One of the few consistent aspects of my life is that I can be described as a people watcher. It is a hobby I engage in every time I am in the presence of others. From my observations there is no trait that we humans possess more obvious, consistent, plentiful, and yet, undeservedly shunned as a monstrosity of power hungry men, than the very trait of ambition. I am still always a little surprised when a cringe follows the allegation of such conduct. If thought about in an everyday context I could envision few circumstances, outside of the atom bomb, which would evoke that same recoil. Certainly, I would say, no one would detest written language, civilization, interstellar technologies, and every other realm where mans ambition carries us onward and upward. I do, however, fully recognize the dark side of mans desire and confess my intent fascination in it. I find it oddly commendable the risks some are willing to take. If administered in the right dosage ones success cannot be quantified. But as in life people do choose to overdose. It is in these choices, and the consequences thereof, where the book resides most heavily.

But in general, Reiss suggests, nuclear weapons may have come to be viewed as expensive and dangerous anachronisms.

Stemming from an international and multidisciplinary network of leading specialists, this best-selling text is fully updated with new chapter additions. With the first edition prepared at the end of the last century and the second edition adding inter-regional relations, this new edition focuses on competing models of regional cooperation within a multipolar world and the role of European Union. This new edition offers: - A comparative analysis of regional cooperation and of both US-centred and EU-centred interregionalism. - A fresh exploration of key issues of regionalism versus globalization and the potential for world economic and political governance through regional cooperation, notably in hard times. - A vigorous response to conventional wisdom on the controversial EU international identity - An appendix on regional and interregional organizations. - A key resource for postgraduate or undergraduate study and research of international relations, European integration studies, comparative politics and international political economy. Taking into account both the expanded European Union and regional cooperation in every continent, this multidisciplinary volume comprises contributions from established scholars in the field: A. Gamble, P. Padoan, G. Joffé, G. Therborn, Th. Meyer, R. Higgott, B. Hettne / F. Ponjaert, F. Soederbaum, Ch. Deblock, K. Eliassen / A. Arnottir, S. Keukeleire / I. Petrova, S. Santander and M. Telò (editor).

What were the origins of British ideas on rural poverty, and how did they shape development practice in Malawi? How did the international development narrative influence the poverty discourse in postcolonial Malawi from the 1960s onwards? In The State and the Legacies of British Colonial Development in Malawi: Confronting Poverty, 1939–1983, Gift Wasambo Kayira addresses these questions. Although by no means rehabilitating colonialism, the book argues that the intentions of officials and agencies charged with delivering economic development programs were never as ill-informed or wicked as some theorists have contended. Raising rural populations from poverty was on the agenda before and after independence. How to reconcile the pressing demand of stabilizing the country’s economy and alleviating rural poverty within the context of limited resources proved an impossible task to achieve. Also difficult was how to reconcile the interests of outside experts influenced by international geopolitics and theories of economic development and those of local personnel and politicians. As a result, development efforts always fell short of their goals. Through a meticulous search of the archive on rural and industrial development projects, Kayira presents a development history that displays the shortfalls of existing works on development inadequately grounded in historical study.

In his eagerly-awaited second edition of American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition, James Ray revisits his deceptively simple premise that the highest priority of leaders is to stay in power. Looking at how political ambition and domestic pressures impact foreign policymaking is the key to understanding how and why foreign policy decisions are made. The text begins by using this analytic approach to look at the history of foreign policymaking and then examines how various parties inside and outside government influence decision making. In a unique third section, the book takes a regional approach, not only covering trends other books tend to miss, but giving students the opportunity to think comprehensively about how issues intersect around the globe—from human security and democratization, to globalization and pollution. Guided by input from adopters and reviewers, Ray has thoroughly re-organized the book and streamlined some coverage to better consolidate the historical, institutional, regional, and topical chapters and focus the thematic lens of the book. Ray has also brought the book fully up-to-date, addressing the latest events in American foreign policy, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the killing of Bin Laden, the WikiLeaks scandal and its aftermath, the impact of social media on foreign policy and world affairs, nuclear proliferation, developments in U.S.-Russian relations, climate change, and more.

