This paper seeks to shed light on the question of the likely evolution of collective bargaining in Europe under EMU by considering the experiences of two countries (Italy and Spain) in which governments and social actors attempted to decentralized collective bargaining during the 1980s only to opt in favor of a re-centralization of bargaining during the 1990s. The paper argues that the experiences of Italy and Spain offer two kinds of insights for our understanding of the future evolution of wage bargaining in the EU. On the one hand, they illustrate why governments and social actors may come to favor a consolidation of the structure of bargaining under EMU rather than opt for a further decentralization of bargaining. On the other hand, they also suggest that any such process of consolidation faces great obstacles in moving beyond the national level. The recent experiences of Italy and Spain thus lead us to conclude that the most likely outcome in the EU is that of a reaffirmation of the national and national/sectoral-levels of bargaining within member states, rather than either a radical decentralization of bargaining across the EU, or an effective shift to EU-level bargaining.

First published in 1999, this volume recognises that in the course of European integration, national economic policy makers lose some effective policy instruments. Contributors to this omnibus volume analyse the 'room for maneuvering' available to national and EU economic and social policies under the conditions of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). They explore the possibilities for European coordination and discuss the tasks of employers’ associations and labour unions on the national and EU level in wage, employment and macroeconomic policies. Section 1 of the book deals with the strengths and weaknesses of the EU in the context of global competition. In spite of national differences, many of the EU member countries share important characteristics. Section 2 addresses the need for and the feasibility of policy coordination in the EMU. With the start of the EMU, wage policy will have to bear the main burden of absorbing asymmetrical economic shocks. The authors from the DIW argue that a wage policy favourable to economic growth, employment and convergence has to be guided by the inflation target set by the European Central Bank (ECB) and by the long-term increase of productivity in individual countries. A precondition for this kind of wage policy is coordination between the main actors of EU economic policy (ECB, EcoFin, social partners).

This important collection presents an authoritative selection of papers on "Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities" This publication is intent on building bridges between economics and the other social sciences. The focus is on the interaction between monetary policy and wage bargaining institutions in European Monetary Union (EMU). Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is written by acknowledged experts in their field. The outcome is a broad analysis of the interactions of labour market actors and central banks. The volume addresses the recent changes in EMU. An important theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant conclusion that emerges from Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-term real effects, even in equilibrium models with fully rational expectations.

In this book, first-rate international scholars in the field explore the role that unions are likely to play in the changed economic environment of the new century. Questions discussed include: What will unions look like in the years to come? Which kind of interest groups will they represent? How important will be the broader political role of unions? To what extent do unions care about future generations? Part One documents a tendency towards greater decentralization in collective bargaining and declining union membership rates in most European countries. The process of decentralization may only be partly reversed by social pacts of the type that occurred in several EU countries in the run-up to EMU. Yet this type of co-ordination is likely to be increasingly unstable in a context where membership is falling, hence will inevitably require government intervention. Not all governments may wish to intervene in wage setting, however, as there are strong reasons to believe that such intervention could impose wage rigidities in some parts of the economy and lead to non-enforcement in other parts. Moreover, under EMU what matters is ultimately co-ordination of bargaining at the pan-European level rather than simply at the national level. Such higher-level, transnational co-ordination is not likely to occur for a long time to come because of the huge costs that it involves. Some transnational co-ordination may occur within multinational firms, however, as costs are likely to be much lower at this level. Part Two characterizes the intergenerational conflicts present within unions. Unions may be able to better respond to the needs of the unemployed without losing the support of current employees when they become involved in the running of unemployment benefit systems, as has been the case in those countries applying the so-called Ghent system. They may also succeed in making the system more efficient by, for example, contributing to the reduction of moral hazard problems associated with the provision of unemployment insurance. Unions are, however, unlikely to solve the latent conflict between their younger and older members in a context where the population is ageing, since they tend to preserve the status quo when it comes to cutting pension benefits in order to deal with demographic transition. The cost of these dynamic inefficiencies may be accepted by younger generations as long as an intergenerational contract can be enforced whereby unions guarantee that the status quo will be preserved, and are credible in their commitment. Unions could play a key role in this implicit intergenerational pact because they are long-lived agents—-certainly longer-lived than many governments—-but, under present conditions, this pact may be no longer credible.