One of the greatest challenges to both national and international security stems from the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. In 1991, Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) authored and advocated the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act after the breakup of the Soviet Union (creating what is now commonly referred to as Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program). The program currently receives funding of over $1 billion a year for cooperative activities to secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies in the former Soviet Union. The Nunn–Lugar CTR program can rightly be called the Marshall Plan of nuclear nonproliferation. It was one of the primary instruments available to the United States for dealing with the dangerous situation resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Problems still exist, however, with regard to the safe and secure storage and handling of nuclear materials in Russia. Substantial resources from the United States and other nations will continue to be needed to eliminate these potential threats in the future. However, the mutual dedication to problem solving that has, at the best of times, characterized the Nunn–Lugar program is now missing. As a result, secondary issues and other priorities have prevented further progress from being made. The early stages of the Nunn–Lugar program, understandably, were marked by suspicion and a lack of trust on both sides—attitudes that hindered progress and slowed implementation of agreed-on measures. Further complicating the situation was that the breakup of the Soviet Union also meant the breakup of the unified control system that facilitated expeditious execution of directives from above. The Yeltsin government was notorious for unfulfilled commitments, and as a result, those working the various programs found that agreed-on procedures often had to be renegotiated at each intervening level of the bureaucracy before they could be put into effect. Even such seemingly simple issues as whether taxes had to be paid on materials provided free of charge under CTR continue to cause problems to this day. To the credit of both sides, in previous years, when a problem was encountered, efforts were made to come up with workable solutions, rather than allowing the process to fall into a series of mutual recriminations. In spite of this record, the program has become bogged down in recent years over issues such as liability for damages and other essentially secondary matters. In terms of nuclear weapons, some 6,382 nuclear warheads have been deactivated under CTR. These include all armaments from the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, where the weapons' status and security came into serious question after the breakup of the Soviet Union. More than 1,400 delivery systems, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers have been decommissioned or destroyed. In terms of materials that could be used to create weapons, over 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been eliminated. Security in transport and storage, and accountability of both weapons and weapon materials, has been enhanced. Finally, more than 22,000 scientists formerly employed in weapons programs (chemical and biological included) have been shifted to cooperative, peaceful endeavors. In sum, the world is a safer place today because of the efforts of the Nunn–Lugar program.

Argues for joint efforts and reform in the antiproliferation field, including enhanced interagency coordination and intergovernmental cooperation and a global approach to securing nuclear weapons and fissile material to prevent illicit nuclear weapons programs, trafficking, and terrorism.

Non-proliferation assistance programs, including co-operative threat reduction, are being examined to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorisation Act, Congress authorised the Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. This book analyses the range of possibilities for applying CTR funds, what kinds of assistance may be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance. A key underlying issue is whether countries that pose particular risks are prepared to provide adequate co-operation to achieve CTR objectives. As many observers have noted, CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other countries. A common factor must be the willingness of such states to co-operate. One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention. Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus additionally on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report

In this book, Michael Krepon analyzes nuclear issues such as missile defenses, space warfare, and treaties, and argues that the United States is on a dangerous course. During the Cold War, Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, facilitated strategic arms control. Now that the Cold War has been replaced by asymmetric warfare, treaties based on nuclear overkill and national vulnerability are outdated and must be adapted to a far different world. A new strategic concept of Cooperative Threat Reduction is needed to replace MAD. A balance is needed that combines military might with strengthened treaty regimes.