This contribution argues that recent Europe-decisions of national constitutional courts demonstrate a new quality of comparative legal reasoning. Whereas classic EU related case-law reflects comparative law dimensions at best by sporadic references to foreign case law, some constitutional courts in Europe have now taken a path towards a more elaborate use of comparative reasoning, including in-depth and sometimes even critical evaluations of foreign jurisprudence in the ratio decidendi. Beyond the traditional motives for courts to rely on comparative law, one particular reason for this intensification seems to be the aim to take an active role in an EU-wide process of shaping a common constitutional law. Seen in a transnational perspective, comparative reasoning by judges can be more than a mere reference to foreign law as such: In fact, the judicial evaluation of foreign Europe-decisions can simultaneously be an evaluation of propositions on common constitutional standards. Comparative reasoning by courts then becomes an active contribution to a transnational dialogue of judges on the making of a common constitutional law in Europe.

To what extent is the language of judicial opinions responsive to the political and social context in which constitutional courts operate? Courts are reason-giving institutions, with argumentation playing a central role in constitutional adjudication. However, a cursory look at just a handful of constitutional systems suggests important differences in the practices of constitutional judges, whether in matters of form, style, or language. Focusing on independently-verified leading cases globally, a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis offers the most comprehensive and systematic account of constitutional reasoning to date. This analysis is supported by the examination of eighteen legal systems around the world including the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. Universally common aspects of constitutional reasoning are identified in this book, and contributors also examine whether common law countries differ to civil law countries in this respect.

The decisions courts make in constitutional rights cases pervade our political life and touch on our most basic interests and values. The spread of judicial review of legislation around the world means that courts are increasingly called on to settle matters of moral and political controversy, including assisted suicide, data privacy, anti-terrorism measures, marriage, and abortion. But doubts regarding the institutional capacities of courts for deciding such questions are growing. Judges now regularly review social science research to assess whether a law will effectively achieve its aim, and at what cost to other interests. They cite studies and statistical information from psychology, sociology, medicine, and other disciplines in which they are rarely trained. This empirical reasoning proceeds alongside open-ended moral reasoning, with judges employing terms such as equality, liberty, and autonomy, then determining what these require in concrete circumstances. This book shows that courts were not designed for this kind of moral and empirical reasoning. It argues that in comparison to legislatures, the institutional capacities of courts are deficient. Legislatures are better equipped than courts for deliberating and decision-making in regard to the kinds of factual and moral issues that arise in constitutional rights cases. The book concludes by considering the implications of comparative institutional capacity for constitutional design. Is a system of judicial review of legislation something that constitutional framers should choose to adopt? If so, in what form? For countries with systems of judicial review, practical proposals are made to remedy deficiencies in the institutional capacities of courts.

The last two decades have witnessed an exponential growth in debates on the use of foreign law by courts. Different labels have been attached to the same phenomenon: judges drawing inspiration from outside of their national legal systems for solving purely domestic disputes. By doing so, the judges are said to engage in cross-border judicial dialogues. They are creating a larger, transnational community of judges. This book puts similar claims to test in relation to highest national jurisdictions (supreme and constitutional courts) in Europe today. How often and why do judges choose to draw inspiration from foreign materials in solving domestic cases? The book addresses these questions from both an empirical and a theoretical angle. Empirically, the genuine use of comparative arguments by national highest courts in five European jurisdictions is examined: England and Wales, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. On the basis of comparative discussion of the practice and its national theoretical underpinning in these and partially also in other European systems, an overreaching theoretical framework for the current judicial use of comparative arguments is developed. Drawing on the author's own past judicial experience in a national supreme court, this book is a critical account of judicial engagement with foreign authority in Europe today. The sober middle ground inductively conceptualized and presented in this book provides solid jurisprudential foundations for the ongoing use of comparative arguments by courts as well as its further scholarly discussion.

The Making of Modern Law: Foreign, Comparative and International Law, 1600-1926, brings together foreign, comparative, and international titles in a single resource. Its International Law component features works of some of the great legal theorists, including Gentili, Grotius, Selden, Zouche, Pufendorf, Bijnkershoek, Wolff, Vattel, Martens, Mackintosh, Wheaton, among others. The materials in this archive are drawn from three world-class American law libraries: the Yale Law Library, the George Washington University Law Library, and the Columbia Law Library.Now for the first time, these high-quality digital scans of original works are available via print-on-demand, making them readily accessible to libraries, students, independent scholars, and readers of all ages.+++++++++++++++The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to insure edition identification: +++++++++++++++Columbia University Law LibraryLP3C001200219020101The Making of Modern Law: Foreign, Comparative, and International Law, 1600-1926Boston, U.S.A.; London: Ginn & Company, 19022 v. 24 cmUnited StatesUnited Kingdom

Precedent is an important tool of judicial decision making and reasoning in common law systems such as the United States. Instead of having each court decide cases anew, the rule of precedent or stares decisis dictates that similar cases should be decided similarly. Adherence to precedent promotes several values, including stability, reliability, and uniformity, and it also serves to constrain judicial discretion. While adherence to precedent is important, there are some cases where the United States Supreme Court does not follow it when it comes to constitutional reasoning. Over time the US Supreme Court under its different Chief Justices has approached rejection of its own precedent in different ways and at varying rates of reversal. This book examines the role of constitutional precedent in US Supreme Court reasoning.

In this book one of the longest-standing members of The Venice Commission reflects on the work of the institution to show how constitutional law in Europe (and beyond) has become increasingly borderless. Over nine chapters, the book tracks the work of the Commission, illustrating the law both in action and in its broader political and historical context. It looks at its treatment of the judiciary and judicial conflicts, including the present crisis of the rule of law in Central Eastern Europe Member States of the European Union. Finally it suggests how all this can only be sensibly understood as a feature of the broader trend towards the internationalisation of constitutional law.