​The motivation for this volume is simple. For a variety of reasons, clinical psychologists have long shown considerable interest in the philosophy of science. When logical positivism gained currency in the 1930s, psychologists were among the most avid readers of what these philosophers had to say about science. Part of the critique of Skinner’s radical behaviorism and thus behavior therapy was that it relied on, and thus was logically dependent on, the truth of logical positivism—a claim decisively refuted both historically and logically by L.D. Smith (1986) in his important Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance. ​

This is the first major text designed to help professionals and students evaluate the merits of popular yet controversial practices in clinical psychology, differentiating those that can stand up to the rigors of science from those that cannot. Leading researchers review widely used therapies for alcoholism, infantile autism, ADHD, and posttraumatic stress disorder; herbal remedies for depression and anxiety; suggestive techniques for memory recovery; and self-help models. Other topics covered include issues surrounding psychological expert testimony, the uses of projective assessment techniques, and unanswered questions about dissociative identity disorder. Providing knowledge to guide truly accountable mental health practice, the volume also imparts critical skills for designing and evaluating psychological research programs. It is ideal for use in advanced undergraduate- and graduate-level courses in clinical psychology, psychotherapy, and evidence-based practice.

This major text provides the first comprehensive anthology of the key topics arising in the philosophy of psychology. Bringing together internationally renowned authors, including Herb Simon, Karl Pribram, Joseph Rychlak, Ullin T Place and Adolf Gr[um]unbaum, this volume offers a stimulating and informative addition to contemporary debate. With the cognitive revolution of the 1960s, there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of the philosophical assumptions and implications of psychology. Several significant themes, such as the foundations of knowledge, behaviourism, rationality, emotion and cognitive science span both philosophy and psychology, and are covered here along with a wide range of issues in the fields of folk psychology, clinical psychology, neurophysiology and professional ethics.

History and Philosophy of Psychology is a lively introduction to the historical development of psychology. Its distinct inclusion of ideas from both Eastern and Western philosophies offers students a uniquely broad view of human psychology. Whilst covering all the major landmarks in the history of psychology, the text also provides students with little-known but fascinating insights into key questions â?? such as whether Freud really cured his patients; what was nude psychotherapy; and were the early psychologists racist? Encourages students to explore the philosophical and theoretical implications of the historical development of psychology Explores key theoretical ideas and experiments in detail, with background to their development and valuable suggestions for further reading

This volume represents the results of the Sixteenth International Conference for Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, entitled “Neuroscience, Logic and Mental Development”. This edited collection brings together selected plenary and keynote papers from the conference, and represents a major contribution to an interdisciplinary dialogue in mental health through the use of new philosophical tools, emerging from neuroscience, clinical psychology, phenomenology and epistemology. The papers gathered in this volume are divided into four parts, depending on their disciplinary paradigm. The papers included in Part I are focused on advances in neuroscience and neuroimaging as theoretical underpinnings for progress in psychiatric and psychological explanations. Special attention is paid here to the critical reappraisal of current approaches to the implementation of neuroscience in mental health. Some of these papers end with suggestions for modifications to contemporary research programs. The papers belonging to Part II contribute to the psychological understanding of mental disorders, particularly personality disorders. Parts III and IV trace the implications of phenomenology and epistemology for the improvement of an interdisciplinary pluralogue in psychiatry.

This is a comprehensive resource of original essays by leading thinkers exploring the newly emerging inter-disciplinary field of the philosophy of psychiatry. The contributors aim to define this exciting field and to highlight the philosophical assumptions and issues that underlie psychiatric theory and practice, the category of mental disorder, and rationales for its social, clinical and legal treatment. As a branch of medicine and a healing practice, psychiatry relies on presuppositions that are deeply and unavoidably philosophical. Conceptions of rationality, personhood and autonomy frame our understanding and treatment of mental disorder. Philosophical questions of evidence, reality, truth, science, and values give meaning to each of the social institutions and practices concerned with mental health care. The psyche, the mind and its relation to the body, subjectivity and consciousness, personal identity and character, thought, will, memory, and emotions are equally the stuff of traditional philosophical inquiry and of the psychiatric enterprise. A new research field--the philosophy of psychiatry--began to form during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Prompted by a growing recognition that philosophical ideas underlie many aspects of clinical practice, psychiatric theorizing and research, mental health policy, and the economics and politics of mental health care, academic philosophers, practitioners, and philosophically trained psychiatrists have begun a series of vital, cross-disciplinary exchanges. This volume provides a sampling of the research yield of those exchanges. Leading thinkers in this area, including clinicians, philosophers, psychologists, and interdisciplinary teams, provide original discussions that are not only expository and critical, but also a reflection of their authors' distinctive and often powerful and imaginative viewpoints and theories. All the discussions break new theoretical ground. As befits such an interdisciplinary effort, they are methodologically eclectic, and varied and divergent in their assumptions and conclusions; together, they comprise a significant new exploration, definition, and mapping of the philosophical aspects of psychiatric theory and practice.

Well-being, happiness and quality of life are now established objects of social and medical research. Does this science produce knowledge that is properly about well-being? What sort of well-being? The definition and measurement of these objects rest on assumptions that are partly normative, partly empirical and partly pragmatic, producing a great diversity of definitions depending on the project and the discipline. This book, written from the perspective of philosophy of science, formulates principles for the responsible production and interpretation of this diverse knowledge. Traditionally, philosophers' goal has been a single concept of well-being and a single theory about what it consists in. But for science this goal is both unlikely and unnecessary. Instead the promise and authority of the science depends on it focusing on the well-being of specific kinds of people in specific contexts. Skeptical arguments notwithstanding, this contextual well-being can be measured in a valid and credible way - but only if scientists broaden their methods to make room for normative considerations and address publicly and inclusively the value-based conflicts that inevitably arise when a measure of well-being is adopted. The science of well-being can be normative, empirical and objective all at once, provided that we line up values to science and science to values.