The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, caused tremendous loss of life, property, and income, and the resulting response from public and private organizations was unprecedented. This monograph examines the benefits received by those who were killed or seriously injured on 9/11 and the benefits provided to individuals and businesses in New York City that suffered losses from the attack on the World Trade Center. The authors examine the performance of the compensation system--insurance, tort, government programs, and charity--in responding to the losses stemming from 9/11.

This book provides a multifaceted array of answers to the question, In the ten years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, how has America responded? In a series of essays, RAND authors lend a farsighted perspective to the national dialogue on 9/11's legacy. The essays assess the military, political, fiscal, social, cultural, psychological, and even moral implications of U.S. policymaking since 9/11. Part One of the book addresses the lessons learned from America's accomplishments and mistakes in its responses to the 9/11 attacks and the ongoing terrorist threat. Part Two explores reactions to the extreme ideologies of the terrorists and to the fears they have generated. Part Three presents the dilemmas of asymmetrical warfare and suggests ways to resolve them. Part Four cautions against sacrificing a long-term strategy by imposing short-term solutions, particularly with respect to air passenger security and counterterrorism intelligence. Finally, Part Five looks at the effects of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. public health system, at the potential role of compensation policy for losses incurred by terrorism, and at the possible long-term effects of terrorism and counterterrorism on American values, laws, and society.--Publisher description.

The most comprehensive account to date of the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon and aftermath, this volume includes unprecedented details on the impact on the Pentagon building and personnel and the scope of the rescue, recovery, and caregiving effort. It features 32 pages of photographs and more than a dozen diagrams and illustrations not previously available.

The inspiration for the Netflix film 'Worth,' starring Michael Keaton, Stanley Tucci, and Amy Ryan: the true story of the man put in charge of the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, and a testament to the enduring power of family, grief, love, fear, frustration, and courage. Just days after September 11, 2001, Kenneth Feinberg was appointed to administer the federal 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, a unique, unprecedented fund established by Congress to compensate families who lost a loved one on 9/11 and survivors who were physically injured in the attacks. Those who participated in the Fund were required to waive their right to sue the airlines involved in the attacks, as well as other potentially responsible entities. When the program was launched, many families criticized it as a brazen, tight-fisted attempt to protect the airlines from lawsuits. The Fund was also attacked as attempting to put insulting dollar values on the lives of lost loved ones. The families were in pain. And they were angry. Over the course of the next three years, Feinberg spent almost all of his time meeting with the families, convincing them of the generosity and compassion of the program, and calculating appropriate awards for each and every claim. The Fund proved to be a dramatic success with over 97% of eligible families participating. It also provided important lessons for Feinberg, who became the filter, the arbitrator, and the target of family suffering. Feinberg learned about the enduring power of family grief, love, fear, faith, frustration, and courage. Most importantly, he learned that no check, no matter how large, could make the families and victims of 9/11 whole again.

The tragedy of September 11, 2001 was so sudden and devastating that it may be difficult at this point in time to write dispassionately and objectively about its effects on the U.S. economy. This retrospective review will attempt such an undertaking. The loss of lives and property on 9/11 was not large enough to have had a measurable effect on the productive capacity of the United States even though it had a very significant localized effect on New York City and, to a lesser degree, on the greater Washington, D.C. area. Thus, for 9/11 to affect the economy it would have had to have affected the price of an important input, such as energy, or had an adverse effect on aggregate demand via such mechanisms as consumer and business confidence, a financial panic or liquidity crisis, or an international run on the dollar. It was initially thought that aggregate demand was seriously affected, for while the existing data showed that GDP growth was low in the first half of 2001, data published in October showed that GDP had contracted during the 3rd quarter. This led to the claim that "The terrorist attacks pushed a weak economy over the edge into an outright recession." We now know, based on revised data, this is not so. At the time of 9/11 the economy was in its third consecutive quarter of contraction; positive growth resumed in the 4th quarter. This would suggest that any effects from 9/11 on demand were short lived. While this may be true, several events took place before, on, and shortly after 9/11, that made recovery either more rapid than it might have been or made it possible to take place. First, the Federal Reserve had eased credit during the first half of 2001 to stimulate aggregate demand. The economy responds to policy changes with a lag in time. Thus, the public response may have been felt in the 4th quarter giving the appearance that 9/11 had only a limited effect. Second, the Federal Reserve on and immediately after 9/11 took appropriate action to avert a financial panic and liquidity shortage. This was supplemented by support from foreign central banks to shore up the dollar in world markets and limited the contagion of 9/11 from spreading to other national economies. Nevertheless, U.S. trade with other countries, especially Canada, was disrupted. While oil prices spiked briefly, they quickly returned to their pre-9/11 levels. Thus, it can be argued, timely action contained the short run economic effects of 9/11 on the overall economy. Over the longer run 9/11 will adversely affect U.S. productivity growth because resources are being and will be used to ensure the security of production, distribution, finance, and communication.

The Impact of 9/11 on Business and Economics is the second volume of the six-volume series The Day that Changed Everything? edited by Matthew J. Morgan. The series brings together from a broad spectrum of disciplines the leading thinkers of our time to reflect on one of the most significant events of our time.

The strike against the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, was a violent blow against the United States and a symbolic attack on capitalism and commerce. It shut down one of the world's busiest commercial centers for weeks, destroyed or damaged billions of dollars worth of property, and forced many New York City employers to slash their payrolls or move jobs to other areas. The immediate economic effect was substantial, but how badly did 9/11 affect New York City's economy in the longer term? In Resilient City, Howard Chernick and a team of economic experts examine the city's economic recovery in the three years following the destruction of the Twin Towers. Assessing multiple facets of the New York City economy in the years after 9/11, Resilient City discerns many hopeful signs among persistent troubles. Analysis by economist Sanders Korenman indicates that the value of New York–based companies did not fall relative to other firms, indicating that investors still believe that there are business advantages to operating in New York despite higher rates of terrorism insurance and concerns about future attacks. Cordelia Reimers separates the economic effect of 9/11 from the effects of the 2001 recession by comparing employment and wage trends for disadvantaged workers in New York with those in five major U.S. cities. She finds that New Yorkers fared at least as well as people in other cities, suggesting that the decline in earnings and employment for low-income New York workers in 2002 was due more to the recession than to the effects of 9/11. Still, troubles remain for New York City. Howard Chernick considers the substantial fiscal implications of the terrorist attacks on New York City, estimating that the attack cost the city about $3 billion in the first two years alone; a sum that the city now must make up through large tax increases, spending cuts, and substantial additional borrowing, which will inevitably be a burden on future budgets. The terrorist attacks of September 11 dealt a severe blow to the economy of New York City, but it was far from a knock-out punch. Resilient City shows that New York's dynamic, flexible economy has absorbed the hardships inflicted by the attacks, and provides a thorough, authoritative A Russell Sage Foundation September 11 Initiative Volume