This monograph analyzes the political impact of the rapidly growing economic relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan and evaluates the prospects for Beijing to exploit that expanding economic relationship to employ economic coercion against Taiwan. It also identifies China's goals for applying economic pressure against Taiwan. To establish a framework for evaluating China's relative success or failure in using economic coercion against Taiwan, this work draws upon the conclusions of the large and empirically rich body of studies of economic diplomacy that have focused on economic coercion and trade sanctions. A large portion of this monograph is devoted to evaluating the cross-strait economic relationship and Taiwan's potential economic vulnerability to Chinese efforts to cut off or disrupt key aspects of that relationship. But this document also extensively analyzes the challenges that China has faced in its efforts to convert this raw, potential economic influence into effective political leverage.

This article examines the ways China employs economic coercion to influence Taiwan, and the limitations of these tactics in influencing Taiwan’s domestic politics. Although there is ample research conducted on the broader theme of Cross-Strait relations, there have been fewer attempts at analyzing the variety of ways China uses economic coercion to impact Taiwan’s domestic politics. China’s growth in the past several decades has resulted in China becoming a dominant power in the global economic sphere. Meanwhile, it has become Taiwan’s largest trading partner. While there are a variety of tools China has employed, they have ultimately been met with limited success, as Taiwan has responded both proactively and reactively to mitigate vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the deepening of Taiwanese democracy and identity further exemplifies the weakness of China’s attempts to bring Taiwan within the sphere of direct influence, and public opinion continues to favor maintaining the status quo over reunification.

Introduction -- Techniques of statecraft -- What is economic statecraft? -- Thinking about economic statecraft -- Economic statecraft in international thought -- Bargaining with economic statecraft -- National power and economic statecraft -- "Classic cases" reconsidered -- Foreign trade -- Foreign aid -- The legality and morality of economic statecraft -- Conclusion -- Afterword : economic statecraft : continuity and change / Ethan B. Kapstein.

Despite apparently consistent statements in 4 decades, the U.S. ¿one China¿ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ¿one China¿ policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. Contents of this report: (1) U.S. Policy on ¿One China¿: Has U.S. Policy Changed?; Overview of Policy Issues; (2) Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: Statements During the Admin. of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama. A print on demand report.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

Since the early 1980s, the cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and mainland China has exploded, driven by economic and political reforms. As a result, each would suffer great economic pain and dislocation in the event of a major disruption in that rapidly growing economic relationship. This monograph analyzes the political impact of that relationship and evaluates the prospects for Beijing to exploit it by employing economic coercion against Taiwan.

How globalized information networks can be used for strategic advantage Until recently, globalization was viewed, on balance, as an inherently good thing that would benefit people and societies nearly everywhere. Now there is growing concern that some countries will use their position in globalized networks to gain undue influence over other societies through their dominance of information and financial networks, a concept known as "weaponized interdependence." In exploring the conditions under which China, Russia, and the United States might be expected to weaponize control of information and manipulate the global economy, the contributors to this volume challenge scholars and practitioners to think differently about foreign economic policy, national security, and statecraft for the twenty-first century. The book addresses such questions as: What areas of the global economy are most vulnerable to unilateral control of information and financial networks? How sustainable is the use of weaponized interdependence? What are the possible responses from targeted actors? And how sustainable is the open global economy if weaponized interdependence becomes a default tool for managing international relations?