Addresses a controversial aspect of constitutional jurisprudence--the governance of foreign affairs and examines the questionof whether our constitutional blueprint for the conduct of foreign affairs is appropriate to the democracy we have become.

This is the first volume in a series of books on democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe. The series focuses on three major aspects of democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe: institutional engineering, transnational pressures and civil society. This first volume analyses constraints on and opportunities of institutional engineering in Eastern Europe: to what extent and how elites in Eastern Europe have been able to shape, if not manipulate, the politics of democraticconsolidation through institutional means.The aim is to contrast a set of democracy theories with empirical evidence accumulated in Eastern Europe over the last ten years. The volume tries to avoid complex debates about definitions, methods and the uses and misuses of comparative research. Instead it tries to establish what has really happened in the region, and which of the existing theories have proved helpful in explaining these developments.The volume starts with a presentation of conceptual and comparative frameworks, followed by in-depth empirical analyses of the thirteen individual countries undergoing democratic consolidation. The first conceptual and comparative part contains three chapters. The first chapter explains what institutional engineering is about and describes our experiences with institutional engineering in former transitions to democracy. It also focuses on the import and export of institutional designs. Thesecond chapter analyses the utility of constitutions in the process of democratic consolidation. The third chapter compares constitutional designs and problems of implementation in Southern and Eastern Europe. The empirical case studies deal with the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland. And the conclusions evaluate the enormous impact of institutions on politics in Eastern Europe and show how central constitutional designs are to the institutional engineering in the societies undergoing transitions to democracy.

This study challenges the belief that liberal democracy is incompatible with an effective foreign policy. The author focuses initially on the effect of democratic practices and institutions on the efficacy and wisdom of international dealings. Then he examines the pursuit and consequences of American foreign policy objectives on some of the central aspects of US democracy, including the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, civil liberties and freedom of speech.

Law is fast globalizing as a field, and many lawyers, judges and political leaders are engaged in a process of comparative borrowing. But this new form of legal globalization has darksides: it is not just a source of inspiration for those seeking to strengthen and improve democratic institutions and policies. It is increasingly an inspiration - and legitimation device - for those seeking to erode democracy by stealth, under the guise of a form of faux liberal democratic cover. Abusive Constitutional Borrowing: Legal globalization and the subversion of liberal democracy outlines this phenomenon, how it succeeds, and what we can do to prevent it. This book address current patterns of democratic retrenchment and explores its multiple variants and technologies, considering the role of legitimating ideologies that help support different modes of abusive constitutionalism. An important contribution to both legal and political scholarship, this book will of interest to all those working in the legal and political disciplines of public law, constitutional theory, political theory, and political science.

A collection of essays that surveys the development and structure of the European Union's constitutional regime for foreign affairs.

This book addresses a highly controversial yet neglected aspect of United States constitutional jurisprudence-the governance of foreign affairs. Henkin asks whether our constitutional blueprint for the conduct of foreign affairs is appropriate to the democracy we have become, or whether it might be desirable to consider constitutional change.

Why there should be a larger role for the judiciary in American foreign relations In the past several decades, there has been a growing chorus of voices contending that the Supreme Court and federal judiciary should stay out of foreign affairs and leave the field to Congress and the president. Challenging this idea, Restoring the Global Judiciary argues instead for a robust judicial role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. With an innovative combination of constitutional history, international relations theory, and legal doctrine, Martin Flaherty demonstrates that the Supreme Court and federal judiciary have the power and duty to apply the law without deference to the other branches. Turning first to the founding of the nation, Flaherty shows that the Constitution’s original commitment to separation of powers was as strong in foreign as domestic matters, not least because the document shifted enormous authority to the new federal government. This initial conception eroded as the nation rose from fledgling state to superpower, fueling the growth of a dangerously formidable executive that today asserts near-plenary foreign affairs authority. Flaherty explores how modern international relations makes the commitment to balance among the branches of government all the more critical and he considers implications for modern controversies that the judiciary will continue to confront. At a time when executive and legislative actions in the name of U.S. foreign policy are only increasing, Restoring the Global Judiciary makes the case for a zealous judicial defense of fundamental rights involving global affairs.