Changing Rules of Delegation shows how institutional rules are constantly re-negotiated and may lead to a power-shift between the concerned actors. It particularly shows how the European Parliament has been able to shift the power balance in its own favour.

With forty well-structured and easy to follow topics to choose from, each workbook has a wide range of case studies, questions, and activities to meet both the individual or organization's training needs. Whether studying for an ILM qualification or looking to enhance the skills of your employees, 'Super Series' provides essential solutions, frameworks and techniques to support management and leadership development.

The majority of rules adopted at the EU level are not issued by democratically elected institutions, but rather by administrative bodies which are empowered to exercise rule-making powers by legislative acts. This book analyses the legal mechanism through which these powers are conferred on the most relevant bodies in the EU institutional landscape, namely the European Commission, the Council, the ECB and EU agencies, and the democratic controls in place to limit and oversee the exercise of these powers. Providing an overarching perspective of the delegation of powers, this book reflects on the notion of delegation and on the commonalities between the different forms of delegation identified. It focuses on the legal requirements and limits for the delegating act, the procedures for the exercise of such powers, the position of the acts in the hierarchy of norms, and their judicial review. Overcoming the fragmentation which characterized the development of the different forms of delegation in the EU, this analysis provides a clear, structured, and coherent picture of the legal framework for the delegation of powers in the light of the constitutional principles of this legal system. Academics and practitioners will equally appreciate this highly accessible addition to the current debate in legal scholarship of the delegation of powers in the EU, as well as its explanations on comitology and the empowerment of EU agencies.

Introduces a realistic approach to leading, managing, and growing your Agile team or organization. Written for current managers and developers moving into management, Appelo shares insights that are grounded in modern complex systems theory, reflecting the intense complexity of modern software development. Recognizes that today's organizations are living, networked systems; that you can't simply let them run themselves; and that management is primarily about people and relationships. Deepens your understanding of how organizations and Agile teams work, and gives you tools to solve your own problems. Identifies the most valuable elements of Agile management, and helps you improve each of them.

An overarching question of contemporary constitutionalism is whether equilibriums devised prior to the emergence of the modern administrative-industrial state can be preserved or recreated by means of fundamental law. The book approaches this problem indirectly, through the conceptual lens offered by constitutional developments relating to the adoption of normative limitations on the delegation of law-making authority. Three analytical strands (constitutional theory, constitutional history, and contemporary constitutional and administrative law) run through the argument. They merge into a broader account of the conceptual ramifications, the phenomenon, and the constitutional treatment of delegation in a number of paradigmatic legal systems. As it is argued, the development and failure of constitutional rules imposing limits on legislative delegation reveal the conditions for the possibility of classical limited government and, conversely, the erosion of normativity in contemporary constitutionalism.

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.