Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century is a wide ranging and ambitious study of why corporate governance is the shape that it is, and how it can be better. The book sets out the emergence of shareholder primacy orientated corporate governance using a study of historical developments in the United Kingdom and the United States. Talbot sees shareholder primacy as a political choice made by governments, not a ‘natural’ feature of the inevitable market. She describes the periods of progressive corporate governance which governments promoted in the middle of the 20th century using a close examination of the theories of the company which then prevailed. She critically examines the rise of neoliberal theories on the company and corporate governance and argues that they have had a negative and regressive impact on social and economic development. In examining contemporary corporate governance she shows how regulatory styles as informed and described by prevailing regulatory theories, enables neoliberal outcomes. She illustrates how United Kingdom-derived corporate governance codes have informed the corporate governance initiatives of European and global institutions. From this she argues that neoliberalism has re-entered ex command transition economies through those United Kingdom and OECD inspired corporate governance Codes over a decade after the earlier failed and destructive neoliberal prescriptions for transition had been rejected. Throughout, Talbot argues that shareholder primacy has socially regressive outcomes and firmly takes a stand against current initiatives to enhance shareholder voting in such issues as director remuneration. The book concludes with a series of proposals to recalibrate the power between those involved in company activity; shareholders, directors and employees so that the public company can begin to work for the public and not shareholders.

The book is the first comprehensive consideration, since the UK Cadbury Report recommended a voluntary Corporate Governance Code, of the question whether Corporate Governance Codes are the most effective way of ensuring adherence to good corporate governance principles. There is no doubt that the idea of voluntary compliance with good corporate governance practices, based on the principle of ‘comply or explain’, has captured the imagination of the world. It is probably one of the best and most comprehensive examples of ‘self-regulation’ ever seen in any area where the society could be affected significantly, for current purposes by corporations.However, is this the most effective way of ensuring that corporations act responsibly and adhere to good corporate governance principles? Have these Codes really improved corporate governance practices significantly? Is it time for a rethink and, at least in certain areas, start to rely more on ‘hard law’ and clearer expectations to ensure compliance? All these issues are addressed in the book.

The current theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is developing along three interwoven lines - oral, social, and environmental. Although everybody recognizes that although CSR is of growing concern in a globalized economy, it being at the top of the board of director's agenda and also good for business, there is no sign of consensus on its rules, structures, or procedures. Now, this collection of essays by leading jurists, businesspeople, and academics takes a giant step toward a more cohesive and durable set of principles that can contribute to a cleaner environment and a better society while respecting and protecting the interests of all stakeholders.

This new book presents recent and significant research on corporate governance which is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way in which a corporation is directed, administered or controlled. Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the many players involved (the stakeholders) and the goals for which the corporation is governed. The principal players are the shareholders, management and the board of directors. Other stakeholders include employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, regulators, the environment and the community at large. Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject. An important theme of corporate governance deals with issues of accountability and fiduciary duty, essentially advocating the implementation of policies and mechanisms to ensure good behaviour and protect shareholders.

Corporate Governance in the 21st Century is a very useful addition to the literature on corporate governance in Japan. It is worth reading simply because it updates many of the ongoing issues such as adoptions of takeover defenses, appointments of independent directors, and increases in foreign direct investment. It is also useful because it examines corporate governance from the perspectives of business as well as law. Furthermore, it provides the beginnings of a framework through which to understand the process of gradual transformation. Christina L. Ahmadjian, Journal of Japanese Studies An invaluable set of resources for everyone with an interest in corporate governance in Japan. Covering both basic information and recent developments, the collection provides readers with an excellent survey of the complexity of modern corporate governance and its legal setting. . . in Japan. Hideki Kanda, University of Tokyo, Japan The essays in this collection approach Japanese corporate governance in the 2000s from a variety of novel perspectives novel in terms of subject matter, methodology, and points of comparison. The result is a comprehensive portrait of the current dynamics of change and stasis in the institutional environment for Japanese firms. Curtis Milhaupt, Columbia Law School, US The lost decade of economic stagnation in Japan during the 1990s has become a found decade for regulatory and institutional reform. Nowhere is this more evident than in corporate law. In 2005, for example, a spate of reforms to the Commercial Code culminated in the new Company Act, a statute promising greater organisational flexibility and shareholder empowerment for Japanese corporations competing in a more globalised economy. But does this new law herald a more Americanised system of corporate governance? Has Japan embraced shareholder primacy over its traditional loyalty to other key stakeholders such as main banks , core employees, and partners within diffuse corporate (keiretsu) groups? This book argues that a more complex gradual transformation is unfolding in Japan a process evident in many other post-industrial economies. The book brings together contributions from academics and practitioners from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. It includes chapters on comparative corporate governance theory and methodology, lifelong employment, the main bank system, board structures, and governance issues in small and medium-sized enterprises. The procedural, substantive and FDI policy dimensions of takeover law and practice are discussed, as well as empirical changes to corporate governance practices in large, publicly listed companies during the past twenty years. The authors rich mix of national, disciplinary and professional backgrounds allows for a broad comparative perspective on developments in Japanese corporate governance. The book will be of great interest to scholars and students of law, business, political economy and Japanese studies, and will also appeal to corporate lawyers and policymakers.

Who should be allowed to call the shots in the boardrooms of U. S. Corporations? And what difference does it make for their growth and profitability? In the last decade, these issues have moved to the center of policy debates about the time horizons and competitiveness of U.S. companies. This book is an indispensable guide through the historical, legal, and institutional background for these corporate governance debates. It explains three broad views on the relationship among the governance, performance, and competitiveness of corporations, and examines the intellectual history, politics, and empirical evidence behind each argument. It also considers the effect that two trends will have on corporate governance: the growth and power of public employees' pension funds and the increase in the economic activity that comes from specialized services and customized production. Blair asserts that companies need to experiment with different governance arrangements, such as choosing directors to represent particular constituencies, or making more radical arrangements like leveraged buyouts or worker-owned companies. Public policy should encourage, or at least not impede, such experimentation.