Echoing Richard Rorty's earlier Consequences of Pragmatism, this collection begins with an essay on "Phenomenology in America: 1964-1984," and concludes with a "Response to Rorty, or Is Phenomenology Edifying?" In between, the differences in the philosophical habits and practice of Anglo-American and Euro-American philosophers are examined and a reformulated, non-foundational phenomenology is sketched as a new direction responsive to the current situation in American philosophy. Don Ihde considers perception, technics, and contemporary Continental thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Hans Georg Gadamer, Michel Foucault, Ortega y Gassett, and Paul Ricoeur.

Von Hermann's Hermeneutics and Reflection, translated here from the original German, represents the most fundamental and critical reflection in any language of the concept of phenomenology as it was used by Heidegger and by Husserl.

Dan Zahavi offers an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of central and contested aspects of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. What is ultimately at stake in Husserl's phenomenological analyses? Are they primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness or are they equally about the world? What is distinctive about phenomenological transcendental philosophy, and what kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Husserl's Legacy offers an interpretation of the more overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology and engages with some of the most contested and debated questions in phenomenology. Central to its interpretative efforts is the attempt to understand Husserl's transcendental idealism. Zahavi argues that Husserl was not a sophisticated introspectionist, not a phenomenalist, nor an internalist, not a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues, and not opposed to all forms of naturalism. Husserl's Legacy argues that Husserl's phenomenology is as much about the world as it is about consciousness, and that a proper grasp of Husserl's transcendental idealism reveals the fundamental importance of facticity and intersubjectivity.

Echoing Richard Rorty's earlier Consequences of Pragmatism, this collection begins with an essay on "Phenomenology in America: 1964-1984," and concludes with a "Response to Rorty, or Is Phenomenology Edifying?" In between, the differences in the philosophical habits and practice of Anglo-American and Euro-American philosophers are examined and a reformulated, non-foundational phenomenology is sketched as a new direction responsive to the current situation in American philosophy. Don Ihde considers perception, technics, and contemporary Continental thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Hans Georg Gadamer, Michel Foucault, Ortega y Gassett, and Paul Ricoeur.

Expanded new edition of the landmark book demonstrating the practice of phenomenology through visual illusions and ambiguous drawings

This book offers fresh perspective on the role of phenomenology in the philosophy of physics which opens new avenues for discussion among physicists, "standard" philosophers of physics and philosophers with phenomenological leanings. Much has been written on the interrelations between philosophy and physics in the late 19th and early 20th century, and on the emergence of philosophy of science as an autonomous philosophical sub-discipline. This book is about the under-explored role of phenomenology in the development and the philosophical interpretation of 20th century physics. Part 1 examines questions about the origins and value of phenomenological approaches to physics. Does the work of classical phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger contain elements of systematic value to both the practice and our philosophical understanding of physics? How did classical phenomenology influence “standard” philosophy of science in the Anglo-American and other traditions? Part 2 probes questions on the role of phenomenology in the philosophies of physics and science: - Can phenomenology help to solve “Wigner’s puzzle”, the problem of the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics in describing, explaining and predicting empirical phenomena? - Does phenomenology allow better understanding of the principle of gauge invariance at the core of the standard model of contemporary particle physics? - Does the phenomenological notion of “Lifeworld” stand in opposition to the “scientific metaphysics” movement, or is there potential for dialogue? Part 3 examines the measurement problem. Is the solution outlined by Fritz London and Edmond Bauer merely a re-statement of von Neumann’s view, or should it be regarded as a distinctively phenomenological take on the measurement problem? Is phenomenology a serious contender in continuing discussions of foundational questions of quantum mechanics? Can other interpretational frameworks such as quantum Bayesianism benefit from implementing phenomenological notions such as constitution or horizonal intentionality?