“Leaning against the wind” (LAW) with a higher monetary policy interest rate may have benefits in terms of lower real debt growth and associated lower probability of a financial crisis but has costs in terms of higher unemployment and lower inflation, importantly including a higher cost of a crisis when the economy is weaker. For existing empirical estimates, costs exceed benefits by a substantial margin, even if monetary policy is nonneutral and permanently affects real debt. Somewhat surprisingly, less effective macroprudential policy and generally a credit boom, with resulting higher probability, severity, or duration of a crisis, increases costs of LAW more than benefits, thus further strengthening the strong case against LAW.

'Leaning against the wind' (LAW) with a higher monetary policy interest rate may have benefits in terms of lower real debt growth and associated lower probability of a financial crisis but has costs in terms of higher unemployment and lower inflation, importantly including a higher cost of a crisis when the economy is weaker. For existing empirical estimates, costs exceed benefits by a substantial margin, even if monetary policy is nonneutral and permanently affects real debt. Somewhat surprisingly, less effective macroprudential policy and generally a credit boom, with resulting higher probability, severity, or duration of a crisis, increases costs of LAW more than benefits, thus further strengthening the strong case against LAW.

This paper takes a new approach to assess the costs and benefits of using different policy tools—macroprudential, monetary, foreign exchange interventions, and capital flow management—in response to changes in financial conditions. The approach evaluates net benefits of policies using quadratic loss functions, estimating policy effects on the full distribution of future output growth and inflation with quantile regressions. Tightening macroprudential policy dampens downside risks to growth stemming from loose financial conditions, and is beneficial in net terms. By contrast, tightening monetary policy entails net losses, calling for caution in the use of monetary policy to “lean against the wind.” These findings hold when policies are used in response to easing global financial conditions. Buying foreign-exchange or tightening capital controls has small net benefits.

In the June 2016 issue of IMF Research Bulletin, Eugenio Cerutti interviews Lars E.O. Svensson. Lars, a professor at the Stockholm School of Economics, was a Visiting Scholar at the IMF. In the interview, he discusses monetary policy, financial stability, and life at the IMF. The Bulletin also features a listing of recent Working Papers, Staff Discussion Notes, and key IMF publications. The table of contents from the latest issue of IMF Economic Review is also included.

This paper explores what history can tell us about the interactions between macroprudential and monetary policy. Based on numerous historical documents, we show that liquidity ratios similar to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) were commonly used as monetary policy tools by central banks between the 1930s and 1980s. We build a model that rationalizes the mechanisms described by contemporary central bankers, in which an increase in the liquidity ratio has contractionary effects, because it reduces the quantity of assets banks can pledge as collateral. This effect, akin to quantity rationing, is more pronounced when excess reserves are scarce.

Leading economists consider the shape of future economic policy: will it resume the pre-crisis consensus, or contend with the post-crisis “new normal”? What will economic policy look like once the global financial crisis is finally over? Will it resume the pre-crisis consensus, or will it be forced to contend with a post-crisis “new normal”? Have we made progress in addressing these issues, or does confusion remain? In April of 2015, the International Monetary Fund gathered leading economists, both academics and policymakers, to address the shape of future macroeconomic policy. This book is the result, with prominent figures—including Ben Bernanke, John Taylor, and Paul Volcker—offering essays that address topics that range from the measurement of systemic risk to foreign exchange intervention. The chapters address whether we have entered a “new normal” of low growth, negative real rates, and deflationary pressures, with contributors taking opposing views; whether new financial regulation has stemmed systemic risk; the effectiveness of macro prudential tools; monetary policy, the choice of inflation targets, and the responsibilities of central banks; fiscal policy, stimulus, and debt stabilization; the volatility of capital flows; and the international monetary and financial system, including the role of international policy coordination. In light of these discussions, is there progress or confusion regarding the future of macroeconomic policy? In the final chapter, volume editor Olivier Blanchard answers: both. Many lessons have been learned; but, as the chapters of the book reveal, there is no clear agreement on several key issues. Contributors Viral V. Acharya, Anat R. Admati, Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Ben Bernanke, Olivier Blanchard, Marco Buti, Ricardo J. Caballero, Agustín Carstens, Jaime Caruana, J. Bradford DeLong, Martin Feldstein, Vitor Gaspar, John Geanakoplos, Philipp Hildebrand, Gill Marcus, Maurice Obstfeld, Luiz Awazu Pereira da Silva, Rafael Portillo, Raghuram Rajan, Kenneth Rogoff, Robert E. Rubin, Lawrence H. Summers, Hyun Song Shin, Lars E. O. Svensson, John B. Taylor, Paul Tucker, José Viñals, Paul A. Volcker

The issue of using monetary policy for financial stability purposes is hotly contested. The crisis was a reminder that price stability is not sufficient for financial stability, financial crises are costly, and policy should aim to decrease the likelihood of crises, not only rely on dealing with their repercussions once they occur. It is clear that well-targeted prudential policies (including micro and macroprudential regulation and supervision) should be pursued actively to attenuate the buildup of financial risks. The question is whether monetary policy should be altered to contain financial stability risks. Should it lend a hand by temporarily raising interest rates more than warranted by price and output stability objectives? Keeping rates persistently higher is also possible, but more costly.