This work examines, among other topics, the personal oath of loyalty that the officers of the German army swore to Adolf Hitler on August 2, 1934. It discusses how the majority of officers--those who did not become conspirators against him--complied with Hitler's orders until May 1945 despite his cruel treatment of soldiers, militarily unsound strategy and tactics, and the widespread destruction and crimes he and his forces committed. The oath taken by the officers had a strong psychological effect among a proud corps with a long history of obedience and honor. They followed Hitler to the end even though they knew they were fighting a losing battle. The author also examines why and how only a few officers, the conspirators, began to break away, lose trust in Hitler, oppose him and finally stage an assassination attempt. This history traces the development within the German army from 1918 of the philosophies of loyalty and disloyalty--and obedience and disobedience--as challenged by the Hitlerian oath of loyalty.

Donald Stoker's book examines British and French involvement from 1919 to 1939 in the creation and development of the naval forces of Poland, Finland and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

"Beginning with an investigation of the interwar neglect that left the Allied militaries incapable of defeating Nazi aggression at the start of World War II, Hart examines the wartime paths the Allies took toward improved military effectiveness. He also explores the continuous German adaptation that prolonged the war and increased the price of eventual Allied victory.

Written by the undisputed dean of U.S. denial and deception experts, Practise to Deceive is the most in-depth look at deception as a military strategy. Barton Whaley knew the history of denial and deception across time, disciplines, and culture. He was the foremost authority on the intricacies of denial and deception strategy and tactics. For Whaley, deception was a mind-game, requiring imagination, deep critical thought, a profound understanding of the enemy as well as one's self (a variation of Sun Tzu), and patience and fortitude. This book presents 88 vividly descriptive case studies to serve as a handbook for intelligence and military professionals. In Whaley's analysis, variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding who achieves victory in combat.

German Disarmament After World War I examines the Allied disarmament of Germany and the challenges that such an enormous task presented to international efforts in enforcing the Treaty of Versailles. In the twenty-first century, disarmament remains a critical issue for the International community. This new book focuses on three key areas and lessons of Allied disarmament operations from 1920-31: the role and experience of international arms inspectors working amidst an embittered German populace the ramifications of the divergent disarmament priorities of the leaders of the disarmament coalition the effectiveness of united Allied policies backed by sanctions. These major issues are examined within the overall context of the assessment of Allied disarmament operations in Germany. While some historians perceive German disarmament as a failure, this book argues that arms inspectors successfully destroyed Germany’s ability to pose a military threat to European security. This new study shows how the destructive legacy of war convinced the victorious nations, especially Britain and France, of the importance in minimizing German military strength. French post-war security concerns, however, were often faced with the unwillingness of Britain to enforce the totality of the military articles of the treaty. German obstruction also influenced Allied disarmament policies. German Disarmament After World War I examines the initial effectiveness of Allied disarmament efforts in Germany and explains how they ultimately disappeared through diverging conceptions of a post-war world. This book will be of great interest to all students of disarmament, the interwar period and of military history, modern European history and security studies.

The Global Great Depression and the Coming of World War II demonstrates the ways in which the economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s helped to cause and shape the course of the Second World War. Historian John E. Moser points to the essential uniformity in the way in which the world s industrialized and industrializing nations responded to the challenge of the Depression. Among these nations, there was a move away from legislative deliberation and toward executive authority; away from free trade and toward the creation of regional trading blocs; away from the international gold standard and toward managed national currencies; away from chaotic individual liberty and toward rational regimentation; in other words, away from classical liberalism and toward some combination of corporatism, nationalism, and militarism.For all the similarities, however, there was still a great divide between two different general approaches to the economic crisis. Those countries that enjoyed easy, unchallenged access to resources and markets the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France tended to turn inward, erecting tariff walls and promoting domestic recovery at the expense of the international order. On the other hand, those nations that lacked such access Germany and Japan sought to take the necessary resources and markets by force. The interplay of these powers, then, constituted the dynamic of international relations of the 1930s: have-nots attempting to achieve self-sufficiency through aggressive means, challenging haves that were too distrustful of one another, and too preoccupied with their own domestic affairs, to work cooperatively in an effort to stop them.