What can we know and what should we believe about today's world? What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues applies the concerns and techniques of epistemology to a wide variety of contemporary issues. Questions about what we can know-and what we should believe-are first addressed through an explicit consideration of the practicalities of working these issues out at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Coady calls for an 'applied turn' in epistemology, a process he likens to the applied turn that transformed the study of ethics in the early 1970s. Subjects dealt with include: Experts-how can we recognize them? And when should we trust them? Rumors-should they ever be believed? And can they, in fact, be a source of knowledge? Conspiracy theories-when, if ever, should they be believed, and can they be known to be true? The blogosphere-how does it compare with traditional media as a source of knowledge and justified belief? Timely, thought provoking, and controversial, What to Believe Now offers a wealth of insights into a branch of philosophy of growing importance-and increasing relevance-in the twenty-first century.

This volume addresses issues in epistemology, ethics and political philosophy. It contains new papers on issues such as semantic theory of truth, sandwich theory of knowledge, American pragmatism and scepticism, arguments from ignorance, infallibilism and fallibilism, justification and confirmation, Tarski’s T-schema, experimental results and ordinary truth, epistemic comparativism and experiments, epiphenomenlism and eliminativism about the mental, the identity theory of truth, thoughts and facts, metaontological maximalism and minimalism, morality and rights, aggregation of value judgements and aggregation of preferences, conditional and unconditional ethics, the role of the theory of evolution in moral epistemology, global and international political community, Rawls' views on cosmopolitanism and global justice, international distributive justice. Contributors are: Tomasz Bigaj, Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Tadeusz Buksiński, Robin Cameron, Jan B. Deręgowski, Nigel Dower, Adam Grobler, Jesper Kallestrup, Adrian Kuźniar, Justyna Miklaszewska, Joanna Miksa, Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Katarzyna Paprzycka, Krzysztof Posłajko, Wlodek Rabinowicz, John Skorupski, Leslie Stevenson, Piotr Szałek, Tadeusz Szubka, Joseph Ulatowski, Jan Woleński, Rafał Wonicki, Anna Wójtowicz, Renata Ziemińska

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

The perfect introduction to contemporary epistemology, completely overhauled for its third edition In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pairs of specially commissioned essays defend opposing views on some of today’s most compelling epistemological issues and problems. Offering a unique blend of accessibility and originality, this timely volume brings together fresh debates on hotly contested issues to provide readers with the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts. Now in its third edition, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology features up-to-date coverage of the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays examine questions of epistemic normativity and knowledge, the relationship between belief and credence, the possibility of internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, the use of thought experiments in epistemology, and more. Presents a rigorous yet accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology Contains head-to-head chapters offering forceful advocacy of opposing philosophical stances Focuses on core areas of epistemology Uses a lively debate format that sharply defines the issues and encourages further discussion All-new chapters provide fully updated coverage of new and emerging topics in epistemology Part of the Wiley-Blackwell Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, remains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, and epistemologists who want to keep current with contemporary epistemological debates.

These sixteen original essays, whose authors include some of the world's leading philosophers, examine themes from the work of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958), and demonstrate his considerable continuing influence on philosophical debate. Part I bears on epistemological topics, such as scepticism about the external world, the significance of common sense, and theories of perception. Part II is devoted to themes in ethics, such as Moore's open question argument, his non-naturalism, utilitarianism, and his notion of organic unities.

This textbook introduces the concepts and theories central for understanding the nature of knowledge. It is aimed at students who have already done an introductory course. Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is concerned about how we know what we do, what justifies us in believing what we do, and what standards of evidence we should use in seeking truths about the world of human experience. The author's approach draws the reader into the subfields and theories of the subject, guided by key concrete examples. Major topics covered include perception and reflection as grounds of knowledge, the nature, structure, and varieties of knowledge, and the character and scope of knowledge in the crucial realms of ethics, science and religion.

This book develops and defends a theory of responsible belief. The author argues that we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence them. It is because we have intellectual obligations to influence our beliefs that we are responsible for them.