Before 2000, roughly 96% of China’s energy demands were met domestically. Since 2001, however, this position of near self-reliance has changed. With steadily increasing demands, China’s need for foreign energy has grown. Today, China is the world’s biggest energy consumer and emitter of greenhouse gases. Building upon the first volume, which examined China’s energy plans, this book will examine the strategies China has taken to meet its burgeoning energy demands, continue its fast-paced economic growth and also address the mounting concerns about environmental welfare and the true cost of China’s development. With new chapters addressing international agreements, the so-called “China energy threat” and the Belt and Road Initiative, this volume will continue to discuss and interpret both domestic policies and China’s international role. 香港城市大學出版社出版。 Published by City University of Hong Kong Press.

A Brookings Institution Press and Global Public Policy Institute publication The global market for oil and gas resources is rapidly changing. Three major trends—the rise of new consumers, the increasing influence of state players, and concerns about climate change—are combining to challenge existing regulatory structures, many of which have been in place for a half-century. Global Energy Governance analyzes the energy market from an institutionalist perspective and offers practical policy recommendations to deal with these new challenges. Much of the existing discourse on energy governance deals with hard security issues but neglects the challenges to global governance. Global Energy Governance fills this gap with perspectives on how regulatory institutions can ensure reliable sources of energy, evaluate financial risk, and provide emergency response mechanisms to deal with interruptions in supply. The authors bring together decisionmakers from industry, government, and civil society in order to address two central questions: •What are the current practices of existing institutions governing global oil and gas on financial markets? •How do these institutions need to adapt in order to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century? The resulting governance-oriented analysis of the three interlocking trends also provides the basis for policy recommendations to improve global regulation. Contributors include Thorsten Benner, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; William Blyth, Chatham House, Royal Institute for International Affairs, London; Albert Bressand, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Dick de Jong, Clingendael International Energy Programme; Ralf Dickel, Energy Charter Secretariat; Andreas Goldthau, Central European University, Budapest, and Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Enno Harks, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Wade Hoxtell, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Hillard Huntington, Energy Modeling Forum, Stanford University; Christine Jojarth, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University; Frederic Kalinke, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University; Wilfrid L. Kohl, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Jamie Manzer, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Amy Myers Jaffe, James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University; Yulia Selivanova, Energy Charter Secretariat; Tom Smeenk, Clingendael International Energy Programme; Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University; Ronald Soligo, Rice University; Joseph A. Stanislaw, Deloitte LLP and The JAStanislaw Group, LLC; Coby van der Linde, Clingendael International Energy Programme; Jan Martin Witte, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin; Simonetta Zarrilli, Division on International Trade and Commodities, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China’s turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China’s potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China’s maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China’s history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China’s current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China’s past as it relates to threats to the country’s internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.

One of Chinese president Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy programs is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a web of infrastructure development plans designed to increase Eurasian economic integration. Chinese official rhetoric on the BRI focuses on its economic promise and progress, often in altruistic terms: all countries have been invited to board this "express train" to wealth and prosperity. Missing from the rhetoric is much discussion of the initiative's security dimensions and implications. Chinese officials avoid describing the strategic benefits they think the BRI could produce, while also gliding over major security risks and concerns. Yet at the unofficial level, China's security community has paid close attention to these issues, probing in great depth the gains Beijing can expect, the challenges it will face, and the new demands it will have to satisfy. Understanding those Chinese assessments is helpful as the United States considers how, when, and in what capacity to engage the BRI.

The United States and China are the world's top two energy consumers and, as of 2010, the two largest economies. Consequently, they have a decisive role to play in the world's clean energy future. Both countries are also motivated by related goals, namely diversified energy portfolios, job creation, energy security, and pollution reduction, making renewable energy development an important strategy with wide-ranging implications. Given the size of their energy markets, any substantial progress the two countries make in advancing use of renewable energy will provide global benefits, in terms of enhanced technological understanding, reduced costs through expanded deployment, and reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to conventional generation from fossil fuels. Within this context, the U.S. National Academies, in collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), reviewed renewable energy development and deployment in the two countries, to highlight prospects for collaboration across the research to deployment chain and to suggest strategies which would promote more rapid and economical attainment of renewable energy goals. Main findings and concerning renewable resource assessments, technology development, environmental impacts, market infrastructure, among others, are presented. Specific recommendations have been limited to those judged to be most likely to accelerate the pace of deployment, increase cost-competitiveness, or shape the future market for renewable energy. The recommendations presented here are also pragmatic and achievable.

Whilst China’s growing economy is widely regarded as being responsible for severe environmental degradation and a high reliance on energy from fossil fuels, China is emerging as a potential leader in new green energy technologies. Outlining the extraordinary growth in China’s wind power capacity since 2005, this book explores the deliberate creation of a whole industry and the strategy of transitioning the power sector to renewable energy by accelerated experimentation and through literally pushing the emerging wind power sector to its limits. Investigating how wind power may not always be considered as sustainable in a wider Chinese developmental context, the book traces the struggle China has had in getting this high technology sector to qualify as truly Chinese scientific development, whilst often being opaquely at the mercy of foreign expertise, technology, and certification. The book furthermore exposes the surprising nuances, dynamics, and potency of unexpected players in Chinese wind power marketisation. Complex interplays are revealed between wind turbine control systems, algorithms in critical software technology, relationships between suppliers, wind farm developers, financiers, the electrical grid itself, the coal lobby, the broader Chinese state, and much more. The book has important implications far beyond wind power and contemporary China studies, highlighting the much wider story of China’s fragmented and experimental style of innovating, upgrading, and greening.