Coalition and Connection in Games: Problems of Modern Game Theory using Methods Belonging to Systems Theory and Information Theory focuses on coalition formation and on connections occurring in games, noting the use of mathematical models in the evaluation of processes involved in games. The book first takes a look at the process of strategy in playing games in which the conditional choices of players are noted. The sequence of decisions during the playing of games and observance of the rules are emphasized. The text also ponders on the mathematical tool of game theory in which the differences in the playing of games is seen as influenced by the number of players involved. The manuscript reviews how the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory is used in measuring the conditions on how games are played. The theory points out that games with more than two players call for the introduction of concepts and an instrument in comparison with two-person zero-sum games. The text also underscores the tendency of players to obtain a large share of the payoff, whether playing by themselves or participating in coalitions. The book is a fine reference for readers interested in the analysis of game theories.

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.

Two crucial aspects of economic reality are uncertainty and dynamics. In this book, new models and techniques are developed to analyse economic dynamics in an uncertain environment. In the first part, investment decisions of firms are analysed in a framework where imperfect information regarding the investment's profitability is obtained randomly over time. In the second part, a new class of cooperative games, spillover games, is developed and applied to a particular investment problem under uncertainty: mergers. In the third part, the effect of bounded rationality on market evolution is analysed for oligopolistic competition and incomplete financial markets.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2016, held in Kelowna, Canada, in May 2016. The 13 papers were carefully selected from 26 submissions and cover topics such as algorithmic game theory, game models and theories, game theories in wireless networks, design and analysis of economic games.

Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. - Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior - Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory - Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

The two-volume proceedings of the ACIIDS 2015 conference, LNAI 9011 + 9012, constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th Asian Conference on Intelligent Information and Database Systems, held in Bali, Indonesia, in March 2015. The total of 117 full papers accepted for publication in these proceedings was carefully reviewed and selected from 332 submissions. They are organized in the following topical sections: semantic web, social networks and recommendation systems; text processing and information retrieval; intelligent database systems; intelligent information systems; decision support and control systems; machine learning and data mining; multiple model approach to machine learning; innovations in intelligent systems and applications; bio-inspired optimization techniques and their applications; machine learning in biometrics and bioinformatics with applications; advanced data mining techniques and applications; collective intelligent systems for e-market trading, technology opportunity discovery and collaborative learning; intelligent information systems in security and defense; analysis of image, video and motion data in life sciences; augmented reality and 3D media; cloud based solutions; internet of things, big data and cloud computing; and artificial intelligent techniques and their application in engineering and operational research.