Throughout this unprecedented crisis which is hitting all major economies in the EU, the escalation of the Eurozone recession increasingly undermines public confidence in the ability of competitive markets to deliver positive outcomes. A debate on the most appropriate way to enforce competition rules, in light of the crisis, is definitely useful. A "relaxed" stance to competition during difficult periods may be tempting and indeed, this has often been the approach used in the past. However, the enforcement of competition rules is no less important during times of crisis than during normal periods. It has also been argued that, when public resources are stretched to the limit and businesses are struggling to survive, competition authorities should seek to focus their limited resources on those anticompetitive practices which are most detrimental to consumer welfare such as cartels. Indeed, if over-enforcement is perhaps undesirable when the economy is functioning well, it will inevitably become more problematic during an economic downturn. In addition, business managers may be increasingly tempted to resort to anticompetitive practices when faced with economic hardship. This book will appeal to judges and lawyers in competition law, European law, business/corporate law and insolvency law ; the study of European competition law, European institutions, national competition authorities, and companies.

Throughout this unprecedented crisis which is hitting all major economies in the EU, the escalation of the Eurozone recession increasingly undermines public confidence in the ability of competitive markets to deliver positive outcomes. A debate on the most appropriate way to enforce competition rules, in light of the crisis, is definitely useful. A “relaxed” stance to competition during difficult periods may be tempting and indeed, this has often been the approach used in the past. However, the enforcement of competition rules is no less important during times of crisis than during normal periods. It has also been argued that, when public resources are stretched to the limit and businesses are struggling to survive, competition authorities should seek to focus their limited resources on those anticompetitive practices which are most detrimental to consumer welfare such as cartels. Indeed, if over-enforcement is perhaps undesirable when the economy is functioning well, it will inevitably become more problematic during an economic downturn. In addition, business managers may be increasingly tempted to resort to anticompetitive practices when faced with economic hardship. This book will appeal to judges and lawyers in competition law, European law, business/corporate law and insolvency law ; the study of European competition law, European institutions, national competition authorities, and companies.

This volume contains the papers presented at the annual Concurrences Journal conference held on 22 February 2013 at the French Parliament. After a key note paper from Commissionner Joaquin Almunia on the state of competition policy enforcement in the EU in 2013, the papers adress four main issues : • Opening competition in protected sectors: Should new entrants be protected? • Personal data: Will competition law collide with privacy? • Private enforcement: Will the wave be coming from Brussels, London, Paris or… elsewhere? • Industrial policy: Can a pro-competition industrial policy exist? The volume ends by a contribution of Fleur Pellerin on innovation and competition.

"This book offers a well-argued and insightful critical assessment of the shortcomings of international trade and competition rules in tackling interventionist State measures in the context of an economic crisis. Dawar offers an evidence-rich account of the challenges that State protectionism creates for international trade liberalisation and for the protection of competition in international markets. Her insights will be particularly interesting in the context of current events leading to another surge of State economic interventionism, both for academics and for policy-makers with an interest in international trade." Dr Albert Sanchez-Graells, University of Bristol Law School "This book bursts the bubble of the self-congratulatory attitude that existing institutions, which were set up to discipline governments from a race to the bottom on economic policy, worked well after the financial crisis. These institutions may have prevented tariff wars, a big achievement compared to the time of the Great Depression. But they went along with the subsidies and state aid that governments put in place after 2007. Such flexibility on economic policy is essential in turbulent times. But these institutions are undermined if flexibility comes with a race to the bottom that shifts money away from policies for the more marginalized sections of society. At a time when the left behinds are changing the political landscape of the world, Kamala's book debunks the myth of the success of existing institutions in containing the economic fallout of the global financial crisis. It gives a sobering warning of what might unfold when institutions deal with economic challenges by turning a blind eye to their own rules for checking unfair competition." Dr Swati Dhingra, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Economics, London School of Economomics 'An impressive contribution to our understanding of the financial crisis. Dawar's reading of bailouts and buy national through the lens of competition law and government procurement law and policy is inspirational.' Professor Mary E Footer, University of Nottingham School of Law 'The diplomatic fiction that during the crisis years regional and global trade rules ensured a level commercial playing field is skewered by Dawar's trenchant legal analysis.' Professor Simon Evenett, University of St Gallen This book examines the international regulation of crises bailouts and buy national policies. It undertakes this research with specific reference to the crisis years 2008–2012. The book includes a comparative analysis of the regulation of public procurement and subsidies aid at both multilateral and regional levels, identifying the strengths and weakness in the WTO legal framework and selected regional trade agreements (RTAs). Ultimately, the aim of this work is to provide options for improving the consistency of these laws and the regulation of these markets. This is of immediate relevance for good economic governance, as well as for managing future systemic financial crises in the interests of citizens: as tax payers and consumers.

A common criticism of the competition rules posed by EU authorities is that they are too inflexible, thereby prohibiting adequate responses to economic and industrial shocks. Competition Law in Crisis challenges this suggestion through an examination of competition responses to crises past and present. With an analysis spanning the response of UK and EU competition authorities to the economic and commercial outfall of the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and potential responses to the climate crisis in the context of post-Brexit British industrial policy, the book argues that relaxing the competition regime is precisely the wrong response. The rigidity of competition rules in the UK and EU has both normative and positive implications for not just the methodology used in competition analysis, but also the role of competition law within the legal order of both jurisdictions. The book concludes with a discussion of the place of the competition in the UK's and EU's legal order.

The paper looks at two aspects of the Covid-19 pandemic. These are (i) the nature of this event and its implication for evaluating past policy and policy into the future, and (ii) the suitability of proposed changes in the implementation of competition policy affecting firm behaviour, market structures and state intervention. The first conclusion the paper reaches is that it is incorrect to describe the Covid-19 pandemic as a "Black Swan" event, unpredicted and unpredictable, and something for which it is not possible to prepare. Policy makers should accept responsibility for possible future events such as pandemics even when timing is uncertain. In the case of Covid-19, policy measures were clearly inadequate. The paper then considers the design and implementation of measures aimed at supporting economic recovery. The arguments that competition policy should be relaxed for the duration of the problem is rejected as ill-founded and counterproductive. In particular, it is wrong to treat the response to the Financial Crisis of 2008-2011 as justifying reduced competition in general. Some aspects of particular policy designs, decisions and actions in response to the recession flowing from the medical response to Covid-19 are subjected to critical analysis.

Luís Silva Morais - Evolutionary Trends of EC Competition Law ? Convergence and Divergence with US Antitrust Law in a Context of Economic Crisis Este artigo faz parte da Revista de Concorrência e Regulação ? Ano 1 ? N.o 1 ? Janeiro-Março 2010 Consulte a página da revista em http://cr.almedina.net Esta revista está também disponível como parte de uma Assinatura.