In this penetrating analysis, Bradford Gray tackles the thorny issues surrounding the question of to whom and for what our physicians and hospitals are accountable. This book provides a careful evaluation of the mechanisms of accountability that have developed along with a growing profit orientation of health care, and it alerts us to keep a sharp eye focused on who is looking out for the interests of the patient.

"[This book is] the most authoritative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of recent trends toward the commercialization of health care," says Robert Pear of The New York Times. This major study by the Institute of Medicine examines virtually all aspects of for-profit health care in the United States, including the quality and availability of health care, the cost of medical care, access to financial capital, implications for education and research, and the fiduciary role of the physician. In addition to the report, the book contains 15 papers by experts in the field of for-profit health care covering a broad range of topicsâ€"from trends in the growth of major investor-owned hospital companies to the ethical issues in for-profit health care. "The report makes a lasting contribution to the health policy literature." â€"Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law.

"We examine the evolving structure of the U.S. hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding their objectives and costs of capital. The model predicts for-profits would be quicker to enter and exit than not-for-profits in response to changing market conditions. We test this hypothesis using data for all U.S. hospitals from 1984 through 2000. Examining annual and regional entry and exit rates, for-profit hospitals consistently have higher entry and exit rates than not-for-profits. Econometric modeling of entry and exit rates yields similar patterns. Estimates of an ordered probit model of entry indicate that entry is more responsive to demand changes for for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. Estimates of a discrete hazard model for exit similarly indicate that negative demand shifts increase the probability of exit more for for-profits than not-for-profits. Finally, membership in a hospital chain significantly decreases the probability of exit for for-profits, but not not-for-profits"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

We examine the evolving structure of the U.S. hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding their objectives and costs of capital. The model predicts for-profits would be quicker to enter and exit than not-for-profits in response to changing market conditions. We test this hypothesis using data for all U.S. hospitals from 1984 through 2000. Examining annual and regional entry and exit rates, for-profit hospitals consistently have higher entry and exit rates than not-for-profits. Econometric modeling of entry and exit rates yields similar patterns. Estimates of an ordered probit model of entry indicate that entry is more responsive to demand changes for for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. Estimates of a discrete hazard model for exit similarly indicate that negative demand shifts increase the probability of exit more for for-profits than not-for-profits. Finally, membership in a hospital chain significantly decreases the probability of exit for for-profits, but not not-for-profits.

An introduction to the new health care for profit. Legal differences between investor-owned and nonprofit health care institutions. Wall Street and the for-profit hospital management companies. When investor-owned corporations buy hospitals: some issues and concerns. Physician involvement in hospital decision making. Economic incentives and clinical decisions. Ethical dilemmas of for-profit enterprise in health care. Secondary income from recommended treatment: should fiduciary principles constrain physician behavior?