Complaint systems have existed in China for many years, and in 2004, a debate took place in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the Letters and Visits System (xinfang zhidu), which was designed to allow people to register complaints with the upper levels of the government. However, both parties generally overlooked several different complaint systems that had preceded the Letters and Visits System during China’s history. Indeed, despite the rich heritage of numerous complaint systems throughout China’s past, most studies of complaint systems in China have paid little attention to the origins, development, practices, impact, and nature of similar institutions in the longue durée of Chinese history. Presenting a comprehensive study of complaint systems in Chinese history from early times to the present, this important book fills the gap in existing literature on complaint systems in China. Drawing on primary sources, Qiang Fang analyses the significance of continuities and changes in historical complaint systems for contemporary China, where the state continues to be nominally strong, but actually fragile. Unlike other major theories of popular resistance to the state in China, such as ‘everyday resistance’, ‘rightful resistance’ and resistance ‘as legal rights’, this book develops the theory that behind Chinese complaint systems, there was a mentality of ‘natural resistance’ that has been deeply embedded in Chinese culture, political philosophy, and folk religion for millennia. Given this history, Fang concludes that it is likely that some form of complaint system will continue to exist, and by helping to mitigate the increasing demands of the Chinese state on the Chinese, will serve to strengthen the state. An essential contribution understanding the strengths, weaknesses, and various roles of the Letters and Visits System in contemporary China, as well as the systems that have preceded it throughout China’s long history, this book will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Chinese history, politics and law.

The dissertation analyzes what we may call the Chinese complaint systems. In the People's Republic of China today, the systems usually go under the name of shangfang (literally "going up to visit"). Since the 1990s, these systems have been a hot topic in the Chinese public media and discussion. In the early twentieth century, there was a national debate on whether to preserve the Mail and Visit system in the PRC. But most scholarship focuses mainly on the systems in contemporary China and pays little attention to complaint systems in earlier periods of Chinese history. But, only after we know the development and role of the complaint systems in Chinese history can we better solve the debate and problems in the current PRC complaint systems. Through a comprehensive historical study, I find that the Chinese complaint systems started informally in the Zhou period (about 1029-256BCE). From the Jin (265-420CE) and especially from the Tang (618-907), several complaint systems gradually became a part of the formal judicial system. In the 20 th century, as a clear distinction between criminal and civil law appeared, various complaint systems developed more or less independently of the rest of the judicial system. In the early PRC, such a distinction between judicial and complaint system blurred. More recently, as part of the effort to enhance the rule of law, the complaint systems have become more distinct from the rest of judicial system. While this is to some extent a return to the Republican period, it is not a complete return and there are echoes of how the systems worked in earlier periods.

Despite the rich heritage of numerous complaint systems in Chinese history, most Western as well as Chinese studies of one or more complaint systems in the PRC and earlier periods have paid little systematic attention to the origins, development, practices, impact, and nature of similar institutions in the longue durée of Chinese history. This book fills this gap, providing the reader with a comprehensive study of complaint systems in Chinese history from early times to the present. As such it will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Chinese history, politics and law.

This book offers a socio-legal exploration of localised consumer complaint processing and dispute resolution in the People's Republic of China – now the second largest consumer market in the world – and the experiences of both ordinary and 'professional' consumers. Drawing on detailed analysis of an impressive body of empirical data, this book highlights local Chinese understandings and practice styles of 'mediation', and identifies in popular consciousness a continuing sense of reliance on the government for securing consumer rights in China. These are not only important features of consumer dispute processing in themselves, but also help to to explain why no ombudsman system has emerged. This innovative book looks at the nature of China's distinctive dispute resolution and complaints system, issues within that system, and the experiences of consumers within it. The book illustrates the access to justice processes locally available to aggrieved consumers and provides a unique contribution to comparative consumer law studies in Asia and elsewhere.

This book develops an informational theory to account for the coexistence of China’s exceptionally resilient authoritarianism and its high decentralization. The nuanced information contained in citizens’ complaints, which are filed through the petition system, helps to sustain China’s decentralized authoritarianism in three important ways. First, petitions help to alleviate the information asymmetry problem that arises when the central government has less information than lower level governments do. When studying citizens’ petitions, higher level governments can obtain valuable and accurate information about local officials’ performance in policy implementation, public goods provision, and corruption. Higher level governments need this information in order to effectively utilize the cadre management system to reward good performance and punish malpractice. The result of this interaction is the PRC’s relatively high quality of governance and effective control of local officials. There is also a second way in which citizens’ petitions help the government to overcome the dictator’s dilemma that arises when an authoritarian regime is uncertain about how much support it really enjoys among its citizens. Citizens’ specific grievances are revealed in these petitions and are mostly addressed in their beginning stages. When citizens’ complaints are rooted in central policy, they set the agenda for policy change in order to maintain social order. There is yet a third benefit conferred upon the PRC by the petition system. Thanks to the petition system, the central government can present itself as the ally of citizens when it addresses the matters raised by their petitions. As a result, the petition system grants the central government an opportunity to hold local officials accountable, scapegoat local authorities, divide citizens and local officials, and justly claim all the credit when its policies succeed. This helps to build citizens’ trust in their central government and reinforces its legitimacy in their eyes. In Huntington’s terms, the Chinese Communist Party institutionalizes mass support by addressing citizens’ grievances expressed through the channel of communication provided by the petition system. In this sense, the complaints of citizens can be very useful tools for regime maintenance. The author substantiates these points with case studies and statistical analysis.