This report examines the business, operator, and household characteristics of farms that have adopted certain conservation-compatible practices, with and without financial assistance from government conservation programs. The analysis finds that attributes of the farm operator and household and characteristics of the farm business are associated with the likelihood that a farmer will adopt certain conservation-compatible practices and the degree to which the farmer participates in conservation programs. For example, operators of small farms and operators not primarily focused on farming are less likely to adopt management-intensive conservation-compatible practices and to participate in working-land conservation programs than operators of large enterprises whose primary occupation is farming.

Conservation payments lead to improvement in environmental quality only if farmers and ranchers who receive them adopt conservation practices that would not have been adopted without the payment. When a voluntary payment causes a change in practice(s) that lead(s) to improved environmental quality, these changes are "additional." We estimate this "additionality" for a number of common conservation practices that are frequently supported by existing conservation programs. We find that the level of additionality varies by practice and that additionality is high for structural and vegeta-tive practices while the risk of nonadditionality appears to be higher for management practices. While the risk of nonadditionality cannot be completely eliminated, it can be reduced. We discuss a number of approaches to managing nonadditionality in both conservation programs and environmental offset programs.

Conservation payments lead to improvement in environmental quality only if farmers and ranchers who receive them adopt conservation practices that would not have been adopted without the payment. When a voluntary payment causes a change in practice(s) that lead(s) to improved environmental quality, these changes are "additional." We estimate this "additionality" for a number of common conservation practices that are frequently supported by existing conservation programs. We find that the level of additionality varies by practice and that additionality is high for structural and vegetative practices while the risk of nonadditionality appears to be higher for management practices. While the risk of nonadditionality cannot be completely eliminated, it can be reduced. We discuss a number of approaches to managing nonadditionality in both conservation programs and environmental offset programs.

Beginning, limited-resource, and socially disadvantaged farmers make up 40% of all U.S. farms. Some Federal conservation programs contain provisions that encourage participation by such ¿targeted¿ farmers. This report compares the natural resource characteristics, resource issues, and conservation treatment costs on farms operated by targeted farmers with those of other participants. Targeted farmers tend to operate more environmentally sensitive land than other farmers, have different conservation priorities, and receive different levels of payments. The different conservation priorities among types of farmers suggest that if a significantly larger proportion of targeted farmers participate in these programs, the programs¿ economic and environmental outcomes could change. Tables and graphs.