Addressing the interaction between military operations and the activities of civilian government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during and after conflict, this study traces the development of civil military operations from their origin during World War II as Civil Affairs and military government to the present array of civil military operations. In so doing, it looks closely at the recent cases of Panama, Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Kurdish rescue mission in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Of particular interest is the book's integration of national policy, strategy, and operations as it looks at the interplay between combat operations and their civil, military and political consequences. The outcome of the operations considered here suggests a need to look at the organization and planning of military forces in contemporary conflict as well as the integration of nonmilitary players into the game from the start of operations. The author concludes that the essence of modern conflict can be found in civil military operations.

This report examines the Army's role in the Third World from a doctrinal perspective. Specifically, the report looks at the development of Army doctrine relevant to MOSW (military operations short of war) and NCO (non-combat operations) and how doctrinal treatment of nonconventional operations affects the Army's capabilities in low-intensity conflict (LIC) environments in developing countries. It considers the relative status of nonconventional operations to Army operations as a whole; the projected post-Cold War increase in Army combat and noncombat missions in nonconventional environments; and the broader issue of the Army's mission within the evolving post-Cold War peacetime strategy. The study also examines LIC doctrine and the overall utility of LIC as a concept, and compares the doctrine with new and renascent doctrinal concepts relevant to operations in LIC. The report concludes that progress toward a workable, integrated LIC doctrine has been slow, but it is occurring. Doctrinal manuals currently in draft should be published without fundamental changes, enabling the Army to move toward a better doctrine for guiding its efforts in this area. It also concludes that the Army cannot continue to maintain its focus on conventional conflict as the primary ingredient of success to the exclusion of nonconventional capabilities. For the U.S. military to play a successful supporting role in peacetime or in conflict, whether through training of international military students, civil affairs, or various forms of civic action, U.S. troops themselves must be adequately versed in the precepts of internal defense and development, LIC and sensitive political environments, civil-military relations, and respect for human rights. More attention must therefore be paid to the training and preparation of U.S. troops sent to LIC environments as advisors, instructors, or less probably, combatants. (1 table, 3 figures, 47 refs.).

This report examines the development of Army doctrine relevant to military operations short of war and noncombat operations and how doctrinal treatment of nonconventional operations affects the Army's capabilities in low intensity conflict (LIC) environments. The report concludes that progress toward a workable, integrated LIC doctrine has been slow, but is occurring. Doctrinal manuals currently in draft should be published without fundamental changes, enabling the Army to move toward a better doctrine for guiding its efforts in this area. It also concludes that the Army cannot continue to maintain its focus on conventional conflict as the primary ingredient of success to the exclusion of nonconventional capabilities. For the U.S. military to play a successful supporting role in peacetime or in conflict--whether through training of international military students, civil affairs, or various forms of civic action--U.S. troops themselves must be adequately versed in the precepts of internal defense and development, LIC and sensitive political environments, civil-military relations, and respect for human rights.

On November 30, 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry testified before the House International Relations and National Security committees on the commitment of U.S. ground forces to the Former Yugoslavia. The commitment, crafted in Dayton, Ohio, had been avoided for some 4 years. Perry carefully discussed the mission, rules of engagement, and exit strategy for U.S. forces. Perry explained the rationale for the deployment an opportunity to end the bloody conflict, further American interests in the region, and prevent the spread of the war to neighboring nations. He clearly defined the mission of the Implementation Force (IFOR) as "to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement."

In November 1997, the United States Army War College joined with the U.S. Southern Command, the Inter-American Defense Board, the National Guard Bureau, and the Latin American Consortium of the University of New Mexico and New Mexico State University to cosponsor a conference entitled .The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century.. The meeting was held from 3 to 6 November in Santa Fé, New Mexico, and was hosted by the New Mexico National Guard. The conference brought together over 150 prominent civilian governmental and military leaders and some of the most noted scholars from throughout the Americas. It was designed to support the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command's objectives of strengthening democratic institutions, assisting nations in eliminating threats to their security, supporting economic and social progress, and enhancing military professionalism. In addition, the meeting sought to promote the Army Chief of Staff.s goals of conflict prevention through peacetime engagement, strategic outreach to organizations and institutions outside the Department of Defense, and the enhancement of Active and Reserve component integration. Included in this publication are the papers and speeches delivered at the conference, rapporteurs-synopses of the working group discussions and an analysis, with recommendations, of the implications for civil-military relations and U.S. policy. These presentations, the level and scope of participation, the candor of the dialogue, the outstanding support provided by our cosponsors, and the charming atmosphere of Santa Fé all contributed to making the meeting a success. The U.S. Army War College extends sincere appreciation to General Charles E. Wilhelm, the Commander-in- Chief, U.S. Southern Command, and to Major General John C. Thompson, Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, and their staffs for the leadership and financial support that made the conference possible. We also recognize Lieutenant General Edward D. Baca, Chief of the National Guard Bureau; Major General William A. Navas, Jr., Director of the Army National Guard; the Adjutants General of New Mexico and Utah, and their outstanding soldiers who provided the crucial escort, logistical and interpretation support. The conference represented a joint military-civilian effort. The Governor of New Mexico, the Honorable Gary E. Johnson; his Chief of Staff, Mr. Lou Gallegos; the Santa Fé County Commission, and the City of Santa Fé permitted use of their facilities and ensured gracious hospitality during our stay in their beautiful state and city. Last, but not least, we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Gilbert Merkx, Mr. Theo Crevenna, Dr. José García and Ms. Vicki Madrid Nelson, from the University of New Mexico-New Mexico State University Latin American Studies Consortium for their assistance in organizing, coordinating and administering the conference. Without their help, this endeavor could not have been undertaken. Our mutual goals as neighbors in this hemisphere are to promote democracy, preserve the peace, and provide for our nations. common security in the 21st century. We hope this conference will be but one step on the path toward those objectives.