Exporters of exhaustible resources have historically exhibited higher income volatility than other economies, suggesting a heightened role for precautionary savings. This paper uses a parameterized small open economy model to quantify the role of precautionary savings in economies with exhaustible resources, when the only source of uncertainty is the price of the exhaustible resource. Results show that the precautionary motive can generate sizable external sector savings. When aggregated over the sample countries, precautionary savings in 2006 add up to 3.2 percent of GDP. The quantitative importance of the precautionary motive varies considerably across the sample countries and is driven primarily by the weight of exhaustible resource revenues in future income. The parameterized model fares well at capturing current account balances in both cross-section and time-series data.

To mitigate systemic risk, some regulators have advocated the greater use of centralized counterparties (CCPs) to clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives trades. Regulators should be cognizant that large banks active in the OTC derivatives market do not hold collateral against all the positions in their trading book and the paper proves an estimate of this under-collateralization. Whatever collateral is held by banks is allowed to be rehypothecated (or re-used) to others. Since CCPs would require all positions to have collateral against them, off-loading a significant portion of OTC derivatives transactions to central counterparties (CCPs) would require large increases in posted collateral, possibly requiring large banks to raise more capital. These costs suggest that most large banks will be reluctant to offload their positions to CCPs, and the paper proposes an appropriate capital levy on remaining positions to encourage the transition.

New regulatory standards require central counterparties (CCPs) to have robust processes in place to mitigate their counterparty credit risk exposures. At the same time, the standards allow CCPs to tailor their risk management models. This paper considers how CCPs can optimally determine the relative mix of initial margin and default fund contributions in a stylised setting, by balancing the costs of default resources with the expected losses they protect against. Where members are of good credit quality and the probability of experiencing losses is low, the loss-mutualising properties of the default fund are favoured over the defaulter-pays properties of initial margin. Significant tail risks in the markets cleared by the CCP further favour the use of the default fund as a cost-effective insurance against potentially large losses. By contrast, when members are more likely to default or extreme losses are unlikely, the CCP has incentives to maximise the defaulter-pays collateral it takes, and the benefits of the loss-mutualising default fund are reduced. Our numerical results support the recognition that CCPs should have some discretion over how they set the optimal level and composition of their default resources, based on the specific risks of the markets and portfolios that they clear. Our results also show that changes in collateral costs and capital requirements can have a significant impact on a CCP's optimal risk management choices.

Central Counterparties (CCPs) are systemic nodes in financial markets. Incentive regulation on CCPs becomes crucial for financial stability. I investigate incentives and optimal regulation of a profit-driven CCP with limited liability. Conditional on available capital, the CCP fine-tunes collateral requirements to balance fee incomes against counterparty risk. High collateral reduces potential default losses, but leads to foregone profitable trades. Limited liability creates a wedge between the CCP's collateral policy and the socially optimal solution to this trade-off. However, regulators can use capital requirements to close the wedge, unless clearing fee exceeds a threshold.

Recovery and resolution regimes are being developed for central counterparties (CCPs). We analyse current resolution tools in the context of policy, which is to restore the critical functions of a failed CCP. We conclude that the toolkit is insufficient to avoid the costs of resolution being borne by taxpayers, and propose alternative policy suggestions for addressing the problem of a failed CCP.