This book articulates the potential of the principle of separation of powers reflected in the structure and text of the Australian Constitution to protect fundamental due process rights. Clearly, the founding fathers did not enact an express bill of rights in the Australian Constitution, and the document contains a limited number of express rights. However, the High Court has accepted as fundamental the doctrine of separation of powers. While the precise contours of the separation of powers principle are still being drawn, the High Court has found that laws which require, or authorise, a court to exercise power involving a departure from characteristics of traditional judicial process are constitutionally suspect. This is because such a law would undermine a court's institutional integrity. While the High Court has been somewhat loath to identify precisely characteristics of traditional judicial process, some indicia - including open courts, ability to review a decision of a lower court for jurisdictional error, the provision of reasons, decisional independence and fairness - have been identified. This book argues that fundamental due process rights in the criminal law area, such as presumption of innocence, the right to silence, the right to confront accusers, open courts, no effective punishment without conviction, and proportionate rather than mandated sentencing, are so fundamental to a criminal procedure that laws which abrogate these rights and expectations are vulnerable to constitutional challenge.

Providing an interdisciplinary overview of Australian constitutional law and practice, this Handbook situates the development of the constitutional system in its proper context. It also examines recurrent themes and tensions in Australian constitutional law, and points the way for future developments.

A critical examination of the dramatic changes in criminal justice over the last two decades and the first full-length study of the law and politics of criminal justice in the era of the Charter and victims? rights.

How do you protect rights without a Bill of Rights? Australia does not have a national bill or charter of rights and looks further away than ever from adopting one. But it does have a range of individual elements sourced from common law, statute and the Constitution which, though unsystematic, do provide Australians with some meaningful rights protection. This book outlines and explains the unique human rights journey of Australia. It moves beyond the criticisms long made of the Australian position – that its 'formalism', 'legalism' and 'exceptionalism' compromise its capacity for rights protection – to consider how the many elements of its novel legal structure operate. This book analyses the interlocking legal framework for the protection of rights in Australia. A key theme of the book is that the many different elements of a fragmented scheme can add up to something significant, albeit with significant gaps and flaws like any other legal rights protection framework. It shows how the jumbled influences of a common law heritage, a written constitution, differing paths taken by jurisdictions within a single federal state, statutory and common law innovations and a strong dose of comparative legal influences have led to the unique patchwork of rights protection in Australia. It will provide valuable reading for all those researching in human rights, constitutional and comparative law.

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines "international law" to include not only "custom" and "convention" between States but also "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" within their municipal legal systems. In 1953, Bin Cheng wrote his seminal book on general principles, identifying core legal principles common to various domestic legal systems across the globe. This monograph summarizes and analyzes the general principles of law and norms of international due process, with a particular focus on developments since Cheng's writing. The aim is to collect and distill these principles and norms in a single volume as a practical resource for international law jurists, advocates, and scholars. The information contained in this book holds considerable importance given the growth of inter-state intercourse resulting in the increased use of general principles over the past 60 years. General principles can serve as rules of decision, whether in interpreting a treaty or contract, determining causation, or ascertaining unjust enrichment. They also include a core set of procedural requirements that should be followed in any adjudicative system, such as the right to impartiality and the prohibition on fraud. Although the general principles are, by definition, basic and even rudimentary, they hold vital importance for the rule of law in international relations. They are meant not to define a rule of law, but rather the rule of law.