As usual, the Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Cognitive Science include leading-edge work by outstanding researchers in the field. This volume contains three kinds of papers corresponding to three of the main disciplines in cognitive science: philosophy, psychology, and artificial intelligence. The title - Cognition, Agency and Rationality - captures the main issues addressed by the papers. Of course, all are concerned with cognition, but some are especially centred on the very concept of rationality, while others focus on (multiple) agency. The diversity of their disciplinary origins and standpoints not only reflects the main topics and the range of different positions presented at ICCS-97, as well as demonstrating the richness, fruitfulness and diversity of research in cognitive science today.

This volume presents new conceptual and experimental studies which investigate the connection between vagueness and rationality from various systematic directions, such as philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology, computing science, and economics. Vagueness in language use and cognition has traditionally been interpreted in epistemic or semantic terms. The standard view of vagueness specifically suggests that considerations of agency or rationality, broadly conceived, can be left out of the equation. Most recently, new literature on vagueness has been released which suggests that the standard view is inadequate and that considerations of rationality should factor into more comprehensive models of vagueness. The methodological approaches presented here are diverse, ranging from philosophical interpretations of rational credence for vagueness to adaptations of choice theory (dynamic choice theory, revealed preference models, social choice theory), probabilistic models of pragmatic reasoning (Bayesian pragmatics), evolutionary game theory, and conceptual space models of categorisation.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and to computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. Sam Coval and Peter Campbell provide a painstaking and distinctive analysis of the nature of action and agency. They introduce a conception of acts which encompasses the purposes that motivate them, the beliefs on the basis of which they are undertaken, and the effects that they bring about. They compare and contrast their account with ones advanced by Davidson, Brand, Searle, Danto, and other, while elaborating its consequences for understanding the nature of alibis, mistakes, accidents, inadvertence, and the like. The valuable diagrams and the discussion of the software program they have developed, which implements their theory, amply displays the potential of combining philosophy and AI with law and other disciplines focused upon agency. J.H.F.

This volume represents an advanced, comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of the field of rational agency as it stands today. It covers the philosophical foundations of rational agency, logical and decision-theoretic approaches to rational agency, multi-agent aspects of rational agency and a number of approaches to programming rational agents. It will be of interest to researchers in logic, mainstream computer science, the philosophy of rational action and agency, and economics.

This book presents a new agency paradigm that can resolve complex socio-political situations in cross-cultural environments.

This volume presents new conceptual and experimental studies which investigate the connection between vagueness and rationality from various systematic directions, such as philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology, computing science, and economics. Vagueness in language use and cognition has traditionally been interpreted in epistemic or semantic terms. The standard view of vagueness specifically suggests that considerations of agency or rationality, broadly conceived, can be left out of the equation. Most recently, new literature on vagueness has been released which suggests that the standard view is inadequate and that considerations of rationality should factor into more comprehensive models of vagueness. The methodological approaches presented here are diverse, ranging from philosophical interpretations of rational credence for vagueness to adaptations of choice theory (dynamic choice theory, revealed preference models, social choice theory), probabilistic models of pragmatic reasoning (Bayesian pragmatics), evolutionary game theory, and conceptual space models of categorisation. I have no doubt that this volume will be a valuable contribution to the current literature on the topic. All chapters are refreshingly original, and they offer surprising connections between vagueness as a semantic phenomenon and other seemingly unrelated problems in game theory, Bayesian epistemology or social choice theory. As a result, the reader is able to acquire a broad understanding of the problem, as well as a sense of its pervasiveness. The book also exhibits a delicate balance between conceptual and experimental approaches to vagueness. It is highly recommended to scholars and graduate students working on epistemology, philosophy of language, cognitive psychology, or linguistics. Eleonora Cresto, CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina.