Preliminary Material -- War Spreads to the Far East -- Japan Bids for Supremacy in China -- Yuan Shih-ka'i Aspires to be Emperor -- European Containment -- American Compromise -- China Enters the War -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- Harvard East Asian Monographs.

This study of World War I diplomacy concerning China covers in detail the outbreak of the war in the Far East; China's attempt to join the allies in 1915; the secret agreements during 1917 between Japan and Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia; and later negotiations relative to China's entry into the war.

US-China Relations in the 21st Century addresses the bilateral relations of these two nations on an international, domestic, societal and individual level between 1990 and 2005. Peaceful power shifts remain a central dilemma in world politics, since historically power transition from a dominant nation to a challenger has been associated with international wars. This book examines whether China and the US can learn from history and manage a potential power transition peacefully. Zhiqun Zhu selects two important cases of power transitions in history as the background for this study: power rivalry between Great Britain and Germany that led to the First World War the peaceful power transition from Great Britain to the United States. US-China Relations in the 21st Century contributes to the current International Relations theory by proposing a new analytical model on global power transition and providing recommendations for peacefully handling a potential power transition from the US to China in the future. This original and comprehensive study is essential reading for scholars of US and Chinese foreign policy, world politics and international relations.

SHORTLISTED FOR THE 2018 WOLFSON HISTORY PRIZE The extraordinary and essential story of how China became the powerful country it is today. Even at the high noon of Europe's empires China managed to be one of the handful of countries not to succumb. Invaded, humiliated and looted, China nonetheless kept its sovereignty. Robert Bickers' major new book is the first to describe fully what has proved to be one of the modern era's most important stories: the long, often agonising process by which the Chinese had by the end of the 20th century regained control of their own country. Out of China uses a brilliant array of unusual, strange and vivid sources to recreate a now fantastically remote world: the corrupt, lurid modernity of pre-War Shanghai, the often tiny patches of 'extra-territorial' land controlled by European powers (one of which, unnoticed, had mostly toppled into a river), the entrepôts of Hong Kong and Macao, and the myriad means, through armed threats, technology and legal chicanery, by which China was kept subservient. Today Chinese nationalism stays firmly rooted in memories of its degraded past - the quest for self-sufficiency, a determination both to assert China's standing in the world and its outstanding territorial claims, and never to be vulnerable to renewed attack. History matters deeply to Beijing's current rulers - and Out of China explains why.

In the early nineteenth century China remained almost untouched by British and European powers - but as new technology started to change this balance, foreigners gathered like wolves around the weakening Qing Empire. Would the Chinese suffer the fate of much of the rest of the world, carved into pieces by Europeans? Or could they adapt rapidly enough to maintain their independence? This important and compelling book explains the roots of China's complex relationship with the West by illuminating a dramatic, colourful and sometimes shocking period of the country's history.

First Published in 1981. Contrary to Chairman Mao's assertion that political power comes from the barrel of a gun, this study contends that political power in China in the early 1920s emanated from the boardrooms of foreign banks. The author's interest in the way financial concerns have shaped foreign policy began with the discovery that the Lloyd George government attempted to influence the American government's policy on the British war debts by offering concessions concerning the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This study should provide understanding concerning the causes of Chinese bitterness as well as suggest the conflicts experienced by diplomats in balancing public and private interests.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.