Examines some of the unforseen incidents which have occured in computer-controlled process plants, and suggests how the risk of such incidents happening again can be minimized. The text describes how Hazop studies can be used to detect hazards in computer-controlled systems.

Computer Control and Human Error presents accounts of various incidents at computer-controlled plants. These incidents include equipment and software faults; treating the computer as a "black box"; misjudging the way operators respond to the computer; errors in the data entry; failure to inform operators of changes in data or programs; and unauthorized interference with peripheral equipment. The discussion then turns to the use of hazard and operability studies (Hazops) to prevent or reduce errors in computer-controlled plants. The book describes the conventional Hazop as used in the process industry and an overview of the different Chazop frameworks/guidelines suggested by engineers and researchers. It then presents new Chazop methodology which is based on incident analysis. The final chapter presents reasons for failures in computerized systems, each of which is illustrated with an example. Most of the examples did not cause an actual safety problem, simply because they occurred within systems that are not safety-related. Some of these examples appear in the literature; others are from personal experience or from private communications.

This title was first published in 2002: This field guide assesses two views of human error - the old view, in which human error becomes the cause of an incident or accident, or the new view, in which human error is merely a symptom of deeper trouble within the system. The two parts of this guide concentrate on each view, leading towards an appreciation of the new view, in which human error is the starting point of an investigation, rather than its conclusion. The second part of this guide focuses on the circumstances which unfold around people, which causes their assessments and actions to change accordingly. It shows how to "reverse engineer" human error, which, like any other componant, needs to be put back together in a mishap investigation.

Human error is cited over and over as a cause of incidents and accidents. The result is a widespread perception of a 'human error problem', and solutions are thought to lie in changing the people or their role in the system. For example, we should reduce the human role with more automation, or regiment human behavior by stricter monitoring, rules or procedures. But in practice, things have proved not to be this simple. The label 'human error' is prejudicial and hides much more than it reveals about how a system functions or malfunctions. This book takes you behind the human error label. Divided into five parts, it begins by summarising the most significant research results. Part 2 explores how systems thinking has radically changed our understanding of how accidents occur. Part 3 explains the role of cognitive system factors - bringing knowledge to bear, changing mindset as situations and priorities change, and managing goal conflicts - in operating safely at the sharp end of systems. Part 4 studies how the clumsy use of computer technology can increase the potential for erroneous actions and assessments in many different fields of practice. And Part 5 tells how the hindsight bias always enters into attributions of error, so that what we label human error actually is the result of a social and psychological judgment process by stakeholders in the system in question to focus on only a facet of a set of interacting contributors. If you think you have a human error problem, recognize that the label itself is no explanation and no guide to countermeasures. The potential for constructive change, for progress on safety, lies behind the human error label.

The book discusses human factors integration methodolgy and reviews the issues that underpin consideration of key topics such as human error, automation and human reliability assesment.

Human error is implicated in nearly all aviation accidents, yet most investigation and prevention programs are not designed around any theoretical framework of human error. Appropriate for all levels of expertise, the book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents, regardless of operational setting (i.e. military, commercial, or general aviation). The book contains a complete description of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which incorporates James Reason's model of latent and active failures as a foundation. Widely disseminated among military and civilian organizations, HFACS encompasses all aspects of human error, including the conditions of operators and elements of supervisory and organizational failure. It attracts a very broad readership. Specifically, the book serves as the main textbook for a course in aviation accident investigation taught by one of the authors at the University of Illinois. This book will also be used in courses designed for military safety officers and flight surgeons in the U.S. Navy, Army and the Canadian Defense Force, who currently utilize the HFACS system during aviation accident investigations. Additionally, the book has been incorporated into the popular workshop on accident analysis and prevention provided by the authors at several professional conferences world-wide. The book is also targeted for students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University which has satellite campuses throughout the world and offers a course in human factors accident investigation for many of its majors. In addition, the book will be incorporated into courses offered by Transportation Safety International and the Southern California Safety Institute. Finally, this book serves as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.

Human factors, also known as human engineering or human factors engineering, is the application of behavioral and biological sciences to the design of machines and human-machine systems. Automation refers to the mechanization and integration of the sensing of environmental variables, data processing and decision making and mechanical action. This book deals with all the issues involved in human-automation systems from design to control and performance of both humans and machines.