In this work, a distinction is made between two forms of cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of petroleum: proportional cooperation between oil companies who jointly own an exclusive petroleum right, either an exclusive licence or a risk contract; and non-proportional cooperation between state enterprises and oil companies who enter into production-sharing agreements or other type of risk contracts. The book explains the reasons for cooperation and the strategies followed to minimise non-market-related risks. It provides detailed analysis of customary joint venture agreements and of special provisions in these agreements such as non-consent options and sole risk options. The work further covers compulsory cooperation in the form of either state participation or unitisation agreements. A separate chapter is devoted to production-sharing agreements. This book is intended for geologists and petroleum engineers in charge of extractive ventures and for international lawyers, consultants and other professionals who are in charge of designing, negotiating and promoting any type of cooperative agreement. The author has drawn on 34 years' experience of the legal, economic and technical aspects of the international petroleum industry, most recently as senior concessions lawyer with Shell Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij in The Hague, The Netherlands, and as part- time professor at the Delft University of Technology.

Challenging the myth that the federal government exercises exclusive control over U.S. foreign-policymaking, Michael J. Glennon and Robert D. Sloane propose that we recognize the prominent role that states and cities now play in that realm. Foreign Affairs Federalism provides the first comprehensive study of the constitutional law and practice of federalism in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. It could hardly be timelier. States and cities recently have limited greenhouse gas emissions, declared nuclear free zones and sanctuaries for undocumented immigrants, established thousands of sister-city relationships, set up informal diplomatic offices abroad, and sanctioned oppressive foreign governments. Exploring the implications of these and other initiatives, this book argues that the national interest cannot be advanced internationally by Washington alone. Glennon and Sloane examine in detail the considerable foreign affairs powers retained by the states under the Constitution and question the need for Congress or the president to step in to provide "one voice" in foreign affairs. They present concrete, realistic ways that the courts can update antiquated federalism precepts and untangle interwoven strands of international law, federal law, and state law. The result is a lucid, incisive, and up-to-date analysis of the rules that empower-and limit-states and cities abroad.