"NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia's external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB’s findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan.1 Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations."--PDF Executive summary.

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia's external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The Columbia accident was not survivable. After the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) investigation regarding the cause of the accident was completed, further consideration produced the question of whether there were lessons to be learned about how to improve crew survival in the future. This investigation was performed with the belief that a comprehensive, respectful investigation could provide knowledge that can protect future crews in the worldwide community of human space flight. Additionally, in the course of the investigation, several areas of research were identified that could improve our understanding of both nominal space flight and future spacecraft accidents. This report is the first comprehensive, publicly available accident investigation report addressing crew survival for a human spacecraft mishap, and it provides key information for future crew survival investigations. The results of this investigation are intended to add meaning to the sacrifice of the crew's lives by making space flight safer for all future generations.

CD-ROM accompanying vol. 1 contains text of vol. 1 in PDF files and six related motion picture files in Quicktime format.

"NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia's external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB’s findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan.1 Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations."--PDF Executive summary.

Human space flight is still in its infancy; spacecraft navigate narrow tracks of carefully computed ascent and entry trajectories with little allowable deviation. Until recently, it remained the province of a few governments. As private industry and more countries join in this great enterprise, we must share findings that may help protect those who venture into space. In the history of NASA, this approach has resulted in many improvements in crew survival. After the Apollo 1 fire, sweeping changes were made to spacecraft design and to the way crew rescue equipment was positioned and available at the launch pad. After the Challenger accident, a jettisonable hatch, personal oxygen systems, parachutes, rafts, and pressure suits were added to ascent and entry operations of the space shuttle. As we move toward a time when human space flight will be commonplace, there is an obligation to make this inherently risky endeavor as safe as feasible. Design features, equipment, training, and procedures all play a role in improving crew safety and survival in contingencies. In aviation, continual improvement in oxygen systems, pressure suits, parachutes, ejection seats, and other equipment and systems has been made. It is a core value in the aviation world to evaluate these systems in every accident and pool the data to understand how design improvements may improve the chances that a crew will survive in a future accident. The Columbia accident was not survivable. After the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) investigation regarding the cause of the accident was completed, further consideration produced the question of whether there were lessons to be learned about how to improve crew survival in the future. This investigation was performed with the belief that a comprehensive, respectful investigation could provide knowledge that can protect future crews in the worldwide community of human space flight. Additionally, in the course of the investigation, several areas of research were identified that could improve our understanding of both nominal space flight and future spacecraft accidents. This report is the first comprehensive, publicly available accident investigation report addressing crew survival for a human spacecraft mishap, and it provides key information for future crew survival investigations. The results of this investigation are intended to add meaning to the sacrifice of the crew's lives by making space flight safer for all future generations. Many findings, conclusions, and recommendations have resulted from this investigation that will be valuable both to spacecraft designers and accident investigators. This report provides the reader an expert level of knowledge regarding the sequence of events that contributed to the loss of Columbia's crew on February 1, 2003 and what can be learned to improve the safety of human space flight for all future crews. It is the team's expectation that readers will approach the report with the respect and integrity that the subject and the crew of Columbia deserve.

A thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle ¿Columbia¿ and her crew on 2/1/03. The investigation determined that a large piece of insulating foam from ¿Columbia¿s external tank had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The shuttle was redesigned and returned to flight. A comprehensive analysis focused on factors and events affecting crew survival. Recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles were made. This report contains the results of the investigation of all elements of crew survival, incl. the design features, equip., training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. Illus.