Identifies how and why 'dialogue' can describe and evaluate institutional interactions over constitutional questions concerning democracy and rights.

Who makes constitutional law? Is constitutional doctrine the monopoly of the courts? In accessible and persuasive prose Louis Fisher explains that constitutional law is not solely or even primarily the Supreme Court's "final word" but rather a richly political convergence of separate interpretations. With a broad range of examples, he argues that constitutional principles emerge from a dialogue among all three branches of government--executive, legislative, and judicial. Important contributions also come from the states and the general public. Fisher identifies executive and legislative initiatives in many areas of constitutional significance. Where there is litigation, the Court generally upholds these initiatives or may avoid making a constitutional decision by using "threshold devices." On those rare occasions when the Supreme Court exercises judicial review and strikes down a presidential or congressional action, it is usually only a matter of time before the proposal is revived and the dialogue begins again. Originally published in 1988. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In a comprehensive examination of the constitutional systems of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, Po Jen Yap contributes to a field that has traditionally focussed on Western jurisdictions. Drawing on the history and constitutional framework of these Asian law systems, this book examines the political structures and traditions that were inherited from the British colonial government and the major constitutional developments since decolonization. Yap examines the judicial crises that have occurred in each of the three jurisdictions and explores the development of sub-constitutional doctrines that allows the courts to preserve the right of the legislature to disagree with the courts' decisions using the ordinary political processes. The book focusses on how these novel judicial techniques can be applied to four core constitutional concerns: freedom of expression, freedom of religion, right to equality, and criminal due process rights. Each chapter examines one core topic and defends a model of dialogic judicial review that offers a compelling alternative to legislative or judicial supremacy.

Focusing on the protection of rights in the UK, this book establishes a framework for interactions to better protect rights, facilitate deliberation, engage citizens, and provide for checks and balances. It further evaluates how well these values are achieved in the UK constitution now, and in light of a British Bill of Rights and Brexit.

“Highly illuminating ... for anyone interested in the Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the American democracy, lawyer and layperson alike." —The Los Angeles Review of Books In his major work, acclaimed historian and judicial authority Melvin Urofsky examines the great dissents throughout the Court’s long history. Constitutional dialogue is one of the ways in which we as a people reinvent and reinvigorate our democratic society. The Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of the Constitution, acknowledged that the Court’s majority opinions have not always been right, and initiated a critical discourse about what a particular decision should mean before fashioning subsequent decisions—largely through the power of dissent. Urofsky shows how the practice grew slowly but steadily, beginning with the infamous and now overturned case of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) during which Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion upheld slavery and ending with the present age of incivility, in which reasoned dialogue seems less and less possible. Dissent on the court and off, Urofsky argues in this major work, has been a crucial ingredient in keeping the Constitution alive and must continue to be so.

“Highly illuminating ... for anyone interested in the Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the American democracy, lawyer and layperson alike." —The Los Angeles Review of Books In his major work, acclaimed historian and judicial authority Melvin Urofsky examines the great dissents throughout the Court’s long history. Constitutional dialogue is one of the ways in which we as a people reinvent and reinvigorate our democratic society. The Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of the Constitution, acknowledged that the Court’s majority opinions have not always been right, and initiated a critical discourse about what a particular decision should mean before fashioning subsequent decisions—largely through the power of dissent. Urofsky shows how the practice grew slowly but steadily, beginning with the infamous and now overturned case of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) during which Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion upheld slavery and ending with the present age of incivility, in which reasoned dialogue seems less and less possible. Dissent on the court and off, Urofsky argues in this major work, has been a crucial ingredient in keeping the Constitution alive and must continue to be so.

Constitutions divide into those that provide for a constitutionally protected set of rights, where courts can strike down legislation, and those where rights are protected predominantly by parliament, where courts can interpret legislation to protect rights, but cannot strike down legislation. The UK's Human Rights Act 1998 is regarded as an example of a commonwealth model of rights protections. It is justified as a new form of protection of rights which promotes dialogue between the legislature and the courts - dialogue being seen not just as a better means of protecting rights, but as a new form of constitutionalism occupying a middle ground between legal and political constitutionalism. This book argues that there is no clear middle ground for dialogue to occupy, with most theories of legal and political constitutionalism combining legal and political protections, as well as providing an account of interactions between the legislature and the judiciary. Nevertheless, dialogue has a role to play. It differs from legal and political constitutionalism in terms of the assumptions on which it is based and the questions it asks. It focuses on analysing mechanisms of inter-institutional interactions, and assessing when these interactions can provide a better protection of rights, facilitate deliberation, engage citizens, and act as an effective check and balance between institutions of the constitution. This book evaluates dialogue in the UK constitution, assessing the protection of human rights through the Human Rights Act 1998, the common law, and EU law. It also evaluates court-court dialogue between the UK court, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights. The conclusion evaluates the implications of the proposed British Bill of Rights and the referendum decision to leave the European Union.