In the popular imagination, space is the final frontier. Will that frontier be a wild west, or will it instead be treated as the oceans are: as a global commons, where commerce is allowed to flourish and no one country dominates? At this moment, nations are free to send missions to Mars or launch space stations. Space satellites are vital to many of the activities that have become part of our daily lives—from weather forecasting to GPS and satellite radio. The militaries of the United States and a host of other nations have also made space a critical arena—spy and communication satellites are essential to their operations. Beginning with the Reagan administration and its attempt to create a missile defense system to protect against attack by the Soviet Union, the U.S. military has decided that the United States should be the dominant power in space in order to protect civilian and defense assets. In Heavenly Ambitions, Joan Johnson-Freese draws from a myriad of sources to argue that the United States is on the wrong path: first, by politicizing the question of space threats and, second, by continuing to believe that military domination in space is the only way to protect U.S. interests in space. Johnson-Freese, who has written and lectured extensively on space policy, lays out her vision of the future of space as a frontier where nations cooperate and military activity is circumscribed by arms control treaties that would allow no one nation to dominate—just as no one nation's military dominates the world's oceans. This is in the world's interest and, most important, in the U.S. national interest.

Kennedy, Adenauer and the Making of the Berlin Wall, 1958-1961 The Second Berlin Crisis, which began with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany in November 1958, has largely been interpreted by foreign policy historians as a conflict between the superpowers, in which the dependent allies - the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR - had almost no influence on the course of events that led to the erection of the Berlin Wall. This interpretation served the political purposes of the governments involved for most of the Cold War. The Kennedy administration as leading government of the Western world could claim to have successfully managed a difficult crisis; the Adenauer administration and the Ulbricht regime could both point to Washington's and Moscow's responsibility for the division of Germany's capital; and Khrushchev, as leading statesman of the Warsaw pact, could finally deliver on some of his promises made to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, recent findings suggest that Ulbricht, not Khrushchev, was the driving force behind the decision to close the East Berlin sector. In the course of the first two years of the Kennedy administration, severe problems arose in West German-American relations. It is time to ask how the West German government's interactions with the Kennedy administration influenced the course of the crisis. President Eisenhower had seemingly managed to avoid an escalation of the Berlin crisis from 1958 to late 1960. This came at the cost of increasing pressure for his successor to find a solution. Ten months into the Kennedy administration, Berlin was divided by a wall, and American and Soviet tanks faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie. This dissertation reexamines the interactions between the Western governments, in particular between West Germany and the United States during the Second Berlin Crisis, and shows how these affected the outcome of the crisis. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the historiography of the Berlin Crisis and German-American relations in the period, especially between the Kennedy and Adenauer governments, and defines the pertinent questions; the second chapter provides an outline of the first two years of the crisis and the Eisenhower administration's approach to Adenauer and Berlin, especially as to Western policy on Berlin when the Eisenhower administration handed over the reins; the third to fifth chapters trace the Kennedy administration's and Chancellor Adenauer's interactions during the crisis in 1961 with particular regard to the actual sealing off of West Berlin, and the last chapter finally serves as an overview of the immediate aftermath. I argue that four key assumptions about the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961 can no longer be upheld: 1. The claim that Kennedy had stood firm on Berlin and merely continued the Eisenhower posture on Berlin is wrong. Instead, the Kennedy administration attempted to find new approaches to Berlin and Germany in line with its general revision of US foreign policy. 2. The notion that the closing of the sector border came as a surprise is not supported by the documents. President Kennedy had been informed numerous times that a closing of the sector border could be expected within the year. 3. Adenauer's policy to prevent diplomatic recognition of the GDR contributed to an escalation of Washington's search for alternative policy options, rather than slowing them. The West German election campaign in 1961 further limited the chancellor's willingness to make changes to his foreign policy. The Kennedy administration eventually sought accommodation with Khrushchev without consulting Bonn. 4. Inherent conceptual mistakes in Kennedy's early foreign policy agenda exacerbated the crisis, rather than contributed to its eventual solution. An additional lack of trust between West Germany and the United States complicated and delayed the attempt to find a more coherent, unified Western approach. All four Western governments anticipated an end to the refugee flow through West Berlin as the first step in a crisis escalation, while developing no contingency plans for this step. The lack of any political intention to prevent the expected stop of the refugee flow became the casting mould for Ulbricht's plan to close the sector border, a plan Khrushchev eventually made his own. By leaving Ulbricht and Khrushchev with only one option, Western policies on Berlin and Germany unwillingly conspired to force East Germany to face its systemic flaws in the summer of 1961.