The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces. The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.

this is the full color edition.Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment describes Marine Corps forces that will be organized, based, trained and equipped for forward presence, security cooperation, counterterrorism, crisis response, forcible entry, prolonged operations and counterinsurgency. The Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: an Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations, and Countering Irregular Threat-A Comprehensive Approach, elaborate on counterinsurgency operations at higher echelons of command. However, counterinsurgency is warfare characterized by small unit action. This handbook provides a guide for the small unit leader.Purpose: This handbook provides the tactics, techniques, and procedures that may be applied by small unit leaders engaged in counterinsurgency. It is principally focused at the company and below. It describes the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, common insurgent approaches, preparation for counterinsurgency, mobilizing the populace, information and intelligence operations, and operations in a counterinsurgency environment. The handbook is not prescriptive but meant to inform. The specific aspects of each conflict combined with small unit leader judgment and initiative will drive how to apply the ideas within the handbook. Understanding Insurgency: Insurgencies date to the earliest forms of government and will continue to exist as long as the governed harbor grievances against authority that they believe cannot be resolved by peaceful means. What is an insurgency? The Department of Defense (DOD) defines insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." Simply put, an insurgency is a struggle between a non-ruling group and their ruling authority. Insurgents use political resources, to include the increased use of the media and international opinion, as well as violence to destroy the political legitimacy of the ruling authority and build their own political legitimacy and power.1 Examples of this type of warfare range from the American Revolution to the present situation in Iraq. The conflict itself can range from acts of terrorism to the more conventional use of the media to sway public opinion. Whatever form the insurgency takes, it serves an ideology or political goal. What are the root causes of an insurgency? For an insurgency to flourish, a majority of the population must either support or remain indifferent to insurgent ideals and practices. There must be a powerful reason that drives a portion of the populace to armed opposition against the existing government. Grievances may have a number of causes, such the lack of economic opportunity, restrictions on basic liberties, government corruption, ethnic or religious tensions, or the presence of an occupying force. It is through this line of thought or ideal that insurgents attempt to mobilize the population. Understanding Counterinsurgency: What is counterinsurgency?-DOD defines counterinsurgency as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called "COIN." The United States uses a wide breadth of national capabilities to defeat insurgencies through a variety of means. The Department of State (DOS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Justice (DOJ) use country teams to generate strategic objectives and assist the host nation government. The military may support those efforts by employing conventional forces, in combination with Special Operations Forces (SOF), in a variety of activities aimed at enhancing security and/or alleviating causes of unrest.

Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency which draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans. He identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been more prevalent in some organizations than others.

A journey through the mind of a commander as he learns and adapts in a complex, deadly environment.

From the introduction: "This handbook provides the tactics, techniques, and procedures that may be applied by small unit leaders engaged in counterinsurgency. It is principally focused at the company and below. It describes the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, common insurgent approaches, preparation for counterinsurgency, mobilizing the populace, information and intelligence operations, and operations in a counterinsurgency environment. The handbook is not prescriptive but meant to inform. The specific aspects of each conflict combined with small unit leader judgment and initiative will drive how to apply the ideas within the handbook." Chapter 1: Overview; Chapter 2: Common Insurgent Approaches; Chapter 3: Preparation for Counterinsurgency; Chapter 4: Mobilizing the Populace; Chapter 5: Information and Intelligence Operations; Chapter 6: Operations in a COIN Environment; Annex A: Patrol Search; Annex B: Basic Observation Skills; Annex C: The Twenty-Eight Articles - Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency; Annex D: Improvised Explosive Devices. Originally published in 2006. 136 pages. ill.

Since the surge in Iraq in 2007, counterinsurgency (COIN) has been at the forefront of military and foreign affairs debates. Although COIN is not a new idea, the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought renewed attention to its theory and practice as top leaders in both the government and the military have considered the most effective strategy for these conflicts. A symposium cosponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation explored the complexities of COIN leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. From that symposium came these papers, which discuss topics such as brigade and regimental command, officer development in the military, and general officer leadership. Featuring leading COIN theorists and practitioners from the military, academic, and private sectors, this volume sheds new light on past and present COIN operations and points the way toward those in the future. This collection includes material written by David Petraeus and Paula Broadwell. Foreword * Major General Robert B. Neller, USMC * Introduction: Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond * Nicholas J. Schlosser * Part I: Counterinsurgency Leadership * Chapter 1 - Counterinsurgency Leadership: The Key to Afghanistan and Iraq * Mark Moyar * Chapter 2 - Supreme Command in Irregular Warfare * Eliot A. Cohen * Part II: Brigade and Regimental Command * Chapter 3 - The Art of Brigade Command in Counterinsurgency * H. R. McMaster * Chapter 4 - Brigade Command in Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons from the Iraq War * Peter R. Mansoor * Chapter 5 - Regimental Command in Counterinsurgency * W. Blake Crowe * Part III: Battalion Command * Chapter 6 - The Art of Battalion Command in Counterinsurgency: A Discussion * Francis J. "Bing" West * David J. Furness * William M. Jurney * Julian Dale Alford * Part IV: Officer Development in the U.S. Military * Chapter 7 - Officer Development for Counterinsurgency * Nathaniel C. Fick * Chapter 8 - The "Major" Challenge of Junior Officer Leadership Development and Talent Management * Paula D. Broadwell * Chapter 9 - Generalship and Counterinsurgency * Thomas E. Ricks * Part V: Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan * Chapter 10 - Winning in Afghanistan * David W. Barno and John K. Wood * Chapter 11 - Advising Afghan Military Forces * Jeffery M. Haynes * Part VI: The 2009 Afghan Presidential Election * Chapter 12 - The Afghan Election and the Future of Afghanistan's Leadership: A Discussion * Robert D. Kaplan * Clare Lockhart * Amin Tarzi * Jeffrey Gedmin * Part VII: General Officer Leadership in Counterinsurgency * Chapter 13 - A Conversation with General David H. Petraeus

Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown once again the difference that excellent leadership can make in irregular warfare. Thrust unexpectedly into counterinsurgency situations in 2002 and 2003, American commanders had to operate under difficult and constantly changing conditions. Some adapted quickly; others adjusted over a longer period of time with the help of experience and education. Selecting the right commanders became more important than ever to unit effectiveness. We have come a long way in recent years, but opportunities for further improvement in leadership development and command selection remain. The need for leadership goes beyond today's conflicts and lies at the heart of the current debates over the future of our national security organizations and strategy.