Beginning with the 2008 global crisis in the United States, and particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic shook economies around the world, academics, practitioners, and other experts have become increasingly sensitised to the potential for financial and economic fragility to result in a systemic breakdown. Presenting a synopsis of lessons learnt from financial crises arising out of the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries, each entry examines a unique past issue to help to develop future outcomes, operating as a touchstone for further research.

The global financial system has proven increasingly unstable and crisis-prone since the early 1980s. The system has failed to serve either creditors or debtors well. This has been reinforced by the global financial crisis of 2008, where we have seen systemic weaknesses bring rich countries to the brink of bankruptcy and visit appalling suffering on the poorest citizens of poor countries. Yet the regulatory responses to this crisis have involved little thinking from outside the box in which the crisis was delivered to the world. This book presents a powerful indictment of this regulatory failure and calls for greatly increased attention to international financial law and analyses new regulatory measures with the potential to make a new recognition of the principles that ought to underlie it. Using a historical approach that compares the various financial crises of the past three decades, the authors clearly show how misconceived economic policy responses have paved the way for each next 'crash'. Among the numerous topics that arise in the course of this revealing analysis are the following: overvalued exchange rates; excess liquidity in rich countries; premature liberalisation of local financial markets; capital controls; derivatives markets; accounting standards; credit ratings and the conflicts in the role of credit rating agencies; investor protection arrangements; insurance companies; and payment, clearing and settlement activities. The authors offer detailed commentary on: the role of multilateral development banks, the IMF and the WTO in responding to crises; the role of the Basel Accords, the Financial Stability Forum and Board, and the responses of the European Commission, the US, and the G20 to the most recent crisis. The book concludes by exploring systemic game-changing reforms such as bank levies, financial activities taxes and financial transaction taxes, and a global sovereign bankruptcy regime; as well as measures to remove the currency mismatches from the balance sheets of developing countries. Apart from its great usefulness as a detailed introduction to the international financial system and its regulation, the book is enormously valuable for its clear identification of the areas of regulatory failure, and its analysis of new regulatory approaches that offer the potential for a genuinely more stable system. Banking and investment policymakers at every level, the lawyers that serve these markets and the regulators that seek to regulate them, cannot afford to neglect this book.

This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.

In this accessible book, a leading expert provides a critical assessment of the official sector's efforts to more effectively manage financial crises in emerging markets. Professor Eichengreen reviews international initiatives on both the crisis prevention and crisis resolution fronts. Whilecrises will always be with us, he concludes that good progress has been made in limiting their spread and strengthening the international financial system. Ironically, however, official-sector initiatives in this area may in fact have made life more difficult for the poorest countries. Initiativesto limit the incidence of crises and threats to the stability of the international financial system should therefore be linked to an increase in development assistance designed to offset the extra burdens on the poorest countries. The other place where official efforts have fallen short is in creating new ways of resolving crises. The author argues that the old way-official sector financing through the International Monetary Fund-is part of the problem, not part of the solution. The Fund's financial operations allow investorsto escape without significant losses, which in turn encourages them to lend without regard to the risks, weakening market discipline. Moreover, bailouts are inequitable. Because investors are allowed to exit and the IMF ultimately gets paid back, the residents of the crisis country end up footingthe bill. This is one reason why IMF programs have come to be regarded with such animus in the developing world.Imagining that the solution is for the official community to simply show the resolve to resist bailouts is too easy. That the International Monetary Fund has repeatedly come under pressure to extend financial assistance reflects more than a lack of political will; it reflects the inadequacy of thealternatives. At the same time, seeking to create radical new alternatives like an international bankruptcy court is too hard. It would do more to increase the efficiency of resource allocation and the stability of financial markets, the author concludes, to concentrate on more modest changes,namely the introduction of restructuring-friendly provisions into loan agreements, enhancing the capacity of creditors and debtors to resolve debt problems on their own.

This book offers commentary and analysis on the catastrophic events which have recently confronted the international economy in the modern era and contrasts the current situation with other financial crises. It includes case studies on Lehman Brothers in the US, Babcock & Brown in Australia, and Northern Rock in the UK. Asking many pertinent questions about the causes of the crisis and its effects, the book explores fundamental themes such as: asset bubbles and speculation in the financial and non-financial markets, systemic risks and the role of regulation, and regulators. It also reviews the response of international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the US Federal Reserve, the EU Central Bank and the G20. The book assesses the triggers of the crisis and evaluates rescue packages and policy responses as well as suggesting reform of regulatory and supervisory frameworks to maintain banking and modern financial systems in the future.

Recurrent crises in emerging markets and in advanced economies in the last decades cast doubt about the ability of financial liberalization to meet the aims of sustainable economic growth and development. The increasing importance of financial markets and financial efficiency criterion over economic decisions and policies since the 1980s laid down the conditions of the development process of emerging market economies. Numerous crises experienced thereafter gave rise to flourishing work on the links between financialization and economic development. Several decades of observations and lessons can now be integrated into economic and econometric models to give more sophisticated and multivariable approaches to financial development with respect to growth and development issues. In the markets-based and private-enterprise dominated world economy, two conditions for a successful growth-enhancing financial evolution can at least be brought fore: macroeconomic stability and consistent supervision. But even after the 2007-2008 global crisis, economists do not agree on the meaning of those conditions. For liberal and equilibrium-market economists, good finance and supervision mean market-friendly structures while for institutionalists, post-Keynesian and Marxist economists, good finance and supervision must lie in collectively designed and managed public structures. Drawing heavily on the tumultuous crises of the 1990s-2000s, this book argues that those experiences can shed light on such a crucial issue and lead economic theory and policy to go beyond the blindness of efficient free markets doctrine to economic catastrophes. It also points to new challenges to global stability in the wake of reconfiguration of international financial arena under the weight of major emerging market economies.

The lingering effects of the economic crisis are still visible—this shows a clear need to improve our understanding of financial crises. This book surveys a wide range of crises, including banking, balance of payments, and sovereign debt crises. It begins with an overview of the various types of crises and introduces a comprehensive database of crises. Broad lessons on crisis prevention and management, as well as the short-term economic effects of crises, recessions, and recoveries, are discussed.