military and economic infrastructure across Georgia's territory. Within days, tens of thousands of Russian troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles roamed Georgian roads. Russia's subsequent decisions to ignore the terms of a cease-fire agreement it signed, and to recognize the independence of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, all complete the picture of long-hatched plan. The purpose was not merely related to South Ossetia or even Abkhazia: it served to punish Georgia and expose the inability of the west to prevent Russia from moving aggressively to restore its primacy over the former Soviet Union's territory, irrespective of the wishes of the governments and populations of the sovereign countries on that area. It is indeed the predetermined nature of this war that makes its implications so far-reaching. It constituted Moscow's first military aggression against a neighboring state since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1978; and it took place, this time, against a member state of European institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and to that a country on track to integration with NATO. As such, political leaders and analyst soon understood that it formed the largest crisis to date in Russia's relationship with the West; some have even come to realize that the Georgian war of 2008 may be the most significant challenge to European Security since the Cold War's end. It is therefore of particular importance to document, already at this stage, how this war started and draw some preliminary conclusions regarding what it means for Georgia, the post-Soviet space, and Europe and the United States. The following pages propose to do so by providing a chronology of events before, during, and immediately after the war; as well as to propose some initial conclusions that could be drawn from this chronology, as well as regarding its implications.--Introduction, p. [3]-4.

In this monograph, the authors state that Russia planned the war against Georgia in August 2008 aiming for the annexation of Abkhazia, weakening the Saakashvili regime, and prevention of NATO enlargement. According to them, while Russia won the campaign, it also exposed its own military as badly needing reform. The war also demonstrated weaknesses of the NATO and the European Union security systems.

The South Caucasus has traditionally been a playground of contesting empires. This region, on the edge of Europe, is associated in Western minds with ethnic conflict and geopolitical struggles in August 2008. Yet, another war broke out in this distant European periphery as Russia and Georgia clashed over the secessionist territory of South Ossetia. The war had global ramifications culminating in deepening tensions between Russia on the one hand, and Europe and the USA on the other. Speculation on the causes and consequences of the war focused on Great Power rivalries and a new Great Game, on oil pipeline routes, and Russian imperial aspirations. This book takes a different tack which focuses on the domestic roots of the August 2008 war. Collectively the authors in this volume present a new multidimensional context for the war. They analyse historical relations between national minorities in the region, look at the link between democratic development, state-building, and war, and explore the role of leadership and public opinion. Digging beneath often simplistic geopolitical explanations, the authors give the national minorities and Georgians themselves, the voice that is often forgotten by Western analysts. This book was based on a special issue of Central Asian Survey.