En række afhandlinger om civil kontrol med militæret med dels teori og dels eksempler fortrinsvis fra udviklingslande. Det konkluderes, at det er gennemførligt, men at det kræver dygtighed, tålmodighed, ledelsesvilje og en god portion held.

Civilian control of the Armed Forces has been a bedrock principle of American government since our Revolution. A painting hanging in the Capitol Rotunda celebrates the legacy of George Washington, who voluntarily resigned his commission as Commander of the Continental Army to the Congress. This principle is enshrined in our Constitution, which divides control of the Armed Forces among the President, as Commander in Chief, and the Congress as coequal branches of government. Since then, Congress has adopted various provisions separating military and civilian positions. In the 19th century, for example, Congress prohibited an Army officer from accepting a civil office. More recently, in the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent revisions, Congress has prohibited any individual from serving as Secretary of Defense within seven years of Active Duty service as a commissioned officer in the Armed Forces. It was only three years later, in 1950, that Congress granted General George Marshall an exemption to that law and the Senate confirmed him to be Secretary of Defense. Indeed, the separation between civilian and military positions has not always been so clear. Twelve of our Nation's Presidents previously served as generals in the Armed Forces. Over the years, numerous high-ranking civilian officials in the Department of Defense have had long careers in military service. The basic responsibilities of civilian and military leaders are simple enough: for civilian leaders, to seek the best professional military advice while under no obligation to follow it; for military leaders, to provide candid counsel while recognizing civilians have the final say or, as James Mattis once observed, to insist on being heard and never insist on being obeyed. Ultimately, the key to healthy civil-military relations and civilian control of the military is the oath soldiers and statesmen share in common, to protect and defend the Constitution.

American Civil-Military Relations offers the first comprehensive assessment of the subject since the publication of Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. Using this seminal work as a point of departure, experts in the fields of political science, history, and sociology ask what has been learned and what more needs to be investigated in the relationship between civilian and military sectors in the 21st century. Leading scholars—such as Richard Betts, Risa Brooks, James Burk, Michael Desch, Peter Feaver, Richard Kohn, Williamson Murray, and David Segal—discuss key issues, including: • changes in officer education since the end of the Cold War • shifting conceptions of military expertise in response to evolving operational and strategic requirements • increased military involvement in high-level politics • the domestic and international contexts of U.S. civil-military relations. The first section of the book provides contrasting perspectives of American civil-military relations within the last five decades. The next section addresses Huntington’s conception of societal and functional imperatives and their influence on the civil-military relationship. Following sections examine relationships between military and civilian leaders and describe the norms and practices that should guide those interactions. What is clear from the essays in this volume is that the line between civil and military expertise and responsibility is not that sharply drawn, and perhaps given the increasing complexity of international security issues, it should not be. When forming national security policy, the editors conclude, civilian and military leaders need to maintain a respectful and engaged dialogue. Essential reading for those interested in civil-military relations, U.S. politics, and national security policy.

One of the central difficulties to a right understanding of American civil-military relations is the nature of the U.S. military. Are our armed forces just obedient bureaucracies like most of the Executive branch, or are they vocational professions granted significant autonomy and a unique role in these relationships because of their expert knowledge and their expertise to apply it in the defense of America? To large measure, the answer to this question should determine the behavior of the strategic leaders of these professions, including the uncommon behavior of public dissent. Using the "Revolt of the Generals" in 2006 as stimulus, the author develops from the study of military professions the critical trust relationships that should have informed their individual decisions to dissent. After doing so, he makes recommendations for the restoration of the professions' ethic in this critical area of behavior by the senior officers who are the professions' strategic leaders.

This book explores contemporary civil-military relations in the United States. Much of the canonical literature on civil-military relations was either written during or references the Cold War, while other major research focuses on the post-Cold War era, or the first decade of the twenty-first century. A great deal has changed since then. This book considers the implications for civil-military relations of many of these changes. Specifically, it focuses on factors such as breakdowns in democratic and civil-military norms and conventions; intensifying partisanship and deepening political divisions in American society; as well as new technology and the evolving character of armed conflict. Chapters are organized around the principal actors in civil-military relations, and the book includes sections on the military, civilian leadership, and the public. It explores the roles and obligations of each. The book also examines how changes in contemporary armed conflict influence civil-military relations. Chapters in this section examine the cyber domain, grey zone operations, asymmetric warfare and emerging technology. The book thus brings the study of civil-military relations into the contemporary era, in which new geopolitical realities and the changing character of armed conflict combine with domestic political tensions to test, if not potentially redefine, those relations.

This book identifies three issues that confront civil-military relations to this day: how to judge the political consequences of military conduct, how to solve problems of international relations while using less force, and how to strengthen civilian control of the military while preserving professional military autonomy.