This book is an edited volume about China-ASEAN relations with contributions from experts based in China and Singapore. The book includes a few excellent papers that were presented at a conference the editor organized in October 2009 and also two other research papers. They examine China-ASEAN relations from a sub-regional cooperation perspective. The book discusses and analyzes China-ASEAN cooperation in the Greater Mekong River Sub-region (GMS), the emerging Pan-Beibu economic zone, ASEAN's growth triangles, and the hydraulic power sector, as well as China-ASEAN economic relations in the wake of the financial crisis. They carefully review the progresses that have been achieved, examine new policy proposals that have been put forth, and explore problems that exist in all these sub-regional cooperation schemes between China and ASEAN.

Differentiated cooperation and GMS cooperation provide a theoretical model and practical example to coordinate the relationship and to promote economic and political cooperation between large and small states for the purpose of economic, political, and social development on the national, regional, and international stages.

Transnational economic integration has been described by globalization boosters as a rising tide that will lift all boats, an opportunity for all participants to achieve greater prosperity through a combination of political cooperation and capitalist economic competition. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has championed such rhetoric in promoting the integration of China, Southeast Asia’s formerly socialist states, and Thailand into a regional project called the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). But while the GMS project is in fact hastening regional economic integration, Jim Glassman shows that the approach belies the ADB’s idealized description of "win-win" outcomes. The process of "actually existing globalization" in the GMS does provide varied opportunities for different actors, but it is less a rising tide that lifts all boats than an uneven flood of transnational capitalist development whose outcomes are determined by intense class struggles, market competition, and regulatory battles. Glassman makes the case for adopting a class-based approach to analysis of GMS development, regionalization, and actually existing globalization. First he analyzes the interests and actions of various Thai participants in GMS development, then the roles of different Chinese actors in GMS integration. He next provides two cases illustrating the serious limits of any notion that GMS integration is a relatively egalitarian process—Laos’ participation in GMS development and the role of migrant Burmese workers in the production of the GMS. He finds that Burmese migrant workers, dam-displaced Chinese and Laotian villagers, and economically-stressed Thai farmers and small businesses are relative "losers" compared to the powerful business interests that shape GMS integration from locations like Bangkok and Kunming, as well as key sites outside the GMS like Beijing, Singapore, and Tokyo. The final chapter blends geographical-historical analysis with an assessment of uneven development and actually existing globalization in the GMS. Cogent and persuasive, Bounding the Mekong will attract attention from the growing number of scholars analyzing globalization, neoliberalism, regionalization, and multiple scales of governance. It is suitable for graduate courses in geography, political science, and sociology as well as courses with a regional focus.

This book evaluates China’s relations with sub-regional Southeast Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation framework. The book looks at domestic drivers and regional receptivity of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and also delves into the challenges of China’s engagement in the Greater Mekong Sub-region. The book examines how China’s BRI will contribute to the development of these countries, to regional economic integration and cooperation processes within a political-economic context. It addresses the BRI process within the GMS on three levels: regional, individual recipient countries and the Chinese perspective. The case studies in the book will help to provide insights on China’s growing economic influence in sub-regional Southeast Asia and its Belt and Road Initiative. This book will appeal to researchers interested in the BRI, China's relations with Southeast Asia and China’s neighbourhood policy and how domestic considerations are influencing China’s policy making.

This book examines the strategic interactions among China, the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asian States in the context of China’s rise and globalization after the cold war. Engaging the mainstream theoretical debates in international relations, the author introduces a new theoretical framework—institutional realism—to explain the institutionalization of world politics in the Asia-Pacific after the cold war. Institutional realism suggests that deepening economic interdependence creates a condition under which states are more likely to conduct a new balancing strategy—institutional balancing, i.e., countering pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions—to pursue security under anarchy. To test the validity of institutional realism, Kai He examines the foreign policies of the U.S., Japan, the ASEAN states, and China toward four major multilateral institutions, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and East Asian Summit (EAS). Challenging the popular pessimistic view regarding China’s rise, the book concludes that economic interdependence and structural constraints may well soften the "dragon’s teeth." China’s rise does not mean a dark future for the region. Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacificwill be of great interest to policy makers and scholars of Asian security, international relations, Chinese foreign policy, and U.S. foreign policy.

A timely look at the impact of China's booming emergence on the countries of Southeast Asia Today, Southeast Asia stands uniquely exposed to the waxing power of the new China. Three of its nations border China and five are directly impacted by its claims over the South China Sea. All dwell in the lengthening shadow of its influence: economic, political, military, and cultural. As China seeks to restore its former status as Asia's preeminent power, the countries of Southeast Asia face an increasingly stark choice: flourish within Beijing's orbit or languish outside of it. Meanwhile, as rival powers including the United States take concerted action to curb Chinese ambitions, the region has emerged as an arena of heated strategic competition. Drawing on more than a decade of on-the-ground experience, Sebastian Strangio explores the impacts of China's rise on Southeast Asia, the varied ways in which the countries of the region are responding, and what it might mean for the future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

The economic corridor approach was adopted by the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries in 1998 to help accelerate subregional development. The development of economic corridors links production, trade, and infrastructure within a specific geographic area. The review of these corridors was conducted to take into account the opening up of Myanmar and ensure that there is a close match between corridor routes and trade flows; GMS capitals and major urban centers are connected to each other; and the corridors are linked with maritime gateways. The review came up with recommendations for possible extension and/or realignment of the corridors, and adoption of a classification system for corridor development. The GMS Ministers endorsed the recommendations of the study at the 21st GMS Ministerial Conference in Thailand in 2016.