China’s growth potential has become a hotly debated topic as the economy has reached an income level susceptible to the “middle-income trap” and financial vulnerabilities are mounting after years of rapid credit expansion. However, the existing literature has largely focused on macro level aggregates, which are ill suited to understanding China’s significant structural transformation and its impact on economic growth. To fill the gap, this paper takes a deep dive into China’s convergence progress in 38 industrial sectors and 11 services sectors, examines past sectoral transitions, and predicts future shifts. We find that China’s productivity convergence remains at an early stage, with the industrial sector more advanced than services. Large variations exist among subsectors, with high-tech industrial sectors, in particular the ICT sector, lagging low-tech sectors. Going forward, ample room remains for further convergence, but the shrinking distance to the frontier, the structural shift from industry to services, and demographic changes will put sustained downward pressure on growth, which could slow to 5 percent by 2025 and 4 percent by 2030. Digitalization, SOE reform, and services sector opening up could be three major forces boosting future growth, while the risks of a financial crisis and a reversal in global integration in trade and technology could slow the pace of convergence.

"China’s growth potential has become a hotly debated topic as the economy has reached an income level susceptible to the “middle-income trap” and financial vulnerabilities are mounting after years of rapid credit expansion. However, the existing literature has largely focused on macro level aggregates, which are ill suited to understanding China’s significant structural transformation and its impact on economic growth. To fill the gap, this paper takes a deep dive into China’s convergence progress in 38 industrial sectors and 11 services sectors, examines past sectoral transitions, and predicts future shifts. The authors find that China’s productivity convergence remains at an early stage, with the industrial sector more advanced than services. Large variations exist among subsectors, with high-tech industrial sectors, in particular the ICT sector, lagging low-tech sectors. Going forward, ample room remains for further convergence, but the shrinking distance to the frontier, the structural shift from industry to services, and demographic changes will put sustained downward pressure on growth, which could slow to 5 percent by 2025 and 4 percent by 2030. Digitalization, SOE reform, and services sector opening up could be three major forces boosting future growth, while the risks of a financial crisis and a reversal in global integration in trade and technology could slow the pace of convergence."--Abstract.

After impressive growth of about 10% per annum for three decades, China's visible signs of economic slowdown since 2008 have been subject to much contention. What causes the deceleration? What should we expect in an era of China's 6% growth? This book answers these questions in three parts. Although it is widely accepted that China can hardly continue its high-speed growth model, estimations for its future growth potential differ greatly. The first part of this book predicts China's growth to 2050, which considers both cross-country historical experiences and China's own demographic structure and employment participation features. In the second part, the book offers a comprehensive estimation of China's national and provincial total factor productivity (TFP) over the period of 1978 to 2014 based on comparable data. It then analyzes the causes of China's economic slowdown from a productivity point of view. Finally, this book correspondingly outlines policy recommendations, including supply-side structural reform and macroeconomic policy frameworks, to effectively address the issue of decline in both labor and labor productivity growth. This book will attract scholars and students of economics and China's economic studies.

"China's growth potential has become a hotly debated topic as the economy has reached an income level susceptible to the "middle-income trap" and financial vulnerabilities are mounting after years of rapid credit expansion. However, the existing literature has largely focused on macro level aggregates, which are ill suited to understanding China’s significant structural transformation and its impact on economic growth. To fill the gap, this paper takes a deep dive into China’s convergence progress in 38 industrial sectors and 11 services sectors, examines past sectoral transitions, and predicts future shifts. The authors find that China’s productivity convergence remains at an early stage, with the industrial sector more advanced than services. Large variations exist among subsectors, with high-tech industrial sectors, in particular the ICT sector, lagging low-tech sectors. Going forward, ample room remains for further convergence, but the shrinking distance to the frontier, the structural shift from industry to services, and demographic changes will put sustained downward pressure on growth, which could slow to 5 percent by 2025 and 4 percent by 2030. Digitalization, SOE reform, and services sector opening up could be three major forces boosting future growth, while the risks of a financial crisis and a reversal in global integration in trade and technology could slow the pace of convergence."--Abstract.

Although China's economy has grown very rapidly in recent decades, there are still very large differences between the economy of mainland China and the economies of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. For example, per capita income in Hong Kong is many, many times higher than per capita income in mainland China. This book considers the degree to which economic convergence between mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan has occurred, and the prospects for increased convergence in the future. It considers economic integration between China and its two Special Administrative Regions (SARS), emphasising the large volume of capital flows and exports, especially from Hong Kong into China, and showing that the economies are highly integrated, despites their differences. It examines income convergence, and changes in productivity, using the same measures for both China and the two SARS, unlike most existing studies. It explores how economic reforms have been crucial to increasing convergence so far, and will continue to be in the future, and concludes by discussing the implications for policy of encouraging increased convergence